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The book reflects academically on important and relevant ethical fields from a 
multidimensional South African context. It wants to add academic-ethical value, 
locally and globally, with its different points of departure deeply embedded in 
justice. From a mainly qualitative methodological perspective, this scholarly 
book demonstrates that ethics requires analytical, thinking and critical people 
who in an existentially and emancipatory way can help make the world a more 
just, decent and humane place in which to live. The co-authors who represent 
different academic and cultural backgrounds, present in respective chapters 
their research systematically, intersectionally and constructivistically, based on 
profound theoretical analysis and reasoning. This epistemology results in an act 
of knowing that actively gives meaning and order to the reality to which it is 
responding. By doing this, they point out that people are in an ongoing process 
of becoming more human – allowing ourselves and our fellow human beings to 
flourish, and to reach fuller potential through justice-based ethical reflection 
and action. The content of this collected work is innovative by addressing the 
shortage of academic books regarding these specific ethical fields and themes, 
grouped together in one volume. The fact that it is written from a diverse but 
inclusive South African perspective, enhances its richness. The book challenges 
conventional borders from different ethical, theological, philosophical, economic 
and cultural perspectives with insight and expertise. Its target audience is 
international scholars, peers, researchers and educators with an interest in ethics, 
especially the specific ethical fields covered in this book. I can confirm that all 
the chapters are based on original research and that no part of the book was 
plagiarised from another publication, or published elsewhere. 
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The right to interpret: 
Epistemic justice for 
women in South Africa





In August 2016, I attended a conference in Calgary and Victoria, 
Canada, on the topic of ‘Women, Rights, and Religion’.1 It was an 
amazingly diverse gathering with feminist theorists speaking on 
this fraught topic from within inter alia the following traditions: 
Hinduism in India; the Islamic community in Canada; Christianity in 
Vancouver; the Islamic tradition viewed historically; Islam in 
1. The organiser was Morny Joy, University Professor in the Department of Religious Studies at 
the University of Calgary, Canada, in collaboration with Paul Bramadat, Director of the Centre 
for Study in Religion and Society (CSRS) at the University of Victoria. Selected conference 
papers appeared in a special edition of the journal, Religious Studies and Theology (namely, 
volume 36, Issue number 2, 2017).
Chapter 1
How to cite: Du Toit, L., 2017, ‘The right to interpret: Epistemic justice for women in South 
Africa’, in C. Jones (ed.), Justice-based ethics: Challenging South African perspectives, 
pp. 3–28, AOSIS, Cape Town. https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2018.BK77.01
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Indonesia; Christian Pentecostalism in Nigeria; Judaism in Canada; 
the Zapatistas viewed as representative of a Mesoamerican 
decolonising perspective; Catholicism in the Philippines; different 
strands of Buddhism, including Tibetan and Thai Buddhism; and 
contemporary Christianity in Canada. What became clear from this 
comparative feminist exercise over the several days of the 
conference, is that women from diverse religious traditions – 
including ‘indigenous’ and ‘world’ religions or religions of the Book – 
are struggling for their right to participate in interpreting the 
authoritative meaning or meanings of these traditions from within.
Another important insight, which emerged strongly, is that the 
secular liberal democratic tradition with its emphasis on individual 
and universal human rights cannot, by any means, simply act as a 
neutral standard or an ideal for measuring and judging the levels 
of  respect or standing accorded to women within the different 
religious traditions. Jennifer Nedelsky’s Law’s Relations (2011) is just 
one recent example of a thorough feminist critique of the extent to 
which the liberal tradition systematically fails to protect women 
and children against male violence, specifically sexual violence.2 
This failure must at least partly be attributed to the relative exclusion 
by the liberal tradition of feminist input into its decisive hermeneutical 
moments. Examples of the latter would include, among other, high-
profile sexual violence trials, policy-making, interpretation and 
application. Furthermore, as Nedelsky (2011:213) makes clear, this 
‘private but systemic’ sexual violence, aimed at women and girls in 
the liberal state, maintains a situation of domination without any 
need for overt legislation. The typical sex laws of liberal states, she 
argues, ‘shape relations of power and responsibility between men 
and women by insulating men from legal accountability for violence’, 
especially for sexual violence perpetrated against women (Nedelsky 
2011:223). Put differently: ‘the cruelty of private sexual violence is 
not institutionalised, but a great deal of male impunity for that 
2. This critique leads to an exposure of the double standards and deception which often 
accompany dominant states’ justification of their military and other kinds of interference in 
states that they consider ‘insufficiently’ civilised referring to their inadequate women’s rights 
records such as in Afghanistan (see Stout 2001 for US First Lady Laura Bush’s call).
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violence is’ (Nedelsky 2011:228). Catharine MacKinnon (1994:15) 
puts the same problem starkly as follows: ‘[E]ach state’s lack of 
protection of women’s human rights is internationally protected, 
and that is called protecting state sovereignty.’ Another source 
of  feminist criticism of the mainstream rights-based tradition is 
The  Feminist Judgments Project, which saw feminist socio-legal 
scholars write alternative feminist judgments in a series of significant 
cases in English, Canadian and Australian law, among others,3 
showing that, also within the dominant sphere of Western rights-
based law, the most influential cases most often fail to include a 
feminist perspective. And, of course, there are many similarly critical 
voices coming from critical legal scholars (e.g. Douzinas 2007), 
Western feminists (e.g. MacKinnon 2007) and post-colonial scholars 
(e.g. Mamdani 1996), detailing the violent exclusions of the dominant 
liberal paradigm and human rights discourses more generally, that 
is, also racial and other forms of exclusion apart from the exclusion 
of feminist voices. The workshop importantly also drew attention 
to  the ways in which liberal Western patriarchy often overlaps, 
reinforces and collaborates with non-Western patriarchies for the 
sake of all kinds of shared power-political aims.
In spite of fascinating and detailed differences between these 
different struggles in different corners of the globe, participants 
to the conference were finally struck by the structural similarities 
characterising the struggles of feminist women4 for interpretative 
3. Cf. https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/fjp/. These were compiled in Feminist Judgments: From 
theory to practice (Hunter, McGlynn & Rackley 2010). This is, of course, an example of 
immanent or internal critique, in other words, an exploration of how the liberal rights tradition 
may be employed to better serve women’s interests rather than a radical critique from the 
outside which would attack the foundational assumptions of the rights paradigm as such.
4. With the term feminist women I aim to pick out those women who habitually also ask 
about women’s welfare in their assessment of any social event, phenomenon, institution 
or situation – whatever other epistemological or political interests they might additionally 
have. Moreover, while I view the commitment to highlight women’s welfare as an essentially 
political commitment, which anyone may in principle hold, in my experience, such roles are 
routinely, although not exclusively, played by persons who are also women. I agree that the 
term ‘feminist women’ should get quotation marks, but it should not also be italicised on top 
of that. 
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impact within the traditions to which they belong. These 
similarities seem to hold irrespective of whether these traditions 
are globally more dominant or more marginalised, more formally 
or informally organised, or even strictly speaking ‘religious’ or 
‘secular’. This common experience strongly suggested the 
importance of an often overlooked dimension of the basic human 
right to religious freedom. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UN 1948) reads:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance. (n.p.)
Thus, we see an emphasis on two important dimensions: firstly, 
of freedom to religion, that is, the freedom to publicly display 
and manifest one’s religious practices without prosecution; and 
secondly, of freedom from religion, that is, the individual freedom to 
change one’s religion or to leave religion altogether, in other words, 
freedom of individual conscience.5 I want to suggest that what 
is missing from this dominant, two-tiered understanding of religious 
freedom is a crucial third tier, namely the freedom of all members 
or adherents to participate equally and fully in the interpretation of 
their religions.6 This new freedom or right,7 which I link to the notion 
of hermeneutical justice, entails the acknowledgement that every 
5. These two main aspects of religious freedom are sometimes differentiated as freedom of 
religion (the collective right of a religious group to practice their faith openly) and freedom 
of worship (the right to individual freedom of conscience).
6. The Enlightenment tradition, characterised by the slogan of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’, 
acknowledges implicitly that, while liberty and equality are the supreme values of this 
tradition, there is an interpretive ‘fraternity’ or collective of autonomous, rational beings who 
will have to decide (dialogically, equally and freely) on what the values will mean in any given 
situation. The fact that the relevant community is initially conceptualised as a fraternity, 
of course speaks volumes about the exclusion of women from this tradition, even up until 
today, and would tie in with Nedelsky’s contemporary criticism of liberal dispensations with 
their high tolerance for systemic sexual violence perpetrated against women.
7. To be clear, this is proposed as a moral right and is nowhere yet recognised as a legal right, 
to the best of my knowledge.
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tradition demands ongoing interpretation and, in its very duration 
and survival, manifests as an unending internal struggle over 
contested interpretations. The new freedom also acknowledges 
that, in principle, equal participation in that interpretative struggle 
should somehow be protected or promoted. My proposed third tier 
of religious freedom thus represents an interesting combination 
of individual and communal rights by drawing attention to the 
mutual constitution and interdependence as well as ongoing 
tension between any adherent as individual and the authority of 
an overarching, enduring tradition. Such a right to interpretative 
participation in one’s own tradition also importantly acknowledges 
the encompassing life-shaping, world-creating force that faith and 
cultural traditions and liberal legal frames wield on the concrete 
possibilities for adherents’ lives. Clearly, this is a right that an adherent 
holds vis-à-vis her faith, cultural community or legal tradition. The 
absence of such a right must ideally have repercussions for how 
much legal recognition is granted to such a tradition and its wider 
claims; also by other neighbouring, competing or even overarching 
traditions or regimes.8
Historically, the right to religious and cultural freedom, as the 
other side of the coin of religious or cultural tolerance has focused 
largely on the first two aspects of that freedom as described 
above. It excluded the right to interpretative freedom and 
participation with at least two prominent effects: firstly, religions 
and cultures were seen as largely internally homogenous, 
bounded wholes or ‘black boxes’ to be protected mainly in some 
form of communal or collective right. This approach implicitly 
8. By overarching regime, I mean something like the co-existence in South Africa of indigenous 
and constitutional law. While the Constitution takes legal precedence over indigenous law, it 
is still the case that millions of women live their whole lives under indigenous or customary law 
without testing its compatibility with constitutional law. My suggestion is that constitutional 
and other lawyers should not only ask whether customary practices adhere to constitutional 
provisions or human rights standards, but also whether women enjoy hermeneutical justice 
or full participative interpretative freedom within their traditions and customs when deciding 
how much weight to give to cultural claims – most particularly those that pertain to women’s 
rights and freedoms. 
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treated religious traditions as essentially insular, whereby the 
currently dominant local elite male interpretations of their 
traditions were implicitly acknowledged as authoritative. In other 
words, by treating other, especially ‘minority’, traditions as black 
boxes, the internal dynamism, the plurality and contestation 
were all erased and the patriarchal and despotic tendencies 
within such traditions were stabilised and bolstered from the 
outside. Secondly, religious or cultural traditions were moreover 
viewed and treated as static, ahistorical and timeless horizons of 
meaning instead of always dynamically evolving in context 
through contestation from both within and without. Thus, the 
two aspects of the tradition of religious freedom itself were 
underpinned by a static, self-enclosed and seamless view of 
religious communities, and an implicit erasure of multiple, 
constitutive influences and relations between them. The right to 
freedom of worship, the second-tier individual right to leave or 
change one’s religion has thus implicitly been limited to making 
an individual choice between the separately existing black boxes 
of various traditions. What was pertinently left out from this 
picture was the right to interpret (within) one’s own tradition.
This is, to my mind, the strength of the kind of critical argument 
made by Okin in Okin et al. (1999) when she claims that 
‘multiculturalism’ or the liberal ‘tolerance’ of (minority) religious 
freedom and cultural autonomy tends to reinforce religious and 
cultural patriarchies, because the way in which the tolerance is 
framed tends to cement the religious and cultural authority of 
whichever internal subgroup happens to hold a monopoly on the 
interpretation of the relevant tradition. This kind of politics of 
religious freedom or cultural autonomy favours, reinforces and, 
indeed, often requires such a static and hypostatised understanding 
of religious or cultural tradition. One may thus argue that the 
political dimension of religious freedom and cultural tolerance in 
broad terms tends to reinforce fundamentalist, patriarchal and anti-
hermeneutical tendencies within traditions. The other side of the 
coin, and where I think Okin’s arguments are at their weakest, is to 
acknowledge the extent to which the liberal tradition itself has been 
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shaped by this liberal custom of supposed religious and cultural 
‘tolerance’. Its very tolerance towards what it portrays as ‘less 
civilised’ or ‘less developed’ cultures and traditions has had several 
aspects and effects: Firstly, it exaggerates and cements the patriarchal 
tendencies and forces in what would otherwise have been internally 
more diverse and more contested regimes. Secondly, it is telling 
that women’s sexuality and especially communal practices around 
this matter so often act as the privileged site of collective identity 
and as a marker either of ‘civilisation’ or of its opposite. By focusing 
on such gender practices as markers of collective difference, liberal 
tolerance paradoxically professes its concern for women’s social 
status and, on the other hand, undermines it in the same breath by 
‘tolerating’ cultural difference which is expressed through a certain 
treatment of women’s sexuality. Thus, different traditions’ gender 
practices are tolerated in ways that are inconceivable when it comes 
to more ‘important’ matters such as trade relations, notions of debt, 
credit or interest, land ownership, and so on. Third, all of these 
aspects of liberal tolerance taken together justifies its position of 
final authority vis-à-vis such minorities or traditions, portrayed as 
‘backward’ or ‘oppressive’, precisely to the extent that women are 
excluded from decisive hermeneutical moments. Fourth, the liberal 
regime thus sets itself up as essentially non-patriarchal or a beacon 
of women’s rights by comparison, from which it would draw its 
justification to interfere in other cultures, whether legally or illegally. 
Fifth, the extent to which women are still systematically oppressed 
under liberal regimes is thereby either denied or rationalised as last 
remnants of an unenlightened past, and thus not acknowledged as 
an enduring characteristic of the Enlightenment tradition itself. 
Sixth, another very unfortunate result of this pervasive idea of 
Western tolerance is that Western feminists and others remain 
blind to the different ways in which women in non-Western cultures 
do, in fact, participate in their traditions, exert their agency, and 
influence change by bringing novel interpretations to their cultural 
norms and practices.
I regard these broader, more political questions as too vast 
and complicated to fit the scope of my chapter. What I instead 
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propose to do now is to make the case for the central importance 
of the moral right to interpret one’s own tradition – the tradition 
to which one belongs, whether through birth or marriage, 
immigration or conversion and within which one’s life chances 
unfold. I thus refrain from further considering the spheres of state 
law and national politics for the sake of focus. I, moreover, use 
the term ‘tradition’ very broadly to mean every encompassing 
framework proposing to express and guide the life humans ought 
to live, inclusive of both religious and secular frameworks as well 
as hybrids of these (or traditions that do not clearly distinguish 




Audre Lorde already in 1984 said that ‘the master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde [1984] 2007:8), 
critiquing the failure of white feminists to listen to black feminists 
and, crucially, to allow black feminists’ different locations, 
perspectives and experiences to impact on the shaping of the 
feminist tradition.9 Patricia Hill Collins ([1990] 2000) and 
Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (1997) similarly discuss the exclusion of 
black and African women’s voices from knowledge production 
dominated by Western white feminists which lead to ideological 
distortions. Equally, with her books Epistemic Responsibility 
(1987), What Can She Know? (1991) and Ecological Thinking 
(2006), Lorraine Code, together with Sandra Harding with Whose 
science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women’s lives (1991), 
have been important writers who investigate over some decades 
issues surrounding what one may call ‘epistemic’ justice and 
injustice, especially in relation to women – lesbian and black 
9. The so-called ‘third wave’ moment in feminist thinking during the 1990s was about 
rectifying the race and class exclusivity which had characterised the movement up until then.
Chapter 1
11
women included. Taking all of these together, one may see that 
the notion of epistemic justice, as it pertains to women, has over 
the years received some attention. However, for the purposes of 
my argument here, I wish to focus on the 2007 book by Miranda 
Fricker, Epistemic injustice: Power & the ethics of knowing, linking 
her proposed theoretical framework to my argument that an 
aspect of the right to freedom of religion should importantly 
include one’s right to interpret one’s own tradition. Here and 
there I will supplement Fricker’s largely analytical argument with 
some insights drawn from other traditions, notably hermeneutics. 
Further, it is important to note that Fricker focuses on the ethics 
rather than the politics of knowing and yet still taking asymmetrical 
power relations into account. She thus tries to limit her 
investigation to questions of epistemic justice in situations of 
unequal power relations to the ethics of the situation, skirting in 
a sense the larger socio-political questions. This approach is 
aligned with my purpose of suspending the socio-political 
dimension of religious tolerance while trying to distil and 
substantiate a moral right to interpret one’s own tradition which 
is a right an individual adherent holds against her own community.
In her book, Fricker (2007:1) distinguishes broadly between 
two forms of epistemic injustice or an injustice done very 
specifically to someone in their capacity as a knower,10 namely 
‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’. Corresponding 
with these two forms of injustice, she evokes the notion of two 
virtues as correcting virtues unsurprisingly labelled the virtues of 
testimonial justice and hermeneutic justice respectively. Both 
these virtues spring from an awareness and vigilance about the 
ever-present danger of these forms of injustice in interpersonal 
communication.11 Delineating Fricker’s notion of epistemic 
10. Fricker (2007:1) thus limits epistemic injustice to cases where one is done an injustice in 
one’s capacity as a knower, distinguishing this type of injustice from more general questions 
around distributive justice such as access to education and information.
11. I am interested in the extent to which these virtues may translate into an ethics of listening 
and an ethics of reading, but will not pursue these matters further here.
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injustice and the personal harms it entails will serve my purpose 
of fleshing out, what I call, the moral right to interpret one’s own 
tradition.12
Testimonial injustice
Drawing on the similar projects of Edward Craig (1990) and 
Bernard Williams (2002) to construct a fictional State of Nature 
as thought experiment in order to characterise or identify our 
most basic epistemic needs, Fricker (2007:111) finds that these 
thinkers agree that accuracy and sincerity are the virtues 
necessary to be present in the speaker or informant in order to 
‘shore up the relations of epistemic trust that are needed for the 
practice of pooling information’ in this basic and simplest of 
human societies. For Williams, the ‘dispositions’ of accuracy and 
sincerity must be encouraged, promoted and inculcated in 
individuals in order for relations of epistemic trust to be properly 
stabilised over time (Fricker 2007:111). However, this is not 
sufficient for the creation of epistemic trust and the pooling of 
information, Fricker argues, because certain skills or dispositions 
are also required from the one who gathers the information; thus 
from the hearer in the communication situation. She notes that 
hearers may err in two extreme ways: being too gullible and 
being too incredulous. Therefore, this primitive society needs 
hearers to be ‘open to truths offered to them … without being 
credulous of testimony that is in fact false’ or insincere (Fricker 
2007:114). Put differently and even more succinctly: ‘Hearers 
need dispositions that lead them reliably to accept truths and 
reject falsehoods’ (Fricker 2007:115, [author’s added emphasis]).
12. I have already indicated that this injustice is one that affects women disproportionately, 
given the overt patriarchy infecting almost all cultural, religious and national constructs. In a 
2014 article, Carol Gilligan discusses the ‘moral injury’ inflicted upon young children through 
their patriarchal induction into gender scripts. It is telling that she sees patriarchal masculinity 
as damaging boys in their emotional capacities (culminating in an adult masculinity captured 
in the phrase I don’t care) and patriarchal femininity as stripping girls of their cognitive abilities 
(culminating in an adult femininity captured in the phrase I don’t know) (Gilligan 2014:95).
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Fricker states that in every exchange of information or every 
instance of communication the hearer needs to make some 
‘credibility judgement’ in order to avoid either accepting false 
information as true, that is, believing a potentially harmful lie or, 
otherwise, rejecting true information as false and thereby losing 
out on potentially important and useful information. Because 
humans live in groups naturally, and because different groups 
may either collaborate or compete with each other, we can 
presume that, in the State of Nature, there will be social categories 
and concepts such as outsider, insider, enemy, rival, ally and so 
on. These categories, she claims, are likely to play an active part 
in the credibility judgement made; thus, there will be some 
necessary reliance on social stereotypes, for example ‘insiders’ 
are likely to be more easily believed (because shared interests 
can be more readily assumed), while knowledge claims made by 
‘enemies’ or ‘rivals’ are likely to be treated with suspicion. Put in 
technical terms, Fricker (2007:116) claims that the State of Nature 
will tend to produce ‘some restricted class of identity-prejudicial 
stereotypes’.13 While they may be reliable, there is also always a 
chance that they might not, leading her (Fricker 2007:116) to 
conclude that ‘hearers’ powers to discriminate genuine from 
false information will need to include a certain anti-prejudicial 
sensitivity even in the State of Nature’, to the tune of ‘just because 
he’s not one of us doesn’t mean he’s a liar or a fool’. One may also 
say that the human tendencies towards deception, concealment 
and prejudice all threaten to undermine the project of epistemic 
trust which is necessary for the most basic human society to 
function. So they demand to be countered or corrected (Fricker 
2007:118) with the virtues of sincerity and accuracy on the part 
13. She (Fricker 2007:4) describes these terms in detail, arguing that ‘prejudices typically 
enter into a hearer’s credibility judgement by way of the social imagination, in the form of a 
prejudicial stereotype’ which is essentially ‘a distorted image of the social type in question’. 
She (Fricker 2007:14) moreover explains that ‘[w]henever there is an operation of power 
that depends in some significant degree upon such shared imaginative conceptions of social 
identity [i.e. stereotypes], then identity power is at work’. Identity power may furthermore 
operate independently of the overt beliefs of both subject and object, because it draws its 
power from the ‘collective social imagination’ (Fricker 2007:15).
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of the speaker and with what she calls the virtue of testimonial 
justice on the side of the listener or receiver of the offered 
information.
Also important to note is Fricker’s insistence (Fricker 2007:120) 
that the virtue of testimonial justice is a hybrid virtue in the sense 
that it serves both justice and truth at the same time: ‘The person 
who possesses the virtue reliably avoids epistemologically 
undermining others, and she avoids missing out on truths offered 
too.’ Her example of the troubled teenager with a known past of 
lying, describing a crime scene, is informative: when interrogated 
by the detective, the social context determines that the pursuit 
of truth is paramount; when interrogated by the psychologist, 
the pursuit of accurate truth may be secondary to the pursuit of 
epistemic justice for the teenager; and, finally, in a conversation 
about the same incident between the teenager and the social 
worker, there might conceivably be a double emphasis on both 
truth and epistemic justice. Fricker (2007) puts it well: 
[T]he social worker […] is engaged in an ongoing project of trying 
to encourage him to include himself and be included in the ordinary 
relations of trust (ethical and epistemic) that make for social inclusion 
and social functionality quite generally. (p. 123)
The social worker’s concern is thus to inculcate in the teenager 
the virtues of accuracy (i.e. truth) and sincerity,14 and to alert 
him to the internal link between those virtues on his side and the 
virtue of testimonial justice on the side of his interlocutors. 
14. Although Fricker does not much pursue this line of thinking, I am interested in the relation 
between the virtues of accuracy and sincerity, and how they should be weighed up in order 
to ensure testimonial justice, but I will not pursue this further here. Fricker briefly touches 
on the relation between these two basic components of trustworthiness when she talks 
about the harms caused by testimonial injustice. Such injustice in the form of prejudice may 
attack either one or both of these components so that either the speaker’s competence or 
sincerity or both are undermined (Fricker 2007:45). My suspicion is that when one looks at 
the current debate on race in South Africa and the general breakdown of epistemic trust, you 
will roughly find a pattern of white people who doubt the accuracy or competence of black 
testimonies, and black people who doubt the sincerity of white testimonies. This pattern may 
even be typical in situations of systemic power imbalances and thus also between women 
and men, poor and rich. But again, this goes somewhat beyond the scope of this chapter.
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In  other words, testimonial justice implies that epistemic trust 
must be earned and also maintained through repeated15 honest 
and sincere behaviour. It is thus inherently fragile and such 
fragility must be recognised by both parties in communicative 
interactions. Also note that, in spite of different ultimate aims, all 
three these personages in their different encounters with the 
teenager do manifest the virtue of testimonial justice.
So far, we have learnt that testimonial justice requires from 
the listener a kind of overt anti-prejudicial sensitivity to the 
particulars of the context of the exchange,16 and this, broadly 
defined, includes an awareness of the social relation between 
speaker and listener (e.g. child and adult, outsider and insider or 
man and woman). It specifically also requires an understanding 
of the relations of social inequality, distance and unfamiliarity 
that may influence the encounter and that are likely to influence 
how the speaker and listener perceive one another. For example, 
if someone expects to be disbelieved, even though they speak 
with both accuracy and sincerity based on the fact that they are 
very young or very old, a social outsider or from a socially 
oppressed group, they may fail to exude the confidence that we 
tend to take for a sign of truth and sincerity. Many kinds of bodily 
signs such as a hushed or faltering voice, a ‘strange’ accent, 
stuttering, a limited vocabulary, avoidance of eye contact and 
bowed head may on the face of it point to inaccuracy, insincerity 
or deceit. The person who possesses the virtue of testimonial 
justice should, however, be extra careful in considering whether 
these behaviours might not equally well betray fear or deference, 
15. It makes sense that one would trust familiar people or insiders more than strangers or 
outsiders, because trust is only ever earned over time, and untrustworthy members are 
weeded out over time by communities living in close proximity.
16. This would imply that in rape trials, for instance, courts must deliberately create an 
overtly anti-prejudicial (anti rape myth and rape culture) context in order to ensure that 
the complainant receives testimonial justice. This would be a strong argument in favour of 
special sexual offences courts in a society such as South Africa where sexual violence is rife. 
The government has over the years been ambivalent about their provision (see for instance 
Chabalala 2017).
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or an innocent difference or distance such as inexperience, 
shyness, internalised oppression, a speech defect or a simple 
ethnic difference rather than enmity. Similarly, the listener will 
ideally be sensitive to how his or her response is likely to be 
received in an ongoing situation in which the creation of epistemic 
trust is pursued. It goes without saying that none of these 
provisions and sensitivities is meant to pave the way for simple 
gullibility, but they all have a role to play in countering situations 
in which testimonial injustice is likely to occur. At the same time, 
and for the same reasons, testimonial justice or fairness requires 
that the listener does not simplistically equate self-confidence 
with trustworthiness and remains vigilant about the danger of 
credibility excess being afforded to confident speakers.
The emphasis thus far has been on considering testimonial 
justice in the context of the collective good of cumulative 
epistemic trust and sharing in a pool of reliable knowledge. 
Testimonial injustice leads to the impoverishment or contamination 
of the shared pool of knowledge. This, according to Fricker 
(2007:43), implies ‘an epistemic disadvantage to the individual 
hearer, and a moment of dysfunction in the overall epistemic 
practice or system’, and if it is systematic, it may point to ‘a serious 
form of unfreedom in our collective speech situation’. However, 
for Fricker, the harm of testimonial injustice extends beyond the 
harm to the group if a lie is believed, that is, absorbed into the 
pool of knowledge, or if a truth is disbelieved and thereby 
discarded from the pool of knowledge. As indicated in the 
beginning of this section, an epistemic injustice is characterised 
by its harmful consequences for the speaker or informant as a 
knower and, in the first place, constitutes an injustice towards him 
personally. I need to explain these harms briefly before moving 
on to a discussion of the second type of epistemic injustice which 
is hermeneutic in nature and which returns us to the collective 
speech situation and its limitations.
To be harmed in one’s capacity as a knower, based on some 
form of testimonial injustice (where insufficient or irrelevant 
evidence in the form of ‘markers’ of the person are used to 
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conclude a credibility deficit), means ultimately to be harmed in 
one’s human status and dignity, because, being a subject of 
knowledge, is a ‘capacity essential to human value’ (Fricker 
2007:5). While allowing for the possibility of indirect harm 
sustained over a long period if one is routinely granted a 
credibility excess,17 for example proper intellectual virtues may 
then fail to develop or be maintained by being challenged by 
others, Fricker is more interested in the injustice associated with 
being granted an unfair credibility deficit.18 She denies that 
innocent mistakes, which lead to credibility deficits, constitute 
instances of injustice and therefore adds that an injustice only 
occurs when the unfair credibility deficit is caused by some moral 
error on the part of the hearer where this error, in other words, 
takes the form of unchecked prejudice against some aspect of 
the speaker’s social identity.
Most typically, or at least most starkly, such ‘identity-
prejudicial credibility deficits’ or testimonial injustices have a 
systematic nature by which she (Fricker 2007:27) means that 
‘they are connected, via a common prejudice, with other types of 
injustice’ and such prejudices often ‘track the subject through 
different dimensions of social activity’.19 Here, her example is 
17. Credibility excess may conceivably constitute an important element in what is called 
‘white privilege’ – an idea which seems to be affirmed in Peggy McIntosh’s essay (2017) on 
the topic. It may also play an important part in bolstering patriarchy as I briefly discussed in 
the context of the Enlightenment slogan of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’.
18. Under a set of very circumscribed conditions a credibility deficit may even be advantageous 
and an excess be disadvantageous. Fricker’s examples (2007:18–19) are of the bumbling 
detective Columbo whose antics mean that criminals drop their guard in his presence, 
betraying themselves, and of the trusted family doctor for whom the excessive credibility 
his patients invest in him may lead to an unwanted ethical burden for him. However, these 
are the exceptions that prove the rule: In general, a credibility deficit is a disadvantage and 
a credibility excess is an advantage.
19. Yet, Fricker does not deny that more incidental testimonial injustices also occur. Her 
example is of a researcher who is treated epistemologically unfairly, because the panel of 
referees of the journal are dogmatically opposed to his chosen research method. Although 
under specified conditions such testimonial injustice may also be very harmful; the greater 
harm is caused where it is more systematic, pervasive and persistent through time (Fricker 
2007:29) and touches on all or most, rather than only a localised aspect of a life.
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from the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird (Lee 1960:202–210) 
where Tom Robinson becomes the victim of testimonial injustice 
caused by the widespread and persistent racial prejudice of the 
time. As explained, and much to her credit, Fricker (2007:116) 
acknowledges that some shortcuts or heuristics in the form of 
reliable stereotypes are always at play when a hearer attempts 
to judge credibility in a speaker. The problem of injustice has to 
do with identity prejudice and thus systematic distortion that 
informs a stereotype. Fricker (2007:117) points out that historically 
marginalised groups such as women, black people and working-
class people are often stereotyped in terms and associations 
that significantly detract from their perceived competence or 
sincerity or both, that is, the stereotypes that militate against 
respect for them as knowers, and which thereby strongly suggest 
that they should, in principle, be excluded from the circles of 
epistemic trust where collectively momentous decisions are 
made. Clearly then, prejudicial stereotypes consist of unreliable 
empirical generalisations about social groups which are not 
backed up by sufficient evidence. In this respect, prejudice is 
epistemologically culpable (Fricker 2007:33), because it neglects 
the pursuit of truth. If someone persists in negative prejudice, 
that is, a disparaging association with a social group in spite of 
evidence to the contrary, ‘owing to some affective investment 
on the part of the subject’, then the prejudice additionally 
becomes ethically culpable (Fricker 2007:35), because this 
attitude epistemologically diminishes the speaker. This is the 
kind of ‘prejudice at work in systematic testimonial injustice’ and 
which results in a distorted perception of the informant or 
speaker (Fricker 2007:36). As Fricker (2007:25) points out, the 
jury members in the rape trial of Tom Robinson ‘really do find 
him guilty [author’s added emphasis]’, because they cannot or 
would not correct their racial prejudice which only ever allows 
them to see him as a ‘lying, raping Negro’.
The primary harm of testimonial injustice is thus ‘to be 
wronged in one’s capacity as a knower’; thus to be wronged in 
one’s capacity for reason which is a capacity essential to human 
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value, and thus it is to be undermined in one’s very humanity. 
In contexts of oppression, it is very common that precisely this 
aspect of the humanity of the oppressed gets undermined. With 
the unfair, prejudiced dismissal of their capacity for knowledge, 
they also get dismissed as full humans worthy of respect 
(given  the honour of being believed) and of epistemic trust. 
There is also a secondary harm of testimonial injustice, namely 
‘a range of possible follow-on disadvantages’ (Fricker 2007:49), 
likely to be caused by the primary harm. The most important 
ones, Fricker (2007:49) lists as follows: 
1. Immediate practical disadvantages typically follow epistemic 
injustice, such as not being considered for employment or 
promotion, or to be unfairly treated in a court of law. 
2. Epistemic harms are also likely to follow, and they take the 
form of diminished self-confidence in one’s general intellectual 
abilities. This self-doubt may lead directly to underperforming 
or excluding oneself from further educational opportunities or 
intellectual development and also from circles of epistemic 
trust. If this type of insult or injury to one’s epistemic capacity 
happens often enough, the knower may not only lose 
confidence in what he or she knows, but may even lose that 
knowledge by discarding and disqualifying it him- or herself.
3. Furthermore, maybe even more than in the case of credibility 
excess, with unjustified credibility deficit, comes the real 
danger that the knower or speaker may fail to develop certain 
intellectual virtues such as intellectual courage. 
Now persistent or systematic credibility deficit starts to have an 
impact on the core being of the wronged party. Fricker (2007:52) 
takes this even further when she argues that to engage in circles 
of epistemic trust allows one to exchange ideas with others, 
giving your perspective and hearing theirs, and that this dialogue 
with others ‘is the chief impetus for [the] process by which 
[one’s] mind becomes settled’. Under the productive pressures 
exerted by the mutual trust as well by as the attempt to look at 
the world and articulate the world in a way that would make 
sense to her, my interlocutor, I try to formulate something that I 
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find true, but which avoids fantasy and thereby something that 
she might also find to be true. ‘We might say then’, says Fricker 
(2007:52), ‘that trustful conversation with others is the basic 
mechanism by which the mind steadies itself’. She then draws on 
Williams’ insight that ‘I become what with increasing steadiness 
[confidence] I can sincerely profess’, in other words, the settling 
of the mind, which trustful dialogue yields, is ‘the most basic 
mechanism whereby we come to be who we are’ (Fricker 
2007:53), by which we stabilise our personal identities.
With these insights into identity formation, Fricker has 
extended the likely harms of testimonial injustice, especially 
systematic testimonial injustice into the psychological and even 
ontological domains. Systematic attacks on my capacity as a 
knower and exclusion from central circles of epistemic trust lead 
not only to self-doubt in terms of what I know and am capable of 
knowing and contributing to the common pool, but eventually 
also as to who I am.20 How can I have a stable, confident personality 
or identity if I have no opportunity to ‘settle my mind’ through at 
once trustful (safe) and truth-searching (challenging) dialogue? It 
is therefore not difficult to see how ‘the prejudice operating 
against the speaker may [ultimately] have a self-fulfilling power’, 
so that, firstly, the speaker is socially constituted according to the 
stereotype, but, secondly, she may to some extent even start to 
resemble the stereotype (Fricker 2007:5). In this final instance, 
‘identity power’ turns productive and ‘at once constructs and 
distorts who the subject really is’ and may become.
Hermeneutical injustice
In her book, Fricker spends much less space exploring this 
second type of epistemic injustice. When first introducing the 
20. Fricker (2007:51) refers us to Simone de Beauvoir’s conclusion (2005 [1959]) after Jean-
Paul Sartre had intellectually diminished her and destroyed ideas about which she had been 
particularly excited, saying ‘I’m no longer sure what I think, or even if I think at all’ (from 
Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter). 
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two types, she (Fricker 2007:1) avers that hermeneutical injustice 
occurs when ‘a gap in collective interpretive [or hermeneutical] 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it 
comes to making sense of their social experiences’, and also 
claims that it occurs at a stage prior to testimonial injustice. Her 
first example of hermeneutical injustice is the situation in which 
someone suffers ‘sexual harassment in a culture that lacks that 
critical concept’. The second example that she discusses is the 
experiences of a boy who discovers his homosexuality in a 
culture where there are only derogatory ways of conceptualising 
his sexual identity. In both cases, much social and personal 
unease and upheaval is caused by the dissonance between one’s 
lived experience and the limited availability of interpretive tools. 
Identifying a phenomenon called hermeneutical injustice 
therefore directs us to the social embeddedness of all knowledge 
projects and knowledge claims; thus of all epistemological 
practice. This insight aligns with the basic insight of critical 
theory which postulates that theory can never be a-historical, 
universal or objective, because all knowledge is underpinned by 
what Jürgen Habermas calls ‘cognitive interests’, reasons for 
knowing or wanting to know things, and also reasons for 
choosing ignorance, systemic blindness and wanting not to 
know some other things. This, however, does not mean that 
Habermas reduces all knowledge to instrumentality, because he 
distinguishes between the technical (properly instrumental), 
communicative and emancipatory cognitive interests. Apart 
from narrowly instrumental interests, we also have fundamental 
human interests in communication and emancipation or liberation 
from oppressive structures (cf. Bohman & Rehg 2017:n.p.).
These materialist points of departure had also been taken up 
in feminist standpoint theory, for example in Nancy Hartsock’s 
insight into how the powerful are materially favoured by the 
social institutions and symbolic practices of a society, and how 
this power is reinforced by the ways in which the powerful 
or  dominant groups largely constitute the social world and 
also  structure and control collective social understandings 
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(Fricker  2007:147, paraphrasing Hartsock (1998) from The 
Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays). Sandra 
Harding’s version of feminist standpoint theory (1991), echoes 
many of these claims made by Hartsock, but she makes the 
added point that the socially powerless or marginalised groups 
paradoxically have an epistemological advantage in the sense 
that they are much better positioned to expose the hidden 
costs involved in the maintenance of any discriminatory social 
order or order of domination. Harding emphasises that those 
positioned in the centre of social systems, benefiting most from 
them, that is, the wealthy in a capitalist state, the talented in a 
meritocracy, white people in racist societies, men in patriarchies, 
and so on, have a vested interest in maintaining a systematic 
blindness and a wilful ignorance regarding the costs and 
violences involved in the system from which they benefit and 
within which they tend to flourish. Fricker (2007) seems to 
almost make the opposite claim when she argues that: 
[T ]he powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of 
their experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their 
social experiences, whereas the powerless are more likely to find 
themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, 
with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render 
them intelligible. (p. 148)
Although it may seem unlikely, I believe both these authors to be 
correct in their claims and the compatibility lies in the details of 
what they are claiming. Neither is making a wholesale claim 
about whether the powerful or the powerless have an 
epistemological advantage in every respect. To me, Fricker 
seems to be right when she claims that the powerful tend to 
control the epistemological and hermeneutical resources and 
also the dominant interpretations of the shared world. In order to 
maintain this control, I believe the powerful have to systematically 
engage in testimonial injustice towards the powerless. It also 
seems logical to me to presume that the more unequal a society 
is, the stronger the hold of the dominant group over these 
resources will be, and the more fully will the powerless be 
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excluded as a group from influencing the dominant episteme, 
especially in hermeneutically decisive moments. Conversely, if 
clearly demarcated social groups are approximating equality in 
power, the contest over political and material power will 
additionally manifest in fierce epistemological battles (again 
I  believe contemporary race relations in South Africa to be a 
case  in point). I also agree with Fricker when she attributes 
hermeneutical gaps in the shared pool of knowledge or 
understanding to such power imbalances where certain groups 
have for prolonged periods been excluded from contributing 
their knowledge to the shared pool. Phenomena such as sexual 
harassment and marital rape have for almost all of human history 
not existed as concepts to help women interpret their experiences, 
even while men’s lived experiences have received extensive 
scholarly attention. However, in the case of male homosexuality, 
as we have seen, concepts have also not been developed to help 
young gay people come to grips with their sexual identity. 
Instead, its reality was either denied or demonised under the 
dominant interpretations. Equally, Harding would say, the natural 
sciences have developed as they have due to their being driven 
and shaped by the interests and problems of wealthy white men 
in the Western world. If poor black women were the ones deciding 
which questions to pose to nature, different avenues would be 
explored, different methods may develop, and the results of 
science would serve such women much better than they have up 
until now.
So, I completely agree with Fricker when she says that it is no 
accident that the epistemological projects and institutions of 
the white patriarchal West have been very reluctant to investigate 
matters such as sexual violence, sexual harassment, marital rape 
and racisms of all kinds. It has been no innocent oversight that 
‘women’s experiences had been falling down the hermeneutical 
cracks’ before feminist scholars appeared on the scene (Fricker 
2007:153). The ignorance or lack of understanding and thus the 
hermeneutical gap experienced by those who suffer under these 
phenomena, is experienced collectively by everyone, because it 
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is systematic. At the same time, Fricker (2007:153) argues that 
the consequences of such collective ignorance are much more 
detrimental for those who are the targets of sexism, homophobia 
and racism than for the perpetrators. It should be even more 
forcefully stated: the powerful typically have a vested interest in 
precisely this kind of blindness, and the powerless typically suffer 
serious harm because of it, exacerbated by the fact that they 
struggle to conceptualise the wrong and even to formulate an 
accusation.21 In fact, she (Fricker 2007:153) contends that ‘the 
whole engine of collective social meanings was effectively geared 
to keeping these [experiences of women] out of sight’, and 
thereby to help maintain their hermeneutical marginalisation. 
This is then where Fricker comes very close to articulating the 
same point as Harding about the systematic ignorance of those 
in power and affirming the point that the powerful have vested 
interests in keeping some aspects of the social world out of sight 
and out of the scrutiny of our shared understandings. Devoid of 
such incentives, indeed driven by the opposite incentives, the 
marginalised have an interest in exposing the contractions, 
the  lacunae and silences of the dominant episteme, because 
these silences are ‘hotspots’ or hermeneutical keys for 
unlocking the hidden violence and other indefensible effects of 
the system. And so, precisely that which the system denies 
knowledge of, is what is of vital importance for the disenfranchised 
to translate into shared knowledge, and precisely that which the 
system wants to repress, is what the disenfranchised know most 
intimately and which, moreover, has the potential to unlock the 
door which is barring the hermeneutically marginalised from 
entrance into the socially most powerful circles of epistemic trust.
21. As a concrete example of someone who suffered sexual harassment before it had a 
name, Fricker (2007:151) tells the story of Carmita Wood, who ‘without that understanding, 
… [was] left deeply troubled, confused, and isolated, not to mention vulnerable to continued 
harassment’. Her lack of a shared and accepted vocabulary in which to cast her experiences, 
impinged on her self-confidence to share her story and to put words to her experiences. It was 
so bad that after she had quit her job and applied for unemployment insurance she could 




Yet, in spite of how such a system serves the powerful, Fricker 
(2007:159) contends that, in the case of hermeneutical injustice, 
the injustice is not interpersonal, because it is the result of a certain 
social structure rather than of individual intention. Put differently, 
the sexual harasser of the 1950s did not inflict the hermeneutical 
injustice on his victims; his unjust acts were not epistemic in nature 
and yet, when his victims experienced the harm of an act without 
a name, the full force of the epistemic background injustice was 
brought home to them. Clearly, his behaviour and impunity 
benefited from this hermeneutical gap. This is a clear indication, 
then, I contend, of what happens when women, as a social group, 
are systematically and over a prolonged period prevented from 
participating ‘on equal terms with men in those practices by which 
collective social meanings are generated’ (Fricker 2007:152). The 
same may be said of any other social groups who are hermeneutically 
marginalised or excluded from the formative, central and powerful 
circles of epistemic trust. As with testimonial injustice, hermeneutical 
injustice may be more or less systematic, pervasive and prolonged. 
As Fricker also acknowledges, it is clear that hermeneutical injustice 
may lead to testimonial injustice, exacerbating the problem, 
because someone who tries to verbalise a hermeneutical injustice 
is per definition struggling to put it into words which may be 
wrongly read or received as lying, vagueness or deception. 
Systematic testimonial injustice such as the complete exclusion of 
women or black people, as possible knowers or informants from 
the spheres of politics, law or religion, seems to be the most likely 
cause over time of hermeneutical lacunae and injustices. Also, as 
with testimonial injustice, the primary harm of hermeneutical 
injustice has to do with ‘prejudicial exclusion from participation in 
the spread of knowledge’ (Fricker 2007:162) which socially implies 
an attack aimed at the core of a person’s or a group’s full humanity. 
Thus, again, similarly to testimonial injustice, the primary harm of 
hermeneutical injustice also tends to issue in further secondary 
harms such as loss of epistemic confidence and undermining of 
one’s sense of self. Although I thus agree with Fricker’s distinction, 
I want to emphasise the tangled web of mutual implication existing 
between these two types of epistemic injustice.
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Conclusion
My main claim so far has been that claims to justice – whether 
originating in the sphere of cultural or religious tradition, or of 
secular, liberal legal or human rights-based traditions – need to 
be opened up to interrogation of a particular kind. This 
interrogation into their validity will focus on their internal 
standards of epistemological justice, including both testimonial 
and hermeneutic justice. Although I have indicated through 
various asides, examples and footnotes that these types of 
injustice may run along racial, class, ethnic and other lines,22 my 
focus here is on the widespread epistemological injustice done 
to women, in particular, and across legal, cultural and religious 
regimes that are otherwise very different from each other.
I will conclude with a few comments on sexual violence against 
women in South Africa and the demands of testimonial justice in 
this specific context. There is a strong tendency in our society to 
‘other’ the problem of rape, in other words, to purify one’s own 
group and project this particular form of ‘backwardness’ (in terms 
of the Enlightenment myth) onto all kinds of ‘others’ or ‘strangers’. 
In another article (Du Toit 2014:102–107), I develop these ideas in 
detail and show that the problem is typically dealt with in popular, 
political and academic discourse by blaming a few deranged 
men or men supposedly damaged by apartheid and the liberation 
struggle, African culture, men of poorer classes, men from other 
African states or black men in general. Such approaches erase 
the colonial legacy of sexual violence as well as the complicity, 
overlap and mutual reinforcement between the various cultural, 
religious and legal regimes under our current constitutional 
dispensation, causing epistemic injustice towards women within 
22. I have also indicated that I think there are many ways in which this analytic framework 
may be applied to contemporary South African social problems such as to what I perceive 
to be an epistemological crisis in the public domain and the almost total breakdown of 
epistemic trust – often along race lines. We may add here the demands of epistemic justice 
within different circles of epistemic trust toward perceived strangers, especially from other 
African countries toward people who have AIDS or live with HIV and toward gay people. 
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all of these circles of epistemic trust. Instead of always othering 
the problem, it is necessary that South Africans develop the 
virtues of epistemic justice which will allow them to see how 
overlapping patriarchal regimes maintain their patriarchal power 
through excluding women from circles of epistemic trust and 
feminist voices from momentous hermeneutical decisions of 
shared national interest. One of the starkest and most central 
examples of this is the role played until recently by the so-called 
‘cautionary rule’ employed in rape cases. This rule cautioned 
legal practitioners that women tend to lie about rape. It was thus 
a way to prejudicially institutionalise a credibility deficit in relation 
to each and every woman who ever approached the justice 
system with a rape complaint. Although the cautionary rule was 
described as outdated and prejudiced in 1998, it was only 
explicitly scrapped from criminal legislation in 2007. No wonder 
that women do not trust the legal system when it comes to sexual 
violence, because it is the legal system that systematically and 
explicitly distrusts their testimony and witness. Indeed, this 
systematic testimonial injustice done to women in the legal 
sphere has also led to hermeneutical injustices which is why 
women still have a hard time explaining to courts that they have 
been raped, why this constitutes a grave harm and why they yet 
can supply reliable testimonies. I worked out this argument in the 
context of the TRC (Du Toit 2009:30–36) where I contend that 
there was no shared moral and political language of the damages 
of sexual violence. Therefore, there was a distinct hermeneutical 
injustice in the form of a gap or lacuna regarding rape as a gross 
human rights violation.
I use this example from Western rape law in South Africa to 
emphasise my earlier point that liberal regimes are, by no means, 
a neutral standard when it comes to criticising the authority, 
legitimacy and validity of other regimes’ claims to justice. The 
manifest exclusion of women and feminists from interpreting 
indigenous African traditions and deciding on their rightful 
application today, seems only to be reinforced rather than 
challenged by patriarchal tendencies within the overarching 
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liberal legal order, in particular when it comes to women’s 
sexuality. Because the control of women’s sexuality is pertinent 
to the maintenance of patriarchal power everywhere – also in the 
liberal state – as in churches and traditional leadership, these 
patriarchies collude in their epistemic injustice towards women 
in  general. In patriarchal regimes, women’s sexuality is 
problematised, seen to detract from women’s full, rational 
personhood, and from their sincerity and honesty. The unfair 
credibility deficit, routinely used against women, ensures that 
they remain excluded from the powerful circles of trust that 
uphold communities and traditions. The serious injustice of 
having one’s sexuality controlled – even owned as property – by 
others, is compounded by the serious injustice of barred access 
to the circles of epistemic trust where decisions are made that 
generally reinforce rather than challenge the first injustice. This 
exclusion of (feminist) women from participation in the 
interpretation of traditions to which they belong – simultaneously 
a testimonial and a hermeneutic injustice with all their attendant 
harms as explained – is a systemic problem permeating all the 
significant power regimes in South Africa. I contend that feminists 
of all stripes in South Africa should mobilise around this issue 
which would significantly cut across all of the most lethal 
dichotomies of race, class and ethnicity upheld in men’s politics. 
Such solidarity would expose the overlaps and complicities 
between different forms of patriarchy, and it would reinforce the 
right of women to testimonial, hermeneutical and overarching 
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Introduction
Ours is an age of unprecedented scientific and technological 
innovation – some would say ‘revolution’. Ever since the 19th 
century we have seen an explosion of knowledge and knowledge 
applications that have transformed the landscape of human 
experience and the arena and scope of human action. We can 
now circumnavigate the globe in a day or two, contrary to 
journeys that took one weeks, if not months, 200 years ago. 
Communication, over seemingly unimaginable distances, is 
immediate and accurate. We have electronic computational 
capacities that enable us to calculate and manage, within minutes, 
complex structures that would have taken our ancestors weeks if 
not months or years. We have, via the Internet, (almost immediate) 
access to knowledge on a scale not only unprecedented but 
probably inconceivable to previous generations. We have landed 
on the moon and are getting ready to travel to further and much 
more challenging destinations in outer space. And by no means 
least: we have acquired power over disease and disability that 
has decimated childhood morbidity and mortality, has given us 
control over a great many earlier fatal diseases and catapulted 
life expectancy to levels unthinkable before the advent of the 
20th century. Try and imagine the incredulity that a person who 
lived as recently as the 18th century, if resurrected in our time, 
might have of the world in which we live every day. For such a 
person, our world would indeed appear as no less than a pure 
flight of fancy, a Xanadu of unimaginable wonder that our time-
traveller would find difficult to recognise as the same geographical 
space in which he or she and their contemporaries lived.
If the world has changed that dramatically over the past 
200 years, who knows what awaits us in the ensuing century, let 
alone millennium? Of course, we have in the process also 
construed the means to not only dramatically enhance human 
existence, but to destroy it. Of that possibility, Hiroshima, 
Chernobyl and Auschwitz have become the grim reminders and 
disconcerting symbols in our time. In the shadows of the Darwins, 
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Einsteins, Watsons and Cricks of history lurk the ominous figures 
of Hitler, Stalin, Mengele, Bin Laden and many others – characters 
ready to abuse the yield of science and technology for what 
Churchill called the ‘dark and lamentable catalogue of human 
crime’, based on ‘perverted science’. For this reason, I will, towards 
the end of this chapter, posit that the category of ‘responsibility’ 
is arguably the most important in current-day moral reflection.
Few developments are a clearer indication of the further 
dramatic innovations that our world is prone to see in the future 
than the new biomedical technologies of our time. By ‘new 
biomedical and other technologies’, I refer to things such as genetic 
engineering, cloning, stem cell applications, life-extending bio-
sciences, intelligence intensifiers, smarter interfaces to swifter 
computers, neural-computer integration, worldwide data networks, 
virtual reality, intelligent agents, swift electronic communication, 
artificial intelligence, neuroscience, neural networks, artificial life, 
off-planet migration and molecular nanotechnology (Van Niekerk 
2014:n.p.). 
What is particularly notable of these (actual and foreseen) 
new technologies are the possibilities that they suggest for 
significant human biomedical enhancements. Allen Buchanan 
(2011) aptly defines the notion of ‘biomedical enhancements’ as 
follows: 
A biomedical enhancement is a deliberate intervention, applying 
biomedical science, which aims to improve an existing capacity that 
most or all normal human beings typically have, or to create a new 
capacity, by acting directly on the body or brain. (p. 43)
These new technologies hold the promise of significant 
improvements in people’s physical characteristics (e.g. speed, 
strength and endurance), cognitive capacities (e.g. various 
aspects of memory, information processing and reasoning), 
affect, emotion, motivation or temperament, improvements in 
humans’ immunity or resistance to diseases (many instances of 
which have become a reality in our time), as well as significantly 
(if not dramatically) increased longevity.
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In principle, these alleged accomplishments could be achieved 
or brought about by a plurality of biomedical technologies. 
Among these are foreseen the selection of embryos for 
implantation according to genotype, the genetic engineering of 
embryos by insertion of human or non-human animal genes 
or artificial chromosomes into those embryos, the administration 
of drugs (e.g. cognitive enhancement drugs such as Ritalin, 
Adderall and Provigil), the implantation of genetically engineered 
tissue or organs, and, most dramatic of all (although by no means 
yet possible) brain-computer interface technologies, using 
nanotechnology to connect neural tissue with electronic circuits 
and thus enabling us to ‘download’ brain activity (and therefore 
brain capacity and intellectual content) to computers.
The fact that these new technologies often operate at the 
genetic level with implications not only for somatic gene therapy 
(where an imposition alters the genes of a specific person with 
no longer-term effects) as well as germline gene therapy (where 
the intervention permanently alters the genome, and these 
altered genes are transferred via procreation), has generated 
significant sensitivities about the moral justifiability of these 
technologies; hence the reference to Nirvana, Prometheus and 
Frankenstein in the heading of this chapter. Many people in our 
time do not look upon the new biomedical (specifically genetic) 
knowledge and technologies as the advent of some ‘Nirvana’ of 
bliss that science has achieved or is about to create. They much 
rather invoke the Prometheus and/or Frankenstein imagery. 
Prometheus is a mythical figure in ancient Greece who was 
believed to have stolen fire from the gods in order to make it 
available to humans – fire, in that culture, being the prototype 
of unprecedented benefits (a magnificent source of light and a 
medium to dramatically enhance the taste of different foods). 
For this deed, Prometheus was punished by being tied to a rock 
and left to the agonies of, on a daily basis, a bird of prey picking 
at and devouring his liver which then grows back at night, only 
for the bird to repeat the process the next day for eternity. 
Frankenstein is the main character in a novel by Mary Shelley. 
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He  wishes to create life (like God), and these researches are 
eventually successful, but the result is a devastatingly 
destructive monster. The purpose of invoking these fictional 
symbols by opponents of the new technologies is clear: we 
should be very careful of ever trying to ‘play God’ (like 
Prometheus), as that might yield results that are (also self-)
destructive and beyond our control (Frankenstein). Although 
I  agree with the call to care and responsibility suggested by 
these images, I nevertheless strongly disagree that science and 
technology could or should be stopped in its tracks, as these 
images suggest. Arguments to this effect will be forthcoming in 
this chapter.
There are a number of reasons for the heightened sensitivities 
about the advent of the new biomedical and genetic technologies 
in our time. Firstly, genetic knowledge of living organisms 
always has effects for more than just the individuals concerned. 
Because this knowledge concerns the genetic constitution of 
an individual (his or her so-called ‘genome’), strong claims could 
be made that this knowledge is intensely ‘private’. Yet, it can 
and often does have all kinds of public repercussions, for 
example the question of whether and when the offspring ought 
to be informed about heritable disease (cf. in the case of 
Huntington’s disease which only becomes effective in a person’s 
forties) or the possibility of the indubitable confirmation of 
parenthood.
A second reason for these sensitivities is the fact that genetic 
knowledge can, and has, in fact, been abused by (political and 
scientific) tyrants in the past. In Nazi Germany, the frightening 
series of coerced medical experiments and the severe violations 
of human rights, not only in relation to Jews, gypsies and ‘people 
of colour’, but, particularly, in relation to people living with 
disabilities, is a tragic testimony to this fact. To this must be 
added the fact that there are alarming signs that old-style 
eugenics is apparently still looked upon favourably by even some 
modern-day policy-makers such as those in Singapore, Malaysia 
and even China (Buchanan et al. 2000:305). 
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A third reason for the mentioned sensitivities is the fact that 
many (uninformed) people tend to think that once we know an 
individual’s genome, we know more or less everything of 
importance about that person. That, of course, is far from being 
the case; many of our beliefs, habits and dispositions derive 
from environmental and not genetic influences. Yet, the 
perception of the pervasiveness of genetic knowledge remains; 
hence the force of slogans that link the acquisition of genetic 
knowledge with the idea of ‘playing God’ (as discussed above). 
A fourth and final reason for these sensitivities about genetic 
knowledge is the fact that many protests against ‘the new 
genetics’ derive from marginalised groups in society (particularly 
people living with disabilities) who fear that genetics, by 
showing how their genomes differ from what is ‘normal’, 
challenges their right to dignity and their specific identity as 
human beings. Given the abuses that have occurred in history 
and that I referred to above, these concerns are understandable 
and ought to be dealt with, with sensitivity and comprehension 
(cf. Van Niekerk 2013).
The reservations that people have about the new biomedical 
technologies are largely based on ignorance, coupled with fear 
of the unknown. This fear is exacerbated by the fact that 
many of the newly foreseen technologies do not only hold the 
promise of better and more lasting cures for disease. As said, 
they also  hold the promise of significant biomedical 
enhancements of human beings – enhancements that would or 
could be physical (increased bodily strength), health oriented 
(increased resistance to disease and longevity), cognitive 
(improved powers of concentration and creativity) and even 
moral. In the rest of this chapter, I will deal with the moral 
problems raised by these kinds of biotechnologically mediated 
enhancements, with the exception of the idea of moral 
enhancement, which currently is no more than an imaginative 
(although interesting) construct. 
Cognitive enhancements as the effects of the application of 
new biotechnologies are in many respects a real possibility that 
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could and ought to be pursued. We have, as long as we can 
remember, enhanced ourselves as a species; these enhancements 
are perhaps, more than anything else, exactly what distinguish us 
as a species from the other animals. Compare, for example, the 
enormous effects that the acquisition of (particularly written) 
language has had on our cognitive capabilities. Compare also 
what we have achieved on the basis of our ability to act, not only 
as individuals, but collectively, as is apparent in the phenomena 
of institutions (the family, schools, churches, universities, courts 
of law, states, etc.). We have for at least 200 years also seen the 
effects of direct biomedical and technological enhancements, for 
example the range of immunisations we (can) receive since early 
childhood – interventions that are not biomedical therapies, but 
preventative measures to safeguard us against possible disease. 
Add to these the various mechanisms that can improve our 
eyesight, our hearing or our mobility. Biomedical enhancements 
and the science and technologies that enable them are part and 
parcel of the human condition and experience.
It is therefore disingenuous to, on the eve of a new revolution 
in applicable biotechnologies such as we are currently seeing, all 
of sudden cringe and vouch to avoid what current-day medicine 
can deliver anew. This avoidance amounts to a kind of unfounded 
conservatism that comes to expression in what Allen Buchanan 
has called ‘the simple conservative argument’. This argument 
runs (Buchanan 2011) as follows: 
Biomedical enhancements carry extraordinary risks and given how 
well off we already are (thanks in part to past enhancements) those 
risks are not worth taking. So even if we could have been wrong – 
indeed stupid – to have forgone the major historical enhancements, 
we should draw the line now. (p. 55) 
To this argument we may answer fourfold. Firstly, it is very 
unlikely that this advice will ever be followed, particularly in 
relation to enhancements that significantly increase our 
productivity but that also hold the promise of ever more effective 
ways of avoiding and combating disease and suffering. Secondly, 
it is hardly credible to assume that the risks of new 
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biotechnologically induced enhancements will be greater than 
those of the past. For example, we have enhanced our ability to 
generate power immensely by nuclear power, but at the same 
time created the danger of destroying our entire civilisation by 
the same power. We have, as another example, enhanced our 
mobility immensely by air travel, and at the same time created 
unknown dangers of destructive global pandemics (such as 
severe acute respiratory syndrome and Swine flu) which flourish 
as a result of current-day aviation. In short: most developments 
or enhancements of the past have also and always been 
accompanied by (increased) risks. Risks cannot be avoided in 
the way in which we live our lives; they must rather be timeously 
identified and prudently managed.
Thirdly, why simply (and uncritically) assume that ‘we have 
gone far enough’, that is, that we are not in need of significantly 
more enhancements to sustain our own well-being and/or extend 
that well-being to people in need of it? Buchanan, for example, 
lists a number of capacities that we as a species might well need 
to develop in the future in order to sustain ourselves. These 
include: an increased capacity for extracting nutrients from 
current foods to counter possible environmental damage due to 
the accumulation of toxins in foods because of global warming; 
the (Buchanan 2011):
[E]nhancement of the ‘normal’ viability of human gametes […] 
in order to counteract a decrease in fertility, an increase […] or 
a rise […] in the rate of cancers due to environmental toxins; 
enhancements to help us adapt physiologically to climate change 
[and enhancements of the immune system to help people in 
countries where disease is increasing, especially in order] to 
accelerate resistance to virulent emerging infectious diseases in an 
era of globalisation. (p. 56)
Fourthly, are we not discovering that a vital aspect of our 
evolution is the fact that we are increasingly realising that the 
next phase of our evolution is the ability to impinge on our 
evolution, to take it to hand and take it further ourselves? We are 
indeed the only species of which this is true; we are at the point 
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in our historical evolution where we are able to decide for 
ourselves which direction our future evolution can and should 
take. Everything that enhancement technologies have achieved 
in the past, has brought us to this point. There is no persuasive 
reason to suspect that we are incapable of rising to the occasion 
and accepting the responsibility that such a development places 
on us. It self-evidently burdens us with an enormous responsibility, 
but it is by no means self-evident or guaranteed that we will 
choose the most prudent direction in our deliberations about 
and applications of these biotechnologies. The challenge is to 
accept this responsibility and to exert it in a way that we make 
our knowledge and technologies work to our mutual benefit 
rather than destruction. I shall return to this issue of responsibility 
in the last section.
In what follows, I want to do three things: Firstly, I want to 
point to and briefly discuss two general ethical problems 
associated with the developments that have been alluded to in 
this introductory section. Secondly, I want to identify and 
critically discuss specific problems raised by these developments 
for the African context in which the authors of this volume find 
themselves. Are we, for example:
 • Talking about a kind of development in healthcare that is 
relevant and available for people living on the continent of 
Africa? 
• Do these technologies entail the danger of a possible 
exacerbation of existing inequalities between Africa and the 
developed world? 
• What are the requirements for the ideal of distributive justice 
for such an eventuality?
Thirdly, in the last part of the chapter, I wish to develop a couple 
of perspectives on this moral problematic – perspectives that are 
informed by an approach to moral reasoning that I call an ethics 
of responsibility and that I believe holds the best potential for 
coming to grips with the moral issues that these new and 
inevitable developments imply and entail.
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Moral problems raised by new 
biotechnologies
Therapy versus eugenics or 
enhancement
The first and foremost problem that the new biomedical, genetic 
technologies raise, is the perennial question as to whether their 
morally justifiable applicability can be motivated by means of a 
legitimate distinction between therapy and eugenics. For some 
writers on this topic (Fukuyama, Habermas and Sandel, about 
whom more will be said later, come to mind), the notion of 
‘eugenics’ is closely associated with the idea of enhancement. 
The argument then runs as follows: 
The new developments in medical and biotechnology are morally in 
order to the extent that they might facilitate the postponement of 
death, the healing of disease and the relief of suffering. Machines for 
hemodialysis, heart-lung machines and new drugs to manage genetic 
diseases such as cystic fibrosis or Huntington’s chorea are thus 
both medically and morally desirable, because they unambiguously 
promote the fundamental purpose of medicine, which is the relief of 
suffering. All interventions that are not aimed at this purpose, but 
that have clearly only been designed to improve people’s bodily 
appearance (e.g. height or eye colour) or to enhance human features 
that are not essential for species-typical functioning (e.g. drugs to 
enhance concentration or academic and/or physical performance) 
are morally dubious. They reek of the morally discredited practice of 
efforts at ‘eugenics’, that is, the perverted effort to create some form 
of ‘super’ or ‘post-human’ race. We have, in Nazi Germany (as well 
as in isolated incidents in other countries since) seen the obscene 
results of this perverse idea. Medicine is fundamentally practised to 
promote the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence, that 
is, the ideals of preventing people from the harms of disease and 
of promoting their physical and mental well-being. Medicine has 
no business in exploring the fostering of human capacities that go 
beyond what is generally accepted as ‘normal’. The development of 
new biomedical and genetic technologies is therefore only morally 
justifiable if their applications are clearly therapeutic, as opposed to 
the promotion of any kind of ‘eugenics’. (n.p.)
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Most of us will be in agreement with the argument as it has so far 
been stated. It clearly seems unnecessary and perverse to utilise 
scarce and costly medical resources to pursue conceited and 
vainglorious ideals such as a perfect body (e.g. in order to 
become a beauty queen), altered eye colour or two added inches 
to one’s height if one is on the short side. We will all mostly agree 
about these clear-cut examples. The situation in real life, however, 
is often considerably more complicated. Let us take, for example, 
the issue of height that has been mentioned. Achondroplasia is 
better known as the (genetically induced) condition of dwarfism. 
I quote a few lines from the Wikipedia discussion of this condition 
(Wikipedia n.d.): 
Physical maleffects of malformed bones vary according to the 
specific disease. Many involve joint pain caused by abnormal bone 
alignment, or from nerve compression. Early degenerative joint 
disease [...] and constriction of spinal cord or nerve roots can cause 
pain and disability. Reduced thoracic size can restrict lung growth and 
reduce pulmonary function. Some forms of dwarfism are associated 
with disordered function of other organs, such as the brain or liver, 
sometimes severely enough to be more of an impairment than the 
unusual bone growth [...] Mental effects also vary according to the 
specific underlying syndrome. In most cases of skeletal dysplasia, 
such as achondroplasia, mental function is not impaired. However, 
there are syndromes which can affect the cranial structure and 
growth of the brain, severely impairing mental capacity. Unless the 
brain is directly affected by the underlying disorder, there is little to 
no chance of mental impairment that can be attributed to dwarfism. 
The psychosocial limitations of society may be more disabling than 
the physical symptoms, especially in childhood and adolescence, 
but people with dwarfism vary greatly in the degree to which social 
participation and emotional health are affected. (n.p.) 
It is clear that this condition sometimes has dangerous health 
complications, but not always or necessarily. We are all aware of 
dwarfs leading relatively normal lives – except for perhaps having 
to deal with the embarrassment of being stared (or even smiled 
or laughed) at because of their clearly impaired height (less than 
four feet 10 inches). If dwarfism could be prenatally diagnosed 
and prevented by genetic interventions, I would speculate that 
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we would mostly be in favour of it. But suppose the same genetic 
intervention could also be used to increase the height of someone 
who is set to grow to a height of five feet, or five feet six inches 
(still regarded quite short for a man) or five feet 10 inches (for 
someone who – other than height – has all the potential and skills 
of becoming a star basketball player)? What must now be 
regarded as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’?
These borderline cases, which provide some of the most 
difficult challenges to people who cling to the validity of the 
therapy-eugenics distinction, can also be neatly illustrated with 
reference to situations of clear-cut medical treatments. Niels 
Holtug (1998) has provided the following example:
Jane is infected with HIV. Her immune system is starting to give in 
and she is about to develop AIDS. Fortunately, there is a new kind 
of gene therapy available – call it therapy A – that will boost her 
immune system and bring it back to normal, so that she will in fact 
never develop AIDS. By performing the therapy, we are correcting 
her (or her immune system). Now consider Helen. She has not yet 
been infected with HIV, but she is a haemophiliac and, since blood 
reserves at the hospital have not been screened for HIV, we know 
it is only a matter of time before she is infected, unless she receives 
a new kind of gene therapy – call it therapy B – that will make her 
immune [...] By performing the therapy, we are enhancing her 
(or her immune system) since we are giving her a desirable property 
that people do not normally (or naturally) have. (p. 211, [emphasis 
in original])
The point of this case is that here it becomes impossible to 
maintain the therapy – enhancement (eugenics) distinction. 
Jane is cured from her HIV seropositive status by her new 
treatment which, as Holtug says, corrects her. Helen (or her 
immune system) is enhanced; she does not yet have the disease, 
and her treatment acts like a vaccination against a disease (HIV) 
which is threatening her, but which she does not yet have. The 
question is: Would, with reference to this case, adherents of 
the  moral desirability of insisting on a distinction between 
treatment and enhancement (eugenics) wish to withhold 
Helen’s drugs from her purely because those drugs are an 
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instance of enhancement and not curing, correction or therapy? 
The latter possibility would, to my mind, be unthinkable, 
inhumane and therefore thoroughly immoral.
With reference to this first general problem, my conclusion 
therefore is that the distinction between therapy and 
enhancement can, at most, be a general regulative idea, but 
that we must be aware of many borderline cases where this 
distinction clearly cannot hold and therefore collapses. The 
prevalence of vaccinations against all kinds of disease 
(smallpox, polio, mumps, measles and rubella) over the past 
century is, in itself, a demonstration of the fact that we do not 
apply the therapy-enhancement distinction consistently. 
Vaccinations are not therapies; they are enhancements of the 
immune system that enable us to avoid disease – not be cured 
from it. We can and ought to expect that similar phenomena 
will increasingly enter our moral radar screens in future.
Compromising autonomy versus 
promoting mastery and perfection
Some of the most vocal concerns about the moral status of 
genetic technologies have to do with the fact that the alleged 
‘enhancements’, which they might bring about, will be the results 
of interventions at the embryonic level. For example (although it 
is by no means yet possible and doubtful whether it ever will be 
possible), an intervention might be found that significantly 
enhances a future child’s mathematical prowess. Such an 
enhancement will then be introduced in some version of gene 
therapy that will be induced into the embryo of the future child. 
The same goes for possible enhancements of physical skills 
(e.g.  introducing superior muscle tissue or bone constitution). 
The question is: Would such ‘enhancements’ not constitute a 
compromise of children’s autonomy to decide for themselves 
what they would want to do, or which careers they wish to follow 
when growing up? Would the knowledge, which they have been 
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thus ‘enhanced’, not put them under irresistible pressure to 
pursue goals set for them by their patents or other people, 
particularly if these enhancements were only made possible at 
considerable costs?
The question in this regard is indeed: Who knows best what is 
to the greatest advantage of an individual belonging to a future 
generation: the individual him- or herself, or the parents? Do, and 
ought, parents to have such determinate rights over the future 
dispositions and choices of their offspring? The phenomenon of 
elective deafness is a case in point. It sometimes occurs that deaf 
parents, who claim that the only culture they know is Deaf culture 
and who refuse to accept that hearing people live in a preferable 
world, insist that, via the technology’s IVF and PGD, an embryo 
be selected that, if it develops to term, will be born as a deaf 
individual. The reason for this, it is claimed, is the parents’ wish to 
let the child be part and parcel of their (Deaf) ‘culture’ (see Van 
Niekerk 2013:108–114).
I am sure most readers experience significant moral discomfort 
with such a prospect. Surely parents ought not to have the right 
to impinge on children’s autonomy to decide for themselves on 
such a monumental issue. In addition, of course, the parents’ 
decision is disingenuous in this case; a hearing child will have the 
capacity to live and operate in both the hearing culture and the 
culture of the deaf; it is not true that selecting a deaf embryo is 
the only way of making the child part of Deaf culture.
That the new biotechnologies might compromise the autonomy 
of newborns, is an argument forcefully developed by Jürgen 
Habermas. He (Habermas 2003) claims that one cannot regard 
oneself as free if one is the product of one’s parents’ genetic 
engineering: 
[I]nterventions aiming at enhancement […] violate the fundamental 
equal status of persons as autonomous beings […] insofar as they 
tie down the person to rejected, but irreversible intentions of third 
parties, barring him from the spontaneous self-perception of being 
the undivided author of his own life. (p. 63, [author’s added emphasis])
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As stated above, I do think that, in general, one might be 
sympathetic to concerns about parents or other people making 
choices (by means of enhancement technologies) that 
compromise the eventual autonomy of human beings to decide 
for themselves what or how they would like to be. At the same 
time, however, I find Habermas’s argument an overstatement of 
this claim. Note the italicised phrase quoted above. It surely is 
overstating the case that each human being is, or can ever be, 
‘the undivided author of his own life’. Our freedom of choice, as 
has been argued by both existentialists (such as Sartre) and 
liberal democracy theorists (such as J.S. Mill), is a remarkable 
aspect of our human experience. Yet, it must be emphasised at 
the same time that who and what I become, as well as my freedom 
of choice generally, is the outcome of opportunities that I acquire 
and experiences that I have, and not the constitution of my 
genotype. Interventions in my genotype might predispose me 
more towards certain activities or proclivities, but not more than 
what will happen as a result of my upbringing or the way in which 
I am educated. A genetic intervention at the embryonic level 
might predispose an individual slightly relative to what the case 
might have been without any intervention (i.e. similarly to the 
way a brother or sister might differ from an individual), but it 
does imply that such an individual still has to be born, raised 
and educated like anyone else and in the process possibly 
turning out to be somebody entirely different from what the 
genetic intervention might have had in mind. The influence of 
environmental factors (parents, teachers, education, experiences, 
role models etc.) on what we become as persons simply cannot 
be denied.
A very prominent contribution to the debate in this regard has 
been made by Michael Sandel, a well known Harvard political 
philosopher. Sandel is particularly concerned that the phenomenon 
of biomedical enhancements applied at the embryonic level is 
indicative of a morally unwarranted ‘obsession with mastery and 
perfection’. In as far as it is directed at the genetic manipulation of 
children, it is indicative of a refusal to ‘accept children as they are, 
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as a gift’ that we are not allowed to manipulate in our own or some 
idealised image (Sandel 2007:80). Because of Sandel’s objection 
to enhancements at the embryonic level, he seems to be opposed 
to the phenomenon of enhancement technologies tout court.
This argument is hardly persuasive. Sandel (2007) is indeed 
not claiming that, because children must be appreciated ‘as gifts 
or blessings’, it implies: 
[T ]o be passive in the face of illness or disease [...] Nor does the 
sense of life as a gift mean that parents must shrink from shaping and 
directing the development of their child. (p. 49)
Apart from an ‘accepting love’, parents must also have a 
‘transformative love’ for their children (Sandel 2007:50).
At this point, the coherence of his argument breaks down: Firstly, 
what is fundamentally the difference between ‘shaping and directing 
the development’ of children (i.e. educating them) and enhancing 
them? Secondly, why can’t a genetically engineered embryo that is, 
for example, less prone to certain diseases or set to attain a certain 
(physical) height in life, not also be a ‘gift’ that further requires 
‘shaping and directing’? Are we not, always, influencing and 
educating our children and thereby doing our best to mould them 
into a fashion of the desired beings that we inevitably prefer? What 
is, in principle, the difference between education and enhancement? 
We resist disease – also genetic disease – with all our might and 
thereby acknowledging that we do not uncritically ‘accept’ 
everything nature bestows on ourselves and our offspring from 
birth. Does ‘the given’ that Sandel (2007:81-100) wishes us to accept 
not inevitably include Huntington’s chorea, cystic fibrosis and 
cancer? Must we ‘accept’ these conditions?
To enhance ourselves and our children is not to pursue a 
coherent blueprint for the future. Sandel confers on the practice 
of enhancement the suspicion that Darwin taught us not to 
have of evolution and the universe. Evolution is not teleological; 
there is no ‘master plan’ for evolution. Evolution proceeds by 
incremental steps infused by contingency. When we enhance, 
like when natural selection happens in the evolution of species, it 
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does not occur in terms of a ‘master plan’, but it is the outcome 
of ‘tinkering’ in view of concrete, short-term needs for 
improvement or survival, mostly precipitated by small mutations. 
Enhancements have in the past and will hopefully in the future 
proceed in a piecemeal manner (Darwin 1971:80–127). There is 
no teleology that natural selection tries to fulfil. The point of 
enhancement is not mastery, but improvement.
I therefore find both Habermas and Sandel’s views 
unpersuasive. A position that creates the impression that one is 
‘against enhancement’ tout court lacks credibility; it is analogous 
to being ‘against technology’ or ‘against globalisation’ – attitudes 
that simply fail to come to grips with inevitable phenomena 
and trends of our current lifeworld.
Genetic biotechnologies and Africa
Genetics and the technologies associated with ‘genetic 
engineering’ are, especially in Africa, a sensitive matter because 
genetics lies and functions at the foundations of family and 
ethnicity24, two of the most powerful forces that determine human 
attitudes and emotions (Van Niekerk 2014:n.p.). Family in Africa 
is a central social construct in terms of which human identity is 
constituted and understood. Race, particularly in Africa, as also 
in many other parts of the world (Van Niekerk 2014:n.p.), is, by 
many, believed to be a genetic trait that has often been elevated 
to the central defining feature of a person’s humanity, and is thus 
one of the most powerful tools for some groups of humans to 
disempower, discriminate against, humiliate and ultimately 
dehumanise fellow human beings. Racism is indeed the original 
form of the ‘genetic ghetto’ into which, according to Buchanan 
et al. (2000:326–328), people can sometimes be marginalised 
because of genetic knowledge and techniques – a ghetto from 
24. Including race, although the latter term is more related to biology than ethnicity, which 
normally rather refers to culture. We know today that the notion of ‘race’, in as far as it is 
identifiable or usable, has no basis in the genomes of people (Jablonski 2006; Atkin 2012). 
However, a vast multitude of people nevertheless regard ‘race’ as determined by genes.
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which the escape is mercifully progressing in our time, although 
it is far from complete.
Given the legacy of racism and the manifold of discriminatory 
perceptions and practices associated with the racist 
marginalisation of the world’s ‘people of colour’ in the past, 
genetic science and technologies do indeed hold, for Africans, 
the threat of the introduction of what Eduardo Rivera-López 
(2002:11) calls ‘a new source of inequality’. If the gains from 
the new genetic technologies will only become manifest 
proportionately to the relative wealth of, and therefore 
predominantly within the confines of the populations of the 
developed world, these new technologies hold the cumbersome 
promise of a new source of disadvantage and marginalisation of 
the peoples of our part of the world where the burdens of 
misfortune, exploitation, poverty and disease threaten to stultify 
countries and communities into chronic maladjustment and 
regression. We therefore ought not to be surprised at widespread 
suspicions among Africans that genetic research and new 
emerging genetic technologies are, or could well be, no less 
than a new form of control over groups of people in the world 
who are allegedly ‘too numerous’ and who are of no relevance 
to market economies (Benatar 1999:172).
Africa has indeed long been the victim of prejudice. Its patent 
current lack of resources and its, generally speaking, limited 
input into state-of-the-art scientific research achievements, hold, 
anew, the threat of a kind of exclusion from the advantages of 
modern medicine. This might, in time, reinforce the prejudice 
against the continent – a prejudice which has in recent times, to 
add insult to injury, been exacerbated by the HIV pandemic (Van 
Niekerk 2014:n.p.). Harold Nickens has shown quite persuasively 
what can easily happen the moment genetics starts playing a 
role when people speculate about the real causes of social 
inequalities. The Tuskegee syphilis experiment, genetic theories 
of intelligence, the potential of discrimination in establishing 
access to health insurance, and the like, are all examples of events 
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that have or could make the science of genomics an instrument 
of renewed social repression (Nickens 1996:61).
It is exactly because of these dangers that it is of paramount 
importance that sensible and prudent public policies for the 
introduction and management of genetic research, technologies 
and therapies be adopted for countries on the African continent. 
I agree with Buchanan et al. (2000) when they claim that it is:
[U]nwise to consider the ethics of genetics only at the individual 
level. What matters is not merely the ethics of the individual scientist, 
physician or counsellor, but the broader questions of justice, of 
claims for freedom and for protection from harm, and our obligations 
towards future generations. (p. 21)
What is therefore important, is the development of a ‘public and 
institutional policy on genetics’ (Buchanan et al. 2000:21) that is 
adopted for the needs of, specifically, the people of Africa.
As is well known, research on the new genetics and its related 
technologies only occurs on a very limited scale in Africa. Africa 
is nevertheless a very important source of information for what 
these technologies might yield in the future. It is equally well 
known that the African gene pool contains much information 
about the history of the human species. It is, nevertheless, safe to 
claim that Africa is not going to figure very prominently in the 
near future as far as the development of these new technologies 
is concerned. It is more likely that the technologies might find a 
wide range of applications that could be of great value to African 
societies. 
Africa is a very poor continent, particularly as far as healthcare 
resources are concerned. Elsewhere, I have explained the African 
predicament as follows (Van Niekerk 2014):
Sub-Saharan Africa generates no more than 1% of the total wealth 
produced in the world. The buying power of all the countries south 
of the Sahara, excluding South Africa, in total just about matches 
that of a country such as Norway. As has often been pointed out, 
Africa is the home of 15% of the world’s population, lives on 1% of 
the global economy, and carries 70% of the world’s HIV/AIDS burden 
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(WHO HIV/AIDS Fact sheet, 2014). The 2010 Health Expenditure 
Report indicates that 84% of annual global health expenditure is 
directed to 18% of the world’s population – the so-called 80–20 
divide. (n.p.)
It is a fact that the United States spends more than half of all 
resources spent on healthcare in the world, but this spending is 
only for the benefit of 5% of the world’s population. In 2014, the 
USA spent more than twice as much per capita on healthcare 
($8745) than the average developed country does ($3484) 
(according to the Peter G. Peterson Foundation [2014]). 
This compares extremely badly with the meagre $49 per 
capita spent in Mozambique in 2014 (The Guardian 2014). These 
figures prove beyond doubt that there is no realistic expectation 
that new genetic technologies, the development of which is 
known to be prohibitively expensive, is soon bound to develop in 
Africa. This has two implications which I have formulated thus 
elsewhere:
 • On the one hand, it holds the danger of perpetuating the gross 
global inequalities in terms of healthcare provision between 
Africa and the West – a situation that, of itself, requires 
increasing moral assessment, as has been done in the work of 
Solly Benatar and others (cf. Benatar 2001a; 2001b; Benatar, 
Daar & Singer 2003). 
• On the other hand, Africa’s limited resources compel us on 
this continent to be quite selective and discriminate about 
those technologies that ought to be deemed appropriate for 
our most urgent needs. Given Africa’s resources crisis, ideas 
about the possibility of all kinds of genetically induced 
personal enhancements are far removed from the urgent and 
immediate healthcare realities that policy-makers have to 
face on a daily basis, given the prohibitive costs that such 
research or technologies might imply. This particularly applies 
to the public health sector which, even in a country such as 
South Africa (a considerably wealthier country than most 
other African states), caters for more than 80% of the 
population. While there has been a decisive improvement in 
membership of medical aid schemes – 2014 figures show that 
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9.7 million South Africans are now members of medical aid 
schemes in a population of 52.98 million, i.e. 18.4% of the 
population – this figure is still woefully inadequate (Statistics 
South Africa: General Household Survey 2014:26–29). It is as 
yet unclear how these schemes will respond to genetic 
therapies. There is, consequently, very little scope, in the short 
to medium term, for exotic genetic technologies to become 
prevalent in African societies (Van Niekerk 2014:n.p.).
Must we conclude from these facts that genetic medicine is 
irrelevant for Africa or cannot, in view of the costs, realistically 
be expected to play an important role in Africa? The latter would 
indeed be a wrong conclusion. It may, in fact, turn out that new 
genetic technologies hold the key to the solution of Africa’s most 
pressing healthcare problems. Here I am specifically referring to 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria – by far the biggest current-day 
killers in Africa and in the rest of the world. With good reason the 
producer of a DVD on killer animals in the African jungles has 
recently, as his last shot, shown a swarm of what remain ‘the 
most dangerous animals in the world’, viz. mosquitoes, the 
carriers of malaria. It could well be expected that the ‘final 
solution’ for the treatment of these diseases resides in the genetic 
manipulation of either the micro-organisms, viruses or bacteria 
that cause these diseases, or the genetic enhancement of people, 
creating immunity from these infections. If that is ever to happen 
(and current developments strongly point in the direction of 
such possibilities), these treatments will turn out to be the 
equivalent of ‘primary care’ for these African populations. It is 
essential that these new therapies be sought and made available 
to African and other developing populations who suffer severely 
from these diseases.
Elsewhere I have concluded (Van Niekerk 2014): 
As far as genetic therapies are concerned, it would, in this respect, 
not be very useful or morally relevant to insist on the therapy/
enhancement distinction (discussed above), since a positive 
outcome of genetic research into the possibility of boosting people’s 
immune systems would be of existential importance to Africans in 
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view of the current AIDS pandemic. As already argued, we are no 
more playing God by altering people genetically so that they have 
greater immunity than we are when we give them vaccinations. (n.p.)
Moral strategy for developing and 
implementing new biotechnologies
Up to this point, much has been said about the nature, potential 
and possible abuse of the new genetic biotechnologies. The 
question remains as to the moral justification of their development 
and implementation, particularly in the developing world.
I would, to conclude this chapter, like to suggest a moral 
strategy that I, following thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, 
Hans Jonas and Zygmunt Bauman, like to call an ‘ethics of 
responsibility’. 
In this regard, I wish to argue one simple claim: The utilisation 
of the new biomedical technologies is morally in order if executed 
with the acceptance of maximal responsibility by all concerned. 
That raises the question of what ‘acceptance of responsibility’ 
means or entails, and it is to this question that I immediately turn.
I have in another earlier article summarised the gist of the 
approach called ‘the ethics of responsibility’ (ER)25 as follows 
(Van Niekerk 2002): 
To take or accept responsibility means to be able to be held 
accountable for whatever decisions are taken on the basis of the 
assumption that reasons can be provided, and that they have 
been thought through, even though they might be fallible. An ER 
is an approach where, on the basis of recognition of the moral 
ambivalences associated with most of the phenomena in the social 
world, the main task of moral judgement is not deemed consistency 
within a single paradigm, but the acceptance of responsibility for 
whatever line of action is recommended. This ethics acknowledges 
the benefits of a variety of approaches, but also admits the failures 
25. The most recent comprehensive book on the ER with specific relation to the work of the 
famous German social theorist, Max Weber, is De Villiers (2018).
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that can be identified in most of these approaches. An ER is a 
form of ethics that makes people – all people, not only politicians, 
researchers, captains of industry, healthcare workers or moral 
philosophers, but also patients and victims of disease – accept 
responsibility for the world in which we live and which we create by 
means of science and technology. It is an ethics that no longer allows 
us to accept the idea that morality is exclusively determined by rules, 
codes and laws behind which people can comfortably hide when 
justifying the morality of actions in morally complex situations. It is 
an ER because it demands that we be accountable for everything 
that we invent and design in our attempts to construct, apply and 
evaluate our life ethos – i.e., the value system according to which we 
live. (pp. 40–41)
Let us elaborate on the two central ideas of the framework called 
the ER. 
The possibility of failure
To refer to responsibility as the most central concept in an 
approach to moral reasoning requires not only careful reflection 
on the reasons for moral decisions, but also the willingness and 
ability to publicly state and defend those reasons. Yet, the ER is 
not a moral theory that claims infallibility. The provision of 
additional information when grappling with ethical issues, or 
even the confrontation with superior moral reasoning – reasoning 
that is more comprehensive and that more fully takes into 
account concerns that were not realised initially – could result in 
the exponent of the ER to change his or her mind, or to come to 
a different conclusion. At the same time, a decision might have 
been made in terms of the original reasoning of the adherent of 
ER. In such a case, the requirement is not an irrational attachment 
to the original judgement, but the willingness and ability to 
clearly state the concerns that were originally taken into account. 
We often find ourselves in situations where moral judgements 
are urgent, and decisions need to be taken on the basis of such 
judgements. What is important in the ER is not the assurance 
that no mistake has (or could have been) made, but the intellectual 
integrity of putting all one’s cards on the table and, step by step, 
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reconstructing the original argument and decision as well as the 
considerations in terms of which it might have failed.
ER is therefore an ethics of fallibility; at a point, we have to 
make a decision in order to move forward, but that decision can 
be wrong and can have dire consequences. Yet, not taking the 
decision or preventing some action can have equally disastrous 
consequences. We have to accept responsibility for whatever we 
decide in the end. Certainty cannot be demanded of us in these 
decision-making situations. What can, however, be demanded, is 
the full catalogue of our reasons and the arguments supporting 
those reasons. When thus engaging in an ER, we have no 
assurance of correct moral behaviour, but we do have assurance 
of responsible moral behaviour. The latter is mostly what can 
realistically be expected from moral agents. (Van Niekerk & 
Nortjé 2013:29).
Phronesis: The dialectic of norms and 
applications
This brings us to the second aspect of the framework developed 
above, viz. the dialectic between appeals to moral norms, on the 
one hand, and the consideration of consequences, on the other 
hand, in the functioning of the ER. 
One of the things that might lead an adherent of the ER to a 
different conclusion than the one originally reached, and which 
thus shows the possible fallibility of the ER approach, is the issue 
of consequences, particularly also if they are unforeseen. If that 
can (and indeed often does) happen, the question becomes why 
the ER as an approach is to be preferred to full-fledged 
consequentialism, that is, the approach to moral reasoning that 
claims the best action is the one supported by the positive 
balance of good over bad consequences.
I find approaches to moral reasoning where the moral relevance 
of consequences are flatly denied (e.g. Kantianism) as objectionable 
as approaches which argue that ‘only consequences matter’ 
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(Rachels & Rachels 2010:111–114). These exclusivist approaches fly 
in the face of some of our most basic moral intuitions. 
There is, as far as I am concerned, an approach to moral 
reasoning that goes a long way in acknowledging the moral force 
of both rules and consequences, of principles and considerations 
of utility in our understanding of morality. I refer to the ethics of 
the Greek thinker, Aristotle, who arguably is the most influential 
intellectual that ever lived. I am particularly referring to Book six 
of his famous Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1955) where he 
deals with the ‘intellectual virtues’ (pp. 203–225 or sections 
1138b1b-1145111). What I would like to devote some attention to is 
his notion of ‘prudence’ or ‘practical wisdom’ – these notions are 
the best English translations of the forceful Greek word phronesis 
that Aristotle explicates in this part of his Ethics. 
A central difference between the ethical ideas of Aristotle and 
his great teacher, Plato, is that ethics, for Plato, amounts to a 
kind of theoretical knowledge (originating from our intellectual 
contemplation of the ‘form of the good’ in our ‘pre-existence’), 
whereas ethical knowledge for Aristotle is practical knowledge – 
knowledge emanating from practical choices we make every 
day. Ethics thus is not concerned with intellectual insight and 
approval as it is for Plato, but with concrete, practical life skills. 
The word he uses by preference for this kind of knowledge is 
phronesis [practical wisdom]. What is important for Aristotle, is 
not so much to know what the good ‘is’ (i.e. Plato’s concern). 
What is important, is to know how to live, how to act justifiably 
and responsibly in the practical situations of everyday life where 
the norms and rules, which we draw on, need to be applied. Such 
situations should influence policy formation rather than serve as 
rules cast in stone.
Phronesis is practical knowledge of how to live the good life. 
But the end of phronesis, the ‘good life’, is not a fixed, 
circumscribed condition about which we are all in agreement 
such as a painless tooth or a working computer. The good life is, 
in fact, not necessarily the same for everyone. Phronesis is a kind 
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of knowledge of both means and ends. The end that we choose 
will influence the means we adopt to acquire it, and vice versa. In 
the words of Comte-Sponville (2001): 
Prudence has something modest or instrumental to it: it is enlisted 
to serve ends that are not its own and is concerned, for its own part, 
with the choice of means. (p. 32)
Aristotle does not require us to make a stark choice between a 
kind of ethics where we only follow rules and act upon fixed 
principles, on the one hand, or where our only concern is the 
consequences of our actions. When we act with phronesis 
(or  prudence), we cultivate or exercise ourselves in a kind of 
knowledge where we try to act in accordance with precepts or 
action guides that we acknowledge, but in such a way that they 
are prudently applied to the situation in which I find myself and 
where I must act in a way that I can live with the consequences. 
That application requires deliberation – a rational interchange 
that moves to and fro between the requirement of the norm 
and the requirements of the situation. 
Richard Bernstein (1986) formulates it as follows: 
[P]hronesis is a form of reasoning and knowledge that involves a 
distinctive mediation between the universal and the particular. This 
mediation is not accomplished by any appeal to technical rules or 
Method (in the Cartesian sense) or by the subsumption of a pre-
given determinate universal to a particular case [...] phronesis is a 
form of reasoning which yields a typical ‘ethical know-how’ in which 
both what is universal and what is particular are co-determined. 
Furthermore, phronesis involves a ‘peculiar interlacing of being and 
knowledge, determination through one’s own becoming’. It is not to 
be identified with or confused with the type of ‘objective knowledge’ 
that is detached from one’s own being and becoming. (p. 99)
Aristotle (1955), himself, makes this clear: 
Prudence is not concerned with universals only; it must also take 
cognisance of particulars, because it is concerned with conduct, and 
conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances. (p. 213; 1141b8-27)
This quoted sentence from Aristotle’s Ethics represents the crux 
of his insights in this regard. Here we see what he essentially 
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means by moral knowledge. For the sake of reliable moral 
knowledge, we do draw on the rules and norms that we are taught 
when becoming educated, but which we also internalise because 
of our education, religion, conscience and by accepting the 
conventions of society. But simply to know the rules is far from 
enough. They need to be responsibly applied in a host of practical 
situations. How they are to be applied, is far from self-evident. 
That is something that we learn in the practice of daily life. It does 
not occur overnight; it takes time. We learn it in many ways. The 
way that Aristotle particularly emphasises, is deliberation. 
Deliberation is an argumentative strategy that requires 
dialogue with ourselves and with others. It implies the careful 
weighing up of the claim of the norm against the requirement of 
the situation – bearing in mind, especially, the consequences of 
what our deeds will have. In this sense, deliberation – the essence 
of phronesis – is a dialectic movement between action guide and 
the requirements of the practical situation, as well as the possible 
consequences of the action (Van Niekerk & Nortjé 2013:30).
Although Aristotle did not use the phrase ER, this, to my mind, 
is the essence of the ER that I developed as the overarching 
framework for moral argumentation in this article, drawing on 
work also done elsewhere (Van Niekerk 2002; Van Niekerk & 
Nortjé 2013). It is the ethics that springs from the application of 
phronesis.
Conclusion
In the first section of this chapter, I have given an overview of the 
range of new biotechnologies, operating mostly at the genetic 
level, that are actually and potentially starting to infiltrate our 
lifeworld and radically change our management and control over 
disease and debility. I have particularly pointed out how the main 
moral controversy surrounding these new technologies stem 
from the capability to (also biomedically) enhance the human 
person that they offer – already, or in the future.
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In the second section, I critically discussed two of the main 
moral controversies provoked by, in particular, these alleged 
enhancement technologies. The first problem stems from the 
claim that technologies that cure unmistakeably sick people are 
morally in order, while those that simply enhance existing, 
‘normal’ capacities run the risk of promoting a eugenic agenda 
and are therefore morally problematic. While I in general share 
the sympathies embodied by this concern, I pointed out that the 
treatment-enhancement dichotomy is difficult to sustain 
consistently, and that we will have to get used to a number of 
grey areas that will continue to accompany our reflection and 
influence our decisions in this regard. 
The second problem, particularly provoked by the 
contributions of Habermas and Sandel, is the question whether 
the new enhancement technologies compromise children’s 
autonomy and promote an irrational quest for mastery and 
perfection in society. These thinkers’ ideas were explained and 
submitted to critical scrutiny. The conclusion was, again, that we 
must be careful to ascribe to these technologies all kinds of 
sinister consequences that are unjustified, and that we would be 
wise to carefully compare these technologies to common 
practices such as education that are not self-evidently morally 
dubious.
I, then, asked the question about the use and applicability of 
these technologies to the African continent. It is clear that Africa 
will not in the near (or probably distant) future be the origin of 
such technologies. The development of these technologies also 
seems to have the potential of exacerbating the existing 
inequalities between developed and developing worlds. At the 
same time, some of these technologies might hold the key to the 
effective management of Africa’s severest health hazards such 
as HIV, malaria and tuberculosis. It therefore is imperative to 
keep Africa in the loop as far as the development and applications 
of these technologies are concerned.
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In the last section of the chapter, I dealt with the development 
of a moral approach that offers the best guidance for reflection 
on the moral status of these technologies and their implementation. 
The key concept in this regard is responsibility. Only by fully 
accepting responsibility for what is done, will the development 
and implementation of these new techniques and therapies yield 
the efficacious outcome that they promise future generations. 
To be responsible means to be able and willing to always provide 
well-argued reasons for every action, but also to acknowledge 
the possibility of, and to take responsibility for, failure.
Very few things in life are inherently good or evil; the same 
applies to the new genetic biotechnologies. Their value and their 
moral acceptability will always depend on the good that they 
can achieve and the suffering they can avoid. Decisions in this 
regard will have to be made on a case by case basis, and will only 
succeed moral scrutiny if those decisions are couched in the 
sustained acceptance and execution of the sense of responsibility 
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Introduction
In his book, The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the 
Struggle  for Democracy in South Africa, André Odendaal 
(2012:5) observes that ‘[d]uring the era of European expansion, 
the world came to be defined in the image of the Europeans 
[author’s added emphasis]’. The period Odendaal refers to is that 
of the colonisation of countries outside Europe by Europeans. 
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However, even with formal decolonisation, the impact of European 
colonialism lingered on. European colonialism has proven to be 
resilient because ‘[w]herever Europe went in the globe, it planted 
its memory’ (Wa Thiong’o 2005:157). Europe accomplished this 
‘by imposing European languages on the conquered’ (Wa Thiong’o 
2005:158). The ultimate objective of imposing European languages 
was raising them to the level ‘of an ideal whose achievement was 
the pinnacle of Enlightenment’ (Wa Thiong’o 2005:158). Because 
languages are not merely communicating tools, but carriers and 
memory banks of cultures, the elevation of European languages 
also meant not only the marginalisation of African languages, but 
also the displacement of Africans’ memory and its replacement 
with European memory (Wa Thiong’o 2005:158). It is for this 
reason that in 2012, Odendaal (2012:4), significantly and correctly 
observes that ‘[t]oday the entire global system of politics and 
economics has been shaped by Europeans and their descendants’. 
The act of destroying others’ cultures and centering Europe by 
making this continent the sole reference point in every aspect of 
life, whether academically, politically, socially, economically and 
culturally is called Eurocentrism (Wa Thiong’o 1986:93). It is as a 
result of Eurocentrism that, in the words of Odendaal (2012:n.p.), 
‘the world came to be defined in the image of the Europeans 
[author’s added emphasis]’. The media played a critical and 
unethical role in advancing the project of Eurocentrism instead 
of, as it should, allowing all cultural expressions to represent 
themselves. Mbennah, Hooyberg and Mersham (1998) note that:
[T ]he mass media were […] misused to create a wrong and negative 
image of the African continent and its people. During colonial times 
the mass media were used to foster loyalty to and conformity with 
the colonial system and to counter anti-colonial elements. To this 
end, the media were willing partners of the colonial governments in 
their sustained negative campaign of presenting Africans as being 
culturally and mentally inferior. (p. 35)
In recognition of, and in order to counter this inferiorisation, 
Africans – those in the continent as well as those in the 
diaspora – convened together, on the 23rd, 24th and 25th July, 
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1900, in London, at a Pan-African Conference (PAC) initiated by 
a Trinidadian lawyer, Sylvester Henry Williams (Sherwood 
2011:72). The conference was the initiative of the African 
Association (AA) which was formed in 1897 by Williams in 
London, and later renamed as Pan-African Association (PAA) 
after the conference (Sherwood 2011:13, 91). The AA intended 
to, among its aims and objectives, encourage a feeling of unity 
to facilitate friendly intercourse among Africans in general. 
It  sought to make representations in cases of oppression 
affecting Africans ‘wherever found’ (Sherwood 2011:50). Thus, 
the AA ‘became the first organisation that took “its initiative 
from and is composed entirely of members of African descent”’ 
(Sherwood 2011:58): 
That Williams managed to form an association of Black people from 
around the world was unprecedented. That it had begun to take 
action on issues affecting Black peoples in many parts of the world 
was a stupendous achievement. (p. 62)
Just as the colonialists saw the effectiveness of the media in 
disseminating their messages, Africans saw the need to set up 
their own newspapers to advance their cause. In this regard, the 
PAA established its own journal called the Pan-African in 1901 
(Sherwood 2011:120). The Pan-African sought to ‘fearlessly and 
impartially’ report on welfare and progress of the African people 
(Sherwood 2011:129). The aims and objectives of the PAA were a 
manifestation of Pan-Africanism. 
Among many definitions, Pan-Africanism refers to the unity of 
Africans throughout the world in a quest to free themselves from 
all forms of foreign domination, including slavery, imperialism, 
colonialism and neo-colonialism (Asante 2015:235; Prah 1998:1). 
Available literature suggests that the concept ‘Pan-African’ was 
used for the first time in 1893 at the Chicago Congress on Africa 
and is thus seen as the ‘beginning of Pan-Africanism as a 
movement’ (Adi & Sherwood 2003:xi). Subsequent to the PAC 
held in London, there were five Pan-African Congresses held that 
preceded the gaining of independence by African countries from 
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1957 onwards (Asante 2015:237–241). Under the leadership of 
W.E.B. du Bois these were held in Paris (1919), London, Brussels 
and Paris (1921), London and Lisbon (1923), New York (1927) and 
Manchester (1945) (Asante 2015:237–241). After the independence 
of African countries, the 6th Congress was held in Tanzania 
(1974), the 7th in Uganda (1994) and the 8th in South Africa 
(Abdul-Raheem 1996:8; Prah 2014:71). The ideology of Pan-
Africanism is not simply about opposing oppression, but also 
about proposing alternatives. In recognising that their oppression 
de-Africanised and dehumanised them, Africans sought to 
re-Africanise and re-humanise themselves. This quest is called 
the African Renaissance - a commitment to African ‘rebirth’ and 
‘renewal’. 
Available literature suggests that the first person to speak 
about the African Renaissance was the American-born Pan-
Africanist, Martin Robinson Delany, in 1858, when he spoke about 
the ‘moral, social and political elevation of ourselves and the 
regeneration [author’s added emphasis] of Africa’ (Sherwood 
2003:36). He was followed by a South African Pan-Africanist, 
Pixley kaIsaka Seme, then a 25-year-old student at Columbia 
University, who wrote an essay that won the first prize of the 
Curtis Medal Orations at Columbia University, entitled ‘The 
Regeneration of Africa’ (Kumalo 2015:191; Obeng 1997:136). Then 
came Nnamdi Azikiwe who penned Renascent Africa in 
1937  (Maloka 1999:30). The three were then followed by the 
Senegalese Pan-Africanist, Cheikh Anta Diop who, on the basis 
of available literature, is credited with being the first person to 
use the concept ‘African Renaissance’ in 1948 when he penned 
the article ‘When can we talk of an African Renaissance?’. Against 
this background, it is not an empty assumption to argue that the 
African Renaissance is a Pan-Africanist project. Saying so is not 
the same as saying that every African Renaissance advocate is a 
Pan-Africanist, or that every Pan-Africanist is an adherent of the 
African Renaissance.
If the African Renaissance project were to be successful, Diop 
(1996:35) argued that the ‘development of our indigenous 
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languages is the prerequisite for a real African Renaissance’. 
Equally, Diop (1987:8) argued that linguistic unity is a necessary 
unity without which ‘national cultural unity is fragile and illusory’. 
Diop (1987:12) argued strongly that linguistic unity based on 
foreign languages is tantamount to ‘cultural abortion’ that would 
irremediably result in the death of Africans’ authentic culture, 
ultimately reducing Africans to ‘perpetual copycats, having 
missed out on our historical mission in the world’ (Diop 1987):
[The] influence of language is so great that the various European 
mother countries feel they can afford to withdraw politically from 
Africa without great loss as long as their (linguistic) presence remains 
in the economic, spiritual and cultural spheres. (p. 13) 
Recognising the central role of writers in the preservation and 
development of languages, Wa Thiong’o (1986) took the argument 
further by pointing out that: 
[W ]riting in our languages per se - although a necessary first step 
in the correct direction – will not itself bring about the renaissance 
in African cultures if that literature does not carry the content of our 
people’s anti-imperialist struggles to liberate their productive forces 
from foreign control. (p. 29)
Below I am going to demonstrate that a number of African 
journalists in South Africa have historically sought to publish 
newspapers dedicated to Pan-Africanism and the African 
Renaissance in African languages. In doing so, they waged their 
struggles on the basis of African history and culture. The 
examination of African issues on the basis of African history and 
culture is called Afrocentricity (Karenga 2003:77). It is a direct 
challenge to Eurocentrism but not the other side of the same coin 
in that while Eurocentrism advocates the cultural superiority of 
European values, Afrocentricity advocates multi-culturalism 
(Karenga 2003:75). Afrocentricity is ethical in its advancement 
of equality and freedom while Eurocentrism is unethical in its 
advancement of inequality and oppression. I begin by giving a 
brief outline of the concrete expressions of Pan-Africanism in 
Africa’s liberation struggles, their successes and failures. 
Thereafter, I trace how South African newspapers made a 
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contribution to these struggles. In the concluding remarks it is 
pointed out that the objectives of Pan-Africanism and the African 
Renaissance are far from being accomplished, and therefore it is 
argued that Afrocentric journalism, in aid of Pan-Africanism and 
the African Renaissance, is an ethical imperative.
Concrete expressions of Pan-
Africanism: Successes and failures
In 1957, Ghana, under the leadership of its first post-colonial head 
of state, Kwame Nkrumah, became the first African state to 
achieve independence. From day one of Ghana’s independence, 
Nkrumah (2017:155) declared that ‘the independence of Ghana is 
meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the 
African continent’. Through Pan-Africanism (also to be referred 
to as ‘African Unity’, interchangeably) Nkrumah hoped that 
African countries would constitute a United States of Africa that 
would strive not only for political independence, but also 
economic liberation (Davidson 2007:41–42). 
Africans’ newly regained freedom inspired high hopes and 
promised liberating freedoms (Davidson 1992:8). But it was not 
long before these high hopes were reduced to despair as brutal 
African dictatorial governments took over and usurped Africans’ 
newly found freedoms (Davidson 1992:9). Ordinary Africans’ 
morale was deflated when their leaders acquired wealth by 
corrupt means, and as if that was not bad enough, became 
ostentatious about it (Davidson 2007:179–180). Leaders’ worth 
was no longer measured by commitment to the improvement of 
ordinary people’s lives but by the size of the leaders’ cars and 
houses (Davidson 2007:136). 
The scramble for scarce resources, however, did not only take 
place among the African elites, but also among the ordinary 
African masses. Just as the African elites felt it was their turn to 
enjoy benefits previously enjoyed by the ruling European elites, 
Africans in different African countries turned on fellow Africans 
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of different geographical origins. At the Ivory Coast, Dahoman 
and Voltaic traders found themselves at the receiving end of 
Ivory Coast’s locals. These ‘foreigners’ were called on to leave, 
their shops were burnt, and street stalls wrecked with the 
government of the Ivory Coast commanding them to go, so as to 
satisfy their nationals (Fanon 2001:125). In 1983, in what Prah 
(2006:32) refers to as possibly the greatest expulsion in living 
memory, Nigeria expelled large numbers of fellow Africans, 
especially Ghanaians, from its soil. However, Prah (2006:32) 
reminds us that 14 years earlier, the Ghanaians did the same thing 
in 1969 when they expelled thousands of Nigerians and other 
West Africans, many of whom had been born in Ghana and 
therefore knew no other home. After the 1994 South African 
democratic elections that saw Africans coming into power, 
followed by a history of a long liberation struggle supported by 
Africans from countries outside South Africa, some black South 
Africans violently attacked fellow Africans and, in some cases, 
killed them by setting them alight after pouring petrol over their 
bodies (Prah 2006:38).
In the face of such African disintegration - a direct opposite of 
Pan-Africanism’s quest for African integration - Fanon (2001:128–
129) appropriately refers to passionate calls for ‘African unity’ as 
that ‘vague formula’ which enables advocates of colonialism to 
‘laugh to themselves derisively when they hear magnificent 
declarations about African unity’. Taking into consideration this 
African self-destruction, Fanon (2001) further observes that it 
makes sense: 
[W]hy keen-witted international observers have hardly taken 
seriously the great flights of oratory about African unity, for it is true 
that there are so many cracks in that unity visible to the naked eye 
that it is only reasonable to insist that all these contradictions ought 
to be resolved before the day of unity can come. (p. 131)
Fanon fervently believed that Pan-Africanism required something 
much more concrete, something very ‘distinct from the hollow 
sloganising of much of the nationalist movement on the continent’ 
(Zeilig 2016:119).
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There are various factors that have undermined the 
development of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. 
One of them is the failure of African leaders to recognise the 
need for linguistic unity, which Diop (1987) has identified as a 
prerequisite for both Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. 
In addition to their own ethnic African languages, Africans are 
set apart from one another by European languages such as 
English, French, Portuguese and others. Calls for a continental 
language that would facilitate a connection and understanding 
among Africans throughout the African continent have so far 
remained just that – calls (Diop 1987:11). Be that as it may, history 
has, happily, recorded that some African intellectuals and 
journalists have appreciated the importance of promoting 
African unity through African languages. Pointing this out is not 
the same as saying that their journalism was the first in employing 
African languages. There were Christian missionary newspapers 
before them. The difference is that in the case of Christian 
missionary newspapers, the agenda, as will be pointed out below, 
was to advance Christian missionary work, while African 
journalists’ work was to advance the liberation struggle’s 
objectives.
The journalists, John Tengo Jabavu, Solomon Tshekiso Plaatje 
and Pixley ka Isaka Seme, whose works are to be examined 
below, had links with Pan-African movements and activists 
outside South Africa.
Imvo zabantsudu [native opinion]: 
A pioneer in African political 
journalism
Imvo Zabantsundu was established by John Tengo Jabavu in 
1884 in King William’s Town and was published in isiXhosa and 
English (Molema 2012:39, 54). While Jabavu did not attend the 
PAC organised by Williams in 1900, in 1899 he did attend a 
meeting of the African Association that was organising the PAC 
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(Sherwood 2011:248). His name appears as one of South Africans 
consulted about the idea and whose support was secured 
(Sherwood 2011:71). Jabavu’s name also appears as one of the 
PAA’s committee members (Sherwood 2011:121, 128). When 
Williams went to South Africa in 1903, Imvo welcomed and gave 
coverage to his activities (Sherwood 2011:143,155).
Imvo was not the first newspaper to be published in an African 
language, isiXhosa, in particular. There were other newspapers 
before it such as Umshumayeli Wendaba (1837), Ikwezi (1844), 
Indaba (1862) and Isigidimi Sama Xhosa (1876) (Diederichs & De 
Beer 1998:90). What distinguished Imvo from its predecessors 
was that Imvo was owned by an African, Jabavu, while others 
were owned by white missionaries. The ownership of newspapers 
by white missionaries had serious implications for African 
interests and welfare. In an act that showed common interests 
between the British colonialists and Christian missionaries, 
Isigidimi refused to publish an article by Jonas Ntsiko, the 
rejection based on the logic that the article ‘attacked British rule 
in South Africa’ (Odendaal 2012:102).
It is important to note that before Jabavu founded Imvo, he 
was first the editor of Isigidimi (Odendaal 2012:102). While, 
initially, Jabavu was relatively free to articulate his views in 
Isigidimi, ‘after complaints from whites about Isigidimi’s “political 
tendency”’, Jabavu was cautioned to be ‘more moderate’ 
(Odendaal 2012:103). Confronted with the option of succumbing 
to his bosses’ pressure, or taking the exit route, Jabavu decided 
to resign his editorship, three months ahead of his contract’s 
expiry date (Odendaal 2012:103). His action responded to an 
expressed need by Africans to have a platform that was free 
from ‘foreigners’ control, and a view that the ‘missionary-
controlled Isigidimi no longer satisfied their needs’ (Odendaal 
2012:102).
A newspaper ‘read and loved by all the Africans’, Imvo 
informed its readership not only about what was taking place in 
South Africa but kept them abreast about international affairs 
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(Molema 2012:39). It responded to Africans’ quest for Pan-
Africanism in that in a short space of time (Odendaal 2012):
[T ]he new newspaper brought together the fragmented pattern 
of African politics in the Eastern Cape into a much more cohesive 
whole. As well as adding to the confidence and effectiveness of the 
emerging elite, it became a potent unifying force among Africans 
[…] Imvo enabled Africans to express their point of view for the first 
time and exposed missionary interests as divergent from those of 
Africans in a way Indaba, Isigidimi and other newspapers could never 
have done. (pp. 106–107, [author’s added emphasis])
One of the people who were highly inspired by Imvo and Jabavu 
was Solomon Tshekiso Plaatje, who was later to become an 
editor of newspapers in his own right – an issue to which will be 
returned to later. Plaatje did not only have an emotional and 
long-distance relationship with Imvo and its editor, Jabavu. 
Driven by the ‘high esteem in which he held Jabavu, [and] 
because of their friendship, and because of his great desire to 
contribute to the advancement of Africans’, Plaatje took the job 
of acting editor of Imvo late in 1911, while Jabavu was in Europe 
(Molema 2012:52). This was a huge sacrifice for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, Plaatje was not paid for this job; secondly, he 
had to travel long distances between Kimberley and King 
William’s Town to perform this task; and thirdly, while editing 
Imvo he was struggling to keep his own newspaper, Tsala ea 
Becoana alive (Molema 2012:52). In spite of these difficulties 
‘Plaatje edited Imvo so well that Jabavu was very happy indeed 
on his return from England and published a short tribute, thanking 
Sol Plaatje for his outstanding work’ (Molema 2012:52).
However, the sweet relationship between Jabavu and Plaatje 
soon turned sour due to their political differences. It needs to be 
recalled at this point that the establishment of Imvo was with 
financial assistance from some white liberals, namely James Weir 
and R.W. Rose-Innes (Ndletyana 2008:35). The support for Jabavu 
was reciprocated by his support for his benefactors’ political 
interests (Ndletyana 2008:35). When the racist South African 
government introduced the Land Act of 1913, which effectively 
dispossessed Africans of their land, Jabavu supported it and 
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claimed that he had the support in this of fellow Africans (Plaatje 
2007:163). Jabavu’s position drew Plaatje’s ire. He dismissed 
Imvo as a ‘paper […] native only in language’ and further remarking 
that ‘God forbid that we should ever find that our mind had 
become the property of someone other than ourselves’. The 
implication here was that Jabavu and his newspaper had become 
white people’s mouthpieces. Plaatje (2007:165) further called 
Jabavu to a public meeting in King William’s Town in order to 
prove the African people’s support he claimed – a challenge 
Jabavu refused to rise up to. But what was Plaatje’s own 
independent contribution to African journalism?
Solomom Tshekiso Plaatje’s 
journalism: Koranta ea Becoana
Koranta ea Becoana, a newspaper published in SeTswana and 
English and founded by Silas Theleso Molema who requested 
Plaatje to become its editor, came into being in 1901 (Molema 
2012:xii,38; Wilan 1984:99). Plaatje was the first General 
Secretary of the South SANNC, later to become the African’s 
National Congress (ANC) (Wilan 1984:vi). Like Jabuvu, Plaatje 
had links with Pan-Africanist movements abroad. While touring 
the United States in the 1920s, Plaatje shared a platform, at 
least twice, with the UNIA’s leader, Marcus Garvey (Wilan 
1984:266–267). His activities in the USA were reported in UNIA’s 
newspaper, the Negro World (Wilan 1984:266–267). Plaatje also 
met Du Bois in 1921 who invited the former to attend the 1921 
Pan-African Congress (Wilan 1984:271). Unable to make it due 
to financial constraints, Plaatje’s letter of support was read at 
the Paris Pan-African Congress by Du Bois himself (Wilan 
1984:271, 273).
Imvo served as an inspiration in the birth of Koranta ea 
Becoana. In establishing the newspaper, it was hoped that 
Koranta ea Becoana (Molema 2012):
[C]ould do for the BaTswana what Imvo was doing for the amaXhosa 
and amaFengu in King William’s Town, East London, Queenstown, 
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Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth and the Transkei. They hoped that 
the little ray of light cast by this paper might also do the same for 
Lesotho. (p. 39)
Plaatje was deeply concerned that BaTswana children sent to 
school looked down upon their own language and seemed to 
think that ‘education only means eloquence in a foreign language’ 
(Molema 2012):
They look down upon their own culture and feel ashamed of their 
own language, SeTswana […] Batswana, my people, we are lost. 
We are a community of slaves and imitators without a backbone or 
grounding in our cultural heritage. Can we be really anything in the 
world if we do not know our identity? How can other nations respect 
us? (p. 105)
Plaatje feared that if the BaTswana lost their language, which 
embodied the African philosophy, botho (ubuntu or African 
Humanism), they would look like ‘aimless vagrants picking up 
the crumbs left by foreigners’ (Molema 2012:105).
As the editor of Koranta ea Becoana, Plaatje dedicated his 
newspaper to ‘the amelioration of the Native’ (Wilan 1984:108). In 
a demonstration of African pride, as soon as he assumed his role 
of editorship, he was assisted by a permanent staff (Wilan 1984):
[A]ll of them Africans; no whites, to the surprise of many who found 
it difficult to believe that the newspaper could be run without white 
assistance, were ever involved in running it. (p. 108)
While Plaatje, through his newspaper, struggled against a 
powerful white government, the resources at his disposal were 
thin. Consequently, due to financial constraints, the newspaper 
Koranta ea Becoana folded in 1909 (Molema 2012:49).
In an act of resilience, Plaatje established yet another 
newspaper, Tsala ea Becoana, which was published in SeTswana, 
isiXhosa and English (Molema 2012:49, 57). The newspaper 
advanced a call ‘encouraging Africans to unite’ to fight against 
laws that discriminated against Africans (Molema 2012:56). 
However, Plaatje’s opposition to discrimination was not confined 
to ‘race’, but also extended to gender. When in 1902, Africans 
convened an African Native Convention in Queenstown but 
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barred women’s participation, singling out Charlotte Maxeke 
(about whom much more will be said later), Plaatje argued in the 
Koranta ea Becoana (Molema 2012) that the:
[C]onvention would surely have benefited by the experience of one, 
who though a woman, is not only their [men] intellectual superior, 
but is besides leading an adventurous life among the heathens of 
Zoutpansbergen, while they [men] demonstrate their manliness by 
leisurely enjoying the sea breezes at the coast. (p. 93)
Plaatje was irked that (Molema 2012):
Out of a gathering of 40 robust men not one could boast of even 
a Kaffrarian degree, while Miss Charlotte Maxeke who was refused 
admittance on account of her sex is, besides other attainments a 
BA and BSc of an American University, and in a report covering 
more than nine columns of the Izwi, hers was the smartest and most 
sensible little speech. (p. 92)
In case the above was not clear, Plaatje, putting the liberation 
struggle into context, pointed out that ‘just as strongly as we 
object to the line of demarcation being drawn on the basis of a 
person’s colour, so we abhor disqualification founded on a 
person’s sex’ (Molema 2012:93). As early as 1902, Plaatje, through 
his journalism, eloquently emphasised the inseparability of the 
fight for non-racialism and non-sexism, an idea that was resisted 
by many in the liberation movement.
Plaatje’s empathy for and commitment to women’s liberation 
was consistent and not fashionable. In his classic text, Native life 
in South Africa, he pays an eloquent yet poignant tribute to the 
then Orange Free State province women, who, in 1913 marched 
against the South African government’s pass laws that restricted 
African movements in the country. The women marched to the 
government’s offices, handed over their passes and declared 
that they were no longer prepared to carry them, whereupon 
they were arrested and subjected to humiliating and torturous 
conditions in different prisons in the Free State (Plaatje 2007:96). 
When Plaatje (2007), visited the women:
[A] severe shock burst upon us, inside the prison walls, when the 
matron withdrew the barriers and the emaciated figures of ladies 
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and young girls of our acquaintance filed out and greeted us. It was 
an exceptionally cold week, and our hearts bled to see young 
women of Bloemfontein, who had spent all their lives in the capital 
and never knew what it was to walk without socks, walking the 
chilly cemented floors and the cold and the sharp pebbles without 
boots. Their own boots and shoes had been taken off, they told 
us, and they were, throughout the winter, forced to perform hard 
labour barefooted […] Tears rolled down our cheeks as we saw 
the cracks on their bare feet, the swellings and chronic chilblains, 
which made them look like sheep suffering from foot-and-mouth 
disease. (p. 96)
Despite the horrifying conditions these African women were 
subjected to, when given the option of a fine instead of serving 
time in prison (Plaatje 2007): 
They all refused to pay the fines and said their little ones could be 
entrusted to the care of providence till their mothers and sisters have 
broken the shackles of oppression by means of passive resistance. 
(p. 95) 
Plaatje’s recording of this event is significant for two reasons. 
The first is that there is little known and said about the 1913 
Women’s March. The famous one, being the 1956 Women’s March 
is celebrated as an official public holiday on 9 August in South 
Africa. The second reason is that many in South Africa think that 
the decision to refuse to pay fines and accept imprisonment was 
unprecedented when the PAC, led by its president, Mangaliso 
Robert Sobukwe, took this stance in the 1960 Anti-Pass Campaign 
March. In journalising this historical occasion and exposing the 
great historical contribution made by women, Plaatje’s journalism 
was Afrocentric. 
Despite Plaatje’s courageous efforts to fly the flag of Tsala 
ea Becoana, due to financial constraints, the newspaper folded 
in 1912 (Molema 2012:49). In the same year he launched 
another, Tsala ea Batho, which struggled along until its 
publication ceased in 1917 (Molema 2012:49, 59). Now we turn 
to another newspaper, Abantu-Batho that also played a 





The Abantu-Batho newspaper was founded in 1912. It was the 
brainchild of Pixley ka Isaka Seme, the man who was also the 
brains behind the founding of the SANN, also founded in 1912, 
and later renamed as the ANC (Saunders 2012:117). The fact that 
Seme was behind the founding of both entities is no coincidence. 
The newspaper was meant to serve as the mouthpiece of the 
ANC in its struggle to liberate Africans from being subjected to 
white domination by white colonialists ‘in the land of their birth’ 
(Saunders 2012:120). While it is an established fact that Seme 
founded Abantu-Batho, it is not clear whether the newspaper 
was, from its inception, an official organ of the ANC (Limb 
2012a:7, 6, 19). What is doubtless is that it was informed by the 
ANC’s quest for African unity and nation-building (Limb 2012a:4). 
It is on this basis that one can argue that Abantu-Batho supported 
Pan-Africanism. Equally, taking into cognisance Limb’s (2012a:4) 
observation that Abantu-Batho played a role in seeking to 
‘recapture African dignity lost under colonialism’, it can be safely 
said that the newspaper played an important role in the quest for 
an African Renaissance.
The African Renaissance project found expression in Abantu-
Batho in the act of reinserting into discourses African notion of 
politics (as around chiefs), and new hybrids of African and 
Western politics (such as Congress itself, ‘a very African [emphasis 
in original] version of a parliament’) (Limb 2012a:14). Reclamation 
of space for a distinct African identity can also be seen in the fact 
that ‘Abantu-Batho was a weapon that allowed engagement 
more on African terms and much more so than in deputations or 
the white press’ (Limb 2012a:14). In fact, as Limb (2012c:325) 
points out, ‘unlike those black editors who threw in their lot with 
the white establishment, its own editors were not cowed’. This 
observation is quite important because it underlines the fact that 
not all black-skinned or African journalists supported the African 
liberation struggles. Some black-skinned African journalists 
supported efforts that were antithetical to the liberation struggle. 
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It is for this reason that Abantu-Batho’s journalism has been 
dubbed ‘committed reporting’ (Limb 2012b:85), that is, because 
not only did the newspaper report labour strikes in the years 1916 
and 1917, but it also supported the workers’ strikes and protests, 
such that, as Limb (2012b:85) observes, ‘with editors active, it 
[could] be hard to tell reportage from intervention’. Significantly, 
in urging the workers to fight on, Abantu-Batho invoked African 
proverbs such as ‘a baby that never cries shall die on its mother’s 
back’ (Limb 2012b:86). When, in 1918, Abantu-Batho’s editors 
continued to strongly identify themselves with the workers’ 
strike, they were arrested (Limb 2012b:86). If the editors’ arrest 
for supporting the workers’ right to dignity was a high price to 
pay by Abantu-Batho, as it will be shown later, there was yet a 
higher price to pay. For now we are discussing more the 
newspaper’s role in advancing the African Renaissance project.
In order to fully appreciate Abantu-Batho’s role in advancing 
the African Renaissance project, attention must be drawn to the 
newspaper’s choice of languages as its medium. These were 
Xhosa, Zulu, SeTswana, SeSotho and English (Limb 2012a:4). 
The four African languages cited were, then, and continue to be 
widely spoken languages in South Africa. It is not just the fact 
that the newspaper published in African languages that identifies 
Abantu-Batho as a Pan-African and pro-African Renaissance 
newspaper, but the fact that, as Limb (2012a:13) notes, there was 
‘a sort of hierarchy of languages in Abantu-Batho’. In this 
hierarchy, African languages were prioritised and ‘English tended 
to be relegated to the middle pages’ (Limb 2012a:13). What this 
means is that the objective of European colonialism to valorise 
Europeans and their languages, and to vilify Africans and their 
languages, in order for Europeans to feel superior and Africans 
to feel inferior, was turned on its head. In this way Abantu-Batho 
waged a significant ‘cultural resistance’ struggle (Limb 2012a:13).
A newspaper that came close to achieving what Abantu-
Batho did in terms of using a number of African languages and 
advancing Pan-Africanist objectives seems to be Umlomo wa 
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Bantu-Molomo oa Batho (Mouthpiece of the People), founded by 
Thomas Mvabaza, in 1910, two years before Abantu-Batho, and 
published in Xhosa, SeSotho and English (Limb 2012a:11; Lowe 
2012:187) with Lowe conjecturing the possibility of having 
published it also in Zulu. While Abantu-Batho had a national and 
cross-border reach, there is uncertainty about whether or not 
Umlomo wa Bantu-Molomo oa Batho reached beyond 
Johannesburg. With regards to its Pan-Africanist quest, Umlomo 
wa Bantu-Molomo oa Batho had, as its policy, the ‘unifying of all 
African tribes into one people, and further to improve and 
expedite the education of the African children’ (Limb 2012a:11). 
Another significant Pan-Africanist dimension of Abantu-Batho 
is revealed by the fact that Swaziland’s Queen Regent, Labotsibeni 
Mdluli, known to be ‘sympathetic to black unity’, provided 
substantial finance for its launch. Mkhonza (2012:135–136), 
however, argues that Labotsibeni was more than sympathetic to 
the cause of Pan-Africanism. She (Mkhonza 2012:135–136) further 
points out that viewing Labotsibeni as a Pan-Africanist ‘is not a 
far-fetched idea’, her logic being that the reaction of Africans to 
the Union of South Africa, established in 1910, which deprived 
Africans of their citizenship to South Africa, by denying them the 
right to vote, the creation of the ANC and the founding of Abantu-
Batho, ‘need to be seen as issues that Labotsibeni supported as 
a Pan-Africanist who saw the organisation of Africans as an 
essential part of forging unity’. The relationship between Seme 
and Labotsibeni was mutually beneficial in that Abantu-Batho 
‘placed Swaziland issues in the centre of discussions on Southern 
Africa’.
In order to fully appreciate the mission of Abantu-Batho, it is 
essential to understand what the man himself, Seme, and his 
organisation, the ANC stood for. Seme studied in the United 
States of America (USA) where the struggle of the African 
Americans inspired and influenced him to embrace Pan-Africanism 
(Saunders 2012:118). Black South Africans viewed African 
Americans as their ‘role models’, and were fascinated by self-help 
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projects advanced by the likes of Booker T. Washington, and the 
thinking of the likes of W.E.B. du Bois and Marcus Garvey among 
many others. As Vinson (2012) notes, many black South Africans:
[G]limpsed their modern futures not in the faces of Europeans, but 
in the faces of American Negroes. The pathway towards modernity 
was through African America, not a white Europe that wanted 
Africans to remain an unchanging, rural-based migrant labour 
force yoked to a segregationist system designed to procure cheap 
labour. (p. 283)
On his return from the USA, Seme began to advocate for the 
formation of a national organisation that would rally Africans as 
one African nation and not as ethnic groups such as baSotho, 
vhaVenda, amaXhosa, et cetera (Ngqulunga 2017:1; Saunders 
2012:119). In line with the objectives of the ANC, Saunders (2012) 
explains that:
Seme wanted to found a national newspaper that would help Africans 
move away from their ethnic and local identities and see themselves 
as Africans first and would promote unity among them. (p. 120)
In this respect, Abantu-Batho rose to the occasion. It ‘broke 
down  ethnic barriers’ and ‘articulated […] African unity’ (Limb 
2012b:325).
Among many African American leaders, Garvey and his 
organisation, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) 
seems to have had a major appeal and influence on Abantu-Batho. 
The UNIA’s first international convention was held in 1920 (Sherwood 
2003:78). Among the convention’s declarations was the ‘inherent 
right of the Negro to possess himself of Africa’ (Sherwood 2003:78). 
In plain language this affirmed the call of ‘Africa for Africans’. 
Another declaration was that the ‘culmination of all the efforts of 
the UNIA must end in a Negro independent nation of Africa’ to 
which all Africans in the diaspora who wished to return could do so. 
Similar to the ANC, the UNIA established its own newspaper, the 
Negro World (Sherwood 2003:77). The Negro World ‘constantly 
challenged entrenched notions of white superiority and advocated 
self-determination for blacks. The paper’s anti-colonial message 
was loud and clear’ (Sherwood 2003:77). 
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The Negro World had correspondents from the Caribbean 
and Africa and circulated in countries such as Kenya, Nyasaland 
(Malawi), Uganda and South Africa (Sherwood 2003:77, 79). 
Garvey himself held strong views about the African condition in 
South Africa, declaring that the country was ‘the worst spot in 
the world for Negroes’ (Vinson 2012:285). The Negro World 
carried strong editorials and analyses, advocating for the 
decolonisation of the African continent, Pan-Africanism and 
socio-economic upliftment (Vinson 2012:284). Not only did the 
Negro World speak on behalf of Africans, but also gave them a 
platform to speak for themselves by re-printing articles from 
South African newspapers such Abantu-Batho and the African 
World (Vinson 2012:293). In turn, not only did Abantu-Batho 
carry favourable reports on the UNIA, but the newspaper also 
adopted the organisation’s ‘Africa for Africans’ slogan and 
accepted Garvey’s title of provisional president for Africa (Vinson 
2012:287). When Garvey was arrested and convicted for fraud in 
1923, Abantu-Batho protested against his incarceration (Vinson 
2012:290–291).
If the test of Afrocentric journalism is the ability of African 
journalists to record African history, Abantu-Batho passed the test 
with flying colours. This is so with particular reference to recording 
not just African people’s struggles against in general, but 
particularly African women’s struggles against white South Africa’s 
injustices. It is noteworthy that Limb (2012b:89) points out that 
‘Abantu-Batho’s reporting of women workers and the formation 
of the NLBW illustrates editors relatively progressive [author’s 
added emphasis] views on gender and class’. Not only did Abantu-
Batho accord growing space to women, but it also found it 
significant to report on the drawing up of the NLBW’s constitution 
and ‘listed a dozen delegates, ignored by historians’ (Limb 
2012b:90, [author’s added emphasis]). By reporting on such an 
important point, ignored by historians, and considering, in addition, 
that ‘Abantu-Batho is one of the few remaining sources to reveal 
the NLBW’s hidden history’ (Limb 2012b:90), Abantu-Batho serves 
as a shining example of Afrocentric journalism.
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Reference to Abantu-Batho’s support for women as ‘progressive’ 
merits comment. That is so because male leaders in the ANC in its 
early years discouraged political activities by women. In fact the 
ANC refused membership to women until 31 years after its formation 
(Gasa 2007:145). But in direct opposition to the ANC’s position, 
Abantu-Batho supported the formation of the NLBW under the 
presidency of Charlotte Maxeke, and the decision to take 
independent action against the pass laws, which was criticised by 
the ANC president, Sefako Mapogo Makgatho, in particular (Limb 
2012b:90). Abantu-Batho’s chief editor, Daniel Simon Letanka, 
endorsed the women’s independent action against the pass laws, 
arguing that the ANC, in the first place had failed to live up to 
expectations (Limb 2012b:90). 
Death of Abantu-Batho: The price for 
fighting for African dignity
The positions taken by Abantu-Batho were not received well by 
the white racist government and white business that benefited 
from the loss of Africans, and enriched by the impoverishment of 
black people. Following the mine workers’ strike in Johannesburg, 
in 1920, which Abantu-Batho supported, the Chamber of Mines 
established its own newspaper, Umteteli wa Bantu, (Mouthpiece 
of the Native Peoples) ‘as a moderate and apolitical counterpoint 
to the ANC’s newspaper’ (Vinson 2012:289). The Chamber of 
Mines’ objective in establishing Umteteli wa Bantu was to dispel 
‘certain erroneous ideas cherished by many natives and 
sedulously fostered by European and Native agitators, and by 
certain Native newspapers’ (Wilan 1984:251). The birth of Umteteli 
wa Bantu saw the government withdrawing the publication of its 
notices in Abantu-Batho and diverting them to Umteteli wa 
Bantu, a move that saw European business following suit by 
diverting its advertisements from Abantu-Batho to Umteteli wa 
Bantu (Limb 2012c:324). The consequence was a drying up of 
essential resources for the newspaper and the weakening of its 
financial muscle. These developments were seen by many as a 
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deliberate attempt to destroy Abantu-Batho and promote 
Umteteli wa Bantu (Limb 2012c:320). 
An examination of the political positions taken by Umteteli wa 
Bantu reveals that these observations about Umteteli wa Bantu 
cannot be reduced to, and dismissed as conspiracy theories.
Umteteli wa Bantu criticised Abantu-Batho’s acceptance of 
Garvey’s provisional title of Africa’s president, arguing that 
Garvey’s claim to the title exposed dictatorial and imperialistic 
agendas (Vinson 2012:289). In a direct opposition to Pan-
Africanism’s core spirit for African unity, Umteteli wa Bantu 
forcefully argued that though skin colour and ancestral origin 
had created links between Africans and African Americans, the 
latter were ‘wholly dissimilar in character, thought and habit’ to 
Africans (Vinson 2012:289). Umteteli wa Bantu further cautioned 
that African American involvement in South Africa would result 
in the ‘absorption and ultimate extinction of Africans’. This was 
an ironic move and unconcealed attempt to advance Eurocentric 
interests, while Umteteli wa Bantu urged Africans to disassociate 
themselves from the African Americans who shared the same 
frustration of white domination, and the same aspiration for 
liberation urged Africans to ‘work in harmony with the Europeans 
in our midst as it is lunatic to be influenced by the impossible 
ideal of an All Black Africa’. In explicit terms, Umteteli wa Bantu 
dismissed and ridiculed Pan-Africanism’s quest for a United 
States of Africa as illusory and delusional.
The arguments by Umteteli wa Bantu give a clear indication 
that the newspaper was diametrically opposed to Pan-Africanism. 
Its argument that there was nothing that linked Africans at home 
and those in the diaspora beyond skin colour, was dismissive of 
Jacques-Garvey’s argument (2017:65) that ‘[e]verybody knows 
that there is absolutely no difference between the native African 
and the American and the West Indian Negroes, in that we are 
descendants from one family stock’. The newspaper’s argument 
was insensitive to Africans’ awareness, as articulated by Garvey 
that it was ‘only a matter of accident that we have been divided 
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and kept apart for over three hundred years’, and that even 
though this was the case, Africans, at home and abroad, as 
articulated by Garvey (Jacques-Garvey 2017:65) ‘felt that when 
the time has come for us to get back together, we shall do so in 
the spirit of brotherly love’. Umteteli wa Bantu’s condescending 
caution to Africans at home to be careful of being dominated by 
African Americans was either oblivious to, or pretended not to 
be aware that Garvey (Jacques-Garvey 2017) himself had made 
it clear to fellow African Americans that:
[A]ny Negro who expects that he will be assisted here, there or 
anywhere by the Universal Negro Improvement Association to 
exercise haughty superiority over the fellows of his own race, makes 
a tremendous mistake. (p. 65)
In no uncertain terms Garvey (Jacques-Garvey 2017) had made it 
clear that:
Such men had better remain where they are and not attempt to 
become in any way interested in the higher development of Africa: 
The Negro has had enough of the vaunted practice of race superiority 
as inflicted upon him by others; therefore he is not prepared to 
tolerate a similar assumption on the part of his own people. (p. 65)
Conclusion
The central argument of this chapter is that the European world 
not only fragmented the African continent physically. European 
colonialism also fragmented the African people by making them 
alienated from one another and to themselves culturally. 
European colonialism elevated their cultural values by privileging 
their own languages while relegating African languages. One of 
the most effective tools of accomplishing this Eurocentric project 
were the media. This exercise on the part of the media was 
unethical because cultural alienation is an unethical act.
In response to the unethical, Eurocentric destruction of 
African culture, some African journalists sought, through 
African-oriented newspapers, to seek the reunification of the 
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African people (Pan-Africanism) and the reclamation of African 
culture (African Renaissance). Despite their valiant struggles, 
Eurocentrism has proven resilient and shown its ugly head 
beyond the gaining of ‘independence’ since the 1950s. 
South Africa was no exception to this impact beyond the first 
democratic elections in 1994. 
As a consequence of years of South Africa’s isolation from 
the rest of Africa, black South Africans were ‘indoctrinated with 
the belief that we, as a nation, are unlike the rest of our brothers 
and sisters on the continent’ (Tsedu 2004:1). As a result of this 
indoctrination, many black South Africans have ‘internalised 
this and see ourselves not as Africans, but as South Africans’ 
(Tsedu 2004:1). This observation was made by Mathatha Tsedu, 
the then City Press’ editor, ten years after South Africa’s first 
democratic elections. His observation is a clear indication of the 
lasting impact of colonialism that sought to alienate Africans 
from one another as well as a clear indication of a very limited 
success, if not failure of the Pan-Africanist project to raise a 
Pan-African consciousness among Africans. Tsedu, a black 
consciousness adherent and Pan-Africanist, made the above 
observations in the relaunch of the City Press newspaper as a 
‘Distinctly African’ newspaper. Tsedu therefore believed that 
the challenge facing black South Africans was their 
re-integration into the African continent ‘which is essentially 
our home’. This was the role that he wanted the City Press, 
henceforth, to play.
Almost a year before the City Press’ relaunch, Tsedu had 
been fired as the Sunday Times’ editor, for, according to Tsedu 
(2004:5) striving to ‘position the paper as an African publication’. 
According to Tsedu, his ‘Africanisation’ project did not sit well 
with some Sunday Times’ white journalists because they felt that 
it would exclude them (Schmidt 2003:10). When he attempted 
to ‘transform the Indian-focus Extra wrap-around edition into a 
multi-cultural product’ this saw ‘the loss of ‘significant members 
of Indian readers’ (Schmidt 2003:10). Tsedu’s moves to Africanise 
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the newspaper resulted, according to his boss, Connie Molusi, in 
circulation slump and hence he was fired (Schmidt 2003:10).
The reaction to Tsedu’s attempts to Africanise the Sunday 
Times reveals the extant attitude to deny the humanity of the 
African people by influential actors in and around the media. The 
media have an ethical responsibility to create a platform for all 
cultural expressions and political aspirations that do not suffocate 
others. This chapter has demonstrated that whenever Africans 
have sought to exercise cultural expression through the media, 
whether African-owned or otherwise, efforts are made to 
undermine this effort.
Pan-Africanism is not merely an anti-colonial political outlook, 
but also a permanently necessary ideology as Africans, at all 
times, seek to develop themselves. Similarly, the African 
Renaissance is not a temporary project aimed at reconstruction 
immediately after colonialism, but also permanently relevant 
in Africans’ struggles for the advancement of their political, social 
and economic conditions. This will be the case as they will seek 
to draw inspiration from their ancestors’ great achievements, 
and also learning from the ancestors’ failures and mistakes. An 
ethical imperative in this exercise will be Afrocentric journalism 
that will help Africans to critically examine their lives on the basis 
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LGBTIQ+ bodies in the church’, in C. Jones (ed.), Justice-based ethics:  Challenging South  African 
perspectives, pp. 89-117, AOSIS, Cape Town. https://doi.org/10.4102/ aosis.2018.BK77.04
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was dominant in defining societal norms and values. These 
perspectives played a defining role in Christian anthropology. 
Being intertwined with politics, economics and society, religion 
prescribed heterosexual hegemony for centuries. These ideas 
were sustained and maintained by (among others) Natural 
Law theology which promoted heteronormativity that informed 
values which regulated procreation, marriage and the ordination 
of men (and women) into clergy positions – and upheld this 
interpretation of the world as God’s will. Contradicting this 
‘order’ meant sin and alienation from the ‘way’. Contrary to the 
belief of heterosexism stands the Good News of God which 
beckons to God’s church and modern societies to welcome fully 
and include queer bodies radically in their lives and practices. 
Attempting to understand these sexualities, the church 
unfortunately often researches queer sexualities only from 
their traditional and ecclesiastical position on hermeneutics, 
ethics and dogma.27 In many cases churches have only recently 
embarked on this important issue of different sexualities and 
therefore are still grappling with specifically homosexuality 
and same-sex relationships; thus, losing sight of bisexual, 
transgender and intersex bodies. In light of this, the chapter 
will start by dealing thoroughly with homosexuality and how 
to understand and interpret the biblical message (of inclusion) 
in this regard. Once traditional ground in this respect has been 
penetrated, the argument will shift towards the second part of 
the chapter,  focusing on Queer Theology, intersecting Body 
Theology and, in the last instance,  paving the way towards a 
possible African Queer Theology.
27. Scholarly research has, in this regard, provided enlightened research on the meaning 
of the text, as well as the meanings associated with human sexuality in the Ancient 
Near Eastern and Greco-Roman world of the Bible and thus also pointing to contextual 
and hermeneutical challenges that arise if we do not work with the Bible in an ethical 




Homosexuality: Read, interpret and 
understand the Bible
It is important to focus throughout on the ‘deep flowing’ central 
message of the Bible when dealing with certain contemporary 
issues. There are mainly two ways of reading and using the Bible: 
The first is from a perspective of exclusion which assumes that 
heterosexuality is normative, and practising homosexuality is 
abnormal. From this perspective biblical texts are read as texts 
of exclusion. The second way of reading the Bible is within a 
framework of a theology of radical inclusion. This perspective is 
propelled by the conviction that the central message of the Bible, 
and especially Jesus’ life, is one of encompassing inclusion. 
Therefore, all people are included in God’s household and are to 
be welcomed into the church fully for who they are (Germond in 
Germond & De Gruchy 1997:188).
Furthermore, one cannot avoid reading the biblical texts 
from the assumptions about life provided by one’s experiences 
and contexts. The Latin Americans lead many people to see 
that it is always good to begin with the context of one’s 
individual lives when reading the Bible. One almost never 
approaches Scripture objectively, but rather subjectively in 
light of the person you are, including your place in the world 
and all that is happening in it.
Germond (in Germond & De Gruchy 1997:189) says that it is 
important to always remember that the ‘Bible was written by 
people’ who, similar to the present situation, ‘came from their 
own particular contexts’. What they were writing, was understood 
from their cultural perspectives and assumptions. It is an implicit 
part of the text. The message of the Bible is couched in the 
perspectives of its writers.
An essential aspect of the hermeneutic circle is what is called 
a hermeneutic of suspicion. Suspicion best helps readers become 
aware of and inquire into the assumptions made when reading 
the Bible. It also helps one become aware of the assumptions in 
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the biblical texts themselves. Therefore, when we look at the 
Bible and, in this case, start with homosexuality specifically, it is 
important to examine both the assumptions one makes about 
sexuality and particularly homosexuality as well as the 
assumptions one understands the Bible to make about it 
(Germond in Germond & De Gruchy 1997:189). James Brownson 
(2013) argues that, in the:
[M]idst of polarised and polarising debates, it is important to ask, 
not only what a text says, but what it means. This entails determining 
the moral logic that shapes biblical prohibitions or commands – 
discerning why a text says what it does and clarifying its underlying 
values and assumptions. (p. 15)
Determining this underlying moral logic is particularly important 
when interpreting Scripture in cross-cultural contexts.
At numerous points in the history of Christian interpretation 
of Scripture, the church has needed to exercise its imagination to 
discern a wider and more encompassing form of moral logic 
underlying biblical commands and prohibitions.
In the past, the Bible has been used in deeply negative and 
destructive ways of which the history of South Africa and Africa 
offers examples. In broader Africa, it was used by colonialists and 
missionaries to destroy much that was good in traditional African 
cultures (Kaoma 2018:156). In South Africa, the Bible was used as 
the central document to justify apartheid and, at the same time, 
it was a major text used in the struggle against apartheid (slavery 
is another good example in this regard) (Germond in Germond & 
De Gruchy 1997:190; also see Bax 1979; De Gruchy & Villa-Vicencio 
1983; Loubser 1987; Ngcokovane 1989). When it comes to the 
question of LGBTIQ+ people, the church has almost universally 
read the Bible from the assumption that heterosexuality is 
normative. This assumption is so powerful that very few people 
stop to examine it – to be suspicious of it, preferring to believe 
that the exclusion of LGBTIQ+ people is in harmony with the 
Christian message. For many LGBTIQ+ people the Bible has not 
brought life, but death.
Chapter 4
93
Heterosexism: An exclusivist 
theology
Heterosexism seeks to maintain conventional ‘norms’ of sexuality 
that privilege heterosexuals. ‘These norms are seen as “natural” 
and essential to human existence. Any deviation is seen as 
rebellion’ (Cohen 2013:77). According to Motsau (2015):
This monolithic understanding of heterosexuality is embedded not 
only in sex, but also in institutions. Heterosexuality, as a practice, is 
considered to be a system which dominates with one ideology, but is 
multidimensional and pervasive in its embeddedness. (p. 29)
Adrian Thatcher (2011) defines heterosexism as:
A term that refers to a system of negative attitudes, bias, and 
discrimination in favour of opposite-sex sexuality and relationships. 
It can assume that opposite-sex attractions and relationships are the 
only norm and therefore superior. (p. 77)
The teaching assumes marriage is ‘restricted to men and women, 
and for same-sex couples who are excluded from it, it is the 
classic “heterosexist” institution’ (Thatcher 2011:77).
The church has predominantly been a heterosexual institution 
which, in many cases, still assumes that heterosexuality is the 
normative form of human sexuality and that all other forms of 
sexual orientation are deviant. This leads to prejudice against 
same-sex partnerships which is, in turn, often reinforced by the 
concept of the family, the education system, mass media and 
popular culture. Like sexism and racism, heterosexism privileges a 
particular social group and discriminates against the group they 
call ‘the other’. Heterosexism regards (practising) homosexuality 
as a perversion of the natural human state, hence falling short of 
the ideal expression of an individual’s humanity.
According to many scholars, Genesis 1:27–28 and 2:18–25, in 
particular, present a theology of heterosexism: What God created 
in the beginning is, according to heterosexists, universally 
normative for human society. The assumption follows that only 
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heterosexual partners can truly complement one another (Jung & 
Smith 1993:13). Joseph Njino, among others, is a good exponent 
of this point of view. He (Njino 2004) uses the creation narratives 
to canonise the Christian marriage as a covenant between one 
man and one woman:
This [narrative] implies that though man and woman are different by 
nature, they complement each other through the union of marriage. 
The unique relationship of a man and woman in marriage becomes 
the symbol of the relationship between God and His people. This 
understanding of marriage extends into the New Testament […] 
Marriage can be valid only where a man and woman are involved. 
Besides, the two (man and woman) must be canonically competent 
in every sense of the word. (pp. 340–341)
Yet, what must be clearly understood is that Genesis 2 was written 
from a majority perspective (in other words a heterosexual and 
patriarchal one), and does not attempt to reflect on all the 
‘variations on the theme’. For example, nothing is said about how 
many times a man may bind himself to a woman. Neither is there 
any indication of what this ceremony or ritual confirming this union 
should look like. For this reason we can assume that the same 
values that should characterise a relationship between a man and 
a woman, according to Genesis 2 (mutuality, co-dependence and 
bonding), should also be valid for other types of relationships.
Radical inclusion: A biblical theology
A theology of radical inclusion, in contrast to the exclusivist 
theology of heterosexism, is central to the Christian message. 
It is the theology by which all biblical texts should be evaluated. 
Texts of exclusion should be read in light of this radical inclusive 
theology to see whether they stand up to the test. The message 
of Christ is a radically inclusive message and challenges 
the  church every time she attempts to create categories of 
exclusion. Without going into detail, the Old Testament’s 
message of inclusion is found, among others, in Isaiah’s vision of 
all nations coming to worship and find salvation at Mount Zion, 
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and Amos who harshly criticises the exclusion and exploitation 
of widows, orphans and the poor by the powerful elite. With 
regard to the New Testament, instances of inclusion can be 
found in Peter’s theology according to Acts 10:11–15, 10:28, 15:9 
as well as in that of Paul’s in Galatians 3:23–29, and Ephesians 
2:12–19. It is important to recall that the biblical justification of 
apartheid was proven wrong when the racist assumptions of 
exegetes were exposed and the selfish ends to which they had 
misused the biblical texts became clear. These texts and their 
use could not stand up to the gospel of radical inclusion. 
According to inclusive theology, the central drive of the 
Christian message means that there should be no dividing walls, 
for we are all one in Christ, according to Galatians 3:28 – also 
regarding heterosexual and homosexual (queer) orientation 
(Germond in Germond & De Gruchy 1997:203–211; see also 
Countryman 1988; Nolan 1988:38; Norton 1977:59; Plaskow 1990; 
Wire 1990:122–128).
However, in the conversation about queer relationships, it is 
easy to become entangled in certain specific Bible verses (see 
below) which one so easily isolates from the broader and deeper 
biblical message of radical inclusion. It is well known that texts 
can be interpreted and explained in many different ways, and 
people all so desperately want to claim that the exegetical and 
hermeneutical keys they work with are the most responsible 
and correct. One must, however, be extremely careful not to 
filter the gospel message on a particular matter – in this case 
homosexuality and same-sex relationships (as well as queer 
bodies) – through a few texts, as one can easily attenuate the 
deeper intention and aim of them to something that it is not. 
Unfortunately, the church has in the past, tragically, totally 
missed – actually undermined – the message of radical inclusion 
in more than one respect. A good example is how difficult it 
sometimes is for Protestants (the tradition from which the 
authors are writing) to accept one of their fundamental 
principles. Paul writes: ‘He who through faith is righteous shall 
live’ (Rm 1:17). All that is necessary is faith. One who believes, is 
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free from any other requirements or responsibilities to ‘earn’ or 
’deserve’ his or her salvation.
According to Bernard Lategan (2011:n.p.), unqualified 
redemption in this context, at the same time means unqualified 
inclusiveness. All who believe sincerely are welcome. The tragedy 
is, however, that throughout the history of the church this radical 
inclusivity has been undermined in different ways (Lategan 2011):
To believe is important, but … 
you must also be circumcised; or you must be baptised again;
or you must join up with your own cultural group;
or you must be male to serve in any capacity in the church;
or you must be a heterosexual or be celibate (if homosexual) to be 
a pastor. (n.p.)
This list of ‘plusses’, says Lategan (2011:n.p.), has changed during 
the centuries. New variations are continually being added which, 
in many ways, have undermined the fundamental inclusivity of 
the community of believers. The worst is that these ‘plusses’ 
were generally theologically grounded. In the case of gay 
candidates (in most mainstream churches) who want to be 
admitted to ministry, the ‘plus added’ is that they must 
be celibate. ‘Why not return to the original fundamental principle 
where faith is the only condition for complete, unqualified, 
inclusive membership of the community of believers?’ (Lategan 
2011:n.p.).
In this regard, one can consider how Jesus included those 
who were previously excluded: the Samaritan woman, the 
centurion, the insignificant and the woman who would otherwise 
have been stoned. Paul also follows this path. We see how 
changed circumstances and unexpected situations in his life 
gave rise to radical inclusion. It has begun certain processes – 
sometimes against Paul’s will and natural inclination. Gentiles, 
the uncircumcised and slaves are included – people who were 
obviously ruled out for traditional reasons. The gospel is 
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paradoxical as is evident from the parables: the last will be first, 
the proud shall be humbled, the uninvited ones will finally sit at 
the table. This is about the overthrow of all presupposed ideas 
or traditional values. This is especially true for people who 
should be excluded according to outside perceptions; but by 
their inclusion, the common categorisation of people is 
penetrated.
The gospel thus contains, in its own history and testimony, 
the ability to unravel and capture trajectories of inclusion in 
surprising ways, and to provide for situations that could never 
be provided for before. The important point is that everything 
is not captured indefinitely from ‘day one’ in certain texts. 
There is a strong evolutionary development in the Bible and 
one must, in understanding the gospel, get onto the trajectory 
of this driving force – undoubtedly taking us to a clearer 
understanding of the radicality of inclusion. We, however, 
often tend to find timeless truths in selected biblical verses, 
because it provides security and control. Unfortunately, this 
kind of process never allows one to become dependent on the 
liberating and inclusive radicality of the gospel. Now, let us 
turn briefly to the biblical texts traditionally used to 
substantiate that homosexuality and same-sex relationships 
(Queer Theology) are wrong.
Homosexual
Texts in the Bible
People who read the Bible literally and on face value, normally 
refer to six texts (and the creation narratives) to reject 
homosexuality and same-sex (queer) partnerships. The Old 
Testament texts are Genesis 19:1–29, Judges 19:16–29, Leviticus 
18:22 and 20:13 (Goertz 2015); and the New Testament texts are 
1 Corinthians 6:9, 1 Timothy 1:10 and Romans 1:18–32. Of all these 
biblical passages of both the Old and New Testament, numerous 
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scholars agree that Romans 1:26–27 presents the clearest but, by 
no means, unambiguous argument against homosexual activity 
(Punt 2007:965–982).28 In this regard Brownson (2013:150–255) 
explores foundational biblical perspectives in four crucial areas 
to help us understand that the moral problem, according to Paul 
in Romans 1, is not same-sex orientation. These areas are the 
pattern of male-female relationships and Scripture’s 
understanding of the bond of marriage, procreation and celibacy. 
Against this backdrop, he then offers one of the most thorough, 
illuminating and biblically insightful interpretations of Romans 
1:24–27 that have been written in the interest of same-sex 
relationships.
With regard to the other biblical texts, which have been 
referred to above, a growing number of scholars note that they 
refer to homosexual rape, lust, fornication, transgressions, 
idolatry, temple prostitution, pederasty, sexual dominance, 
humiliation and exploitation, and cannot be compared to 
committed, loving, consecrated same-sex relationships of today. 
According to Brownson (2013:53), ‘most revisionist positions 
argue that whatever the Bible says about same-sex eroticism in 
the ancient world does not directly apply to contemporary 
committed gay or lesbian relationships’.
Matthew Vines (2014:59–116), too, confirms that these texts 
are simply not convincing at all. They fail to sway the biblical 
theology of inclusion. As said, Romans 1 offers the best defence 
for heterosexists, but it stands alone against the cumulative force 
of Jesus’ inclusive work on the cross. According to Ephesians 
2:11–22, ‘Christ died to break down all dividing walls. He died so 
28. For more exegetical and hermeneutical information on Romans 1, but also on (the) other 
texts see, Johnson (2012:115–162) and Thatcher (2011:157–173). Punt (2007:965–982) also 
puts the debate about Romans 1:18–32 into perspective by surveying some recent alternative 
opinions about its meaning. He establishes that two particular matters are most important 
in Romans 1:18–32 in the past and current debate about its interpretation: the argument 
according to ‘nature’ and the nature of the infringement or error (Rm 1:27). 
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that all may no longer be alien, but members of the household of 
God’ (Germond in Germond & De Gruchy 1997:228).29
African perspective
Homosexuality (and queer bodies) in Africa are perceived as un-
African (Hoad, Martin & Reid 2005; Punt 2013; Steyn & Van Zyl 
2009), a post-colonial development and as religiously prohibited 
by the Bible (Togarasei & Chitando 2011). African scholars such as 
Igboin (2006), Asaju (2006) and Chukwe (2004), among others, 
argue that homosexuality (queer bodies) on the African continent 
is against scriptural morality and therefore assert that homosexuality 
should be removed from the societal fabric as a prerogative of 
church and state institutions (see Asaju 2006:25; Chukwe 2004:245).
Kaoma (2018:107) argues that church and state unite in their 
goal to ‘block same-sex rights’. This often has to do with prejudice 
against the other and is masked with fear and holding onto 
power.
South African theologian, Yolanda Dreyer (2006:464), states 
that the church, as male subjugated institution, endorses 
prejudice. Gunda (2011:94) points out that prejudice ‘is an 
attitude which allows people to negatively prejudge others on 
the basis of what is supposedly known about these “others”’. 
Heteronormative institutions uphold binary positions on gender 
and sexuality which can lead to discrimination and violence. In 
South Africa and on the African continent, sexual minorities still 
experience violent crimes and exclusion (Ossome 2013:37–38). 
These crimes have been termed, among others, corrective rape. 
South African law scholars, Koraan and Geduld (2015:1931), 
define corrective rape as ‘an instance when a woman is raped in 
29. For more (exegetical) information regarding abovementioned 6 texts, read Bahnsen 
(1978:34), Boswell (1980), Douglas (2001:1786–1790), Dunn (1990:183–205), Gagnon 
(2001:111–146), Klawans (2000), LaCocque and Ricoeur (1998), Milgrom (2004), Nissinen 
(1998), Scroggs (1983:40–42), Ukleja (1983:259).
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order to “cure” her of her lesbianism’. Corrective rape exposes 
entrenched homophobia in society.
Togarasei and Chitando (2011:109–125) refer in this regard to 
Gagnon (2001:62–113) whose interpretations are favoured by 
(African) scholars who condemn same-sex relationships. Except for 
Gagnon’s very literal interpretation of the abovementioned texts, 
he also uses the ‘creation stories, the fact that God created Adam 
(male) and Eve (female) to argue that heterosexual relationships 
are normative’, and that ‘natural sex is therefore heterosexual while 
homosexual is unnatural’ (Togarasei & Chitando 2011:112). Gagnon 
makes his argument on the basis of complementarity:30
It is only through a woman a being made out of man that she can 
be a suitable and complementary counterpart for him [...] male and 
female are perfect fits from the standpoint of divine design and 
blessing. Male and male and female and female are not. (p. 112)
‘This anti-same-sex sexuality reading of these texts is one that is 
followed by many Christians’ – not only in Africa, but right across 
the globe (Togarasei and Chitando 2011:112). ‘However, those who 
support same-sex relationships have also used the Bible to buttress 
their arguments’ (Togarasei & Chitando 2011:112). In this respect, 
African scholars Togarasei and Chitando (2011:109–125) use Bess’s 
argument (1995:82) that ‘there is no reference to same-sex sexual 
orientation in the Bible’. According to Bess, ‘it is not proper to ask 
the Bible to answer questions that it never addresses’ (Togarasei & 
Chitando 2011:112). Further, Jesus often commented on the evils of 
his day, but, according to what we know, never addressed the 
subject of same-sex relationships. There are furthermore also pro-
same-sex sexuality arguments that question the authority of the 
Bible in contemporary Christian communities. Such liberal 
approaches to the Bible are highlighted by Gunda (2011). ‘This 
argument is based on the fact that the Bible was only authoritative 
in a specific culture and its teachings are therefore culturally relative’ 
30. Read Thatcher (2011:41–44, 98–100, 185) to see how he challenges this strand in the 
conservative case against homosexuality. Brownson (2013:22–26) too does not find 
convincing biblical support for a ‘complementarian’ view. 
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(Togarasei & Chitando 2011:114). According to Togasarei and 
Chitando (2011:113), Seow (1996:62), too, ‘points to cultural 
differences between the context of the biblical text and that of 
modern society’ that must be taken into account if we want to 
extrapolate very old texts responsibly to our modern society. They 
also refer to Scroggs (1983:85) who reasons that one must allow 
oneself to be guided by:
[T ]he hermeneutical principle that, for moral and ethical passages 
of the Bible to be applied to today’s world, there must be some 
reasonable similarity between the contexts then and now […]. (p. 85)
With regard to the creation stories, they cite White (2011) who 
believes that the stories of creation ‘are about God’s power and 
presence in the universe – not about natural and unnatural sexual 
relationships’ (Togarasei & Chitando 2011:114) as well as Seow 
(1996:26) who argues that the ‘creation stories are about biology 
and the human status in relation to God – not about social and 
sexual relationships’.
Further scholarly engagement is needed with how the Bible is 
read critically and acted upon, especially in Africa: how ‘same-sex 
sexuality and homosexual tendencies’ (queer bodies) ‘have been 
part and parcel of African sexuality’ (Togarasei & Chitando 2011:122), 
how science can be used in a just manner in this dialogue, and how 
the role of Western governments and agencies complicates this 
discourse from an African point of view, to name only a few. 
Church
Gender prejudice in the use of biblical 
texts against same-sex relationships31
‘Gender and prejudice’, according to Gunda (2011:93), ‘are two 
commonly used terms in mainstream gender studies throughout 
31. This heading is borrowed from the title of Gunda’s article in the Journal of Gender and 
Religion in Africa. For a further perspective on gendered texts (power and language), see 
Thatcher (2011:17–31, 40–44).
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the world, whereby the former is almost synonymous with 
women or females’. ‘Gender prejudices affect not only women 
but also sexual minorities because they too are largely seen 
through the lenses of gender’ (Gunda 2011:93). This implicates 
LGBTIQ+ identities. Gunda (2011) looks at the:
[H]omophobic response to same-sex relationships as a downstream 
and subtle effect of preconceived gender prejudices, which are 
buttressed by invoking certain texts from the Bible, especially 
Genesis 1 and 2. (p. 93)
He (Gunda 2011:93) also ‘analyses the gendered language of 
some of the slur statements used against same-sex relationships’ 
and argues that:
[G]ender prejudices against same-sex relationships are justified and 
presented as divine through the deployment of the biblical creation 
narratives. The creation narratives have provided society with a basis for 
prejudice since they have been interpreted to suggest that God created 
men and women, suggesting that ‘male’ and ‘female’ are synonymous 
with ‘man’ and ‘woman’. This confusion between sex and gender is 
behind the gender prejudices against same-sex relationships. (p. 93)
Gunda (2011) proposes a:
[R]e-reading of Genesis 1 to show that the Creator God cannot be 
limited to two sexes simply because that is what we are comfortable 
with. It is argued that God is God, because God continues to confound 
us. (p. 93)
Challenging the church and contemporary 
thinking about sexuality
The contradiction in the reasoning of many churches regarding 
homosexuality and same-sex relationships remains the distinction 
which is made between homosexual orientation and homosexual 
behaviour. Where the latter is regarded as sin, these churches do 
not regard the former as such. But can the orientation be harmless 
if it points to a tendency towards behaviour which is regarded as 
sinful? The above argument of (church) people who so readily 
distinguish between orientation and behaviour is problematic and 
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will most probably not stand the test of time. It is reasonably widely 
accepted today that sexuality is not an isolated area of our 
existence. It is seen as part of our total being. It is an integral part 
of our identity – of how we have been ‘put together’. In direct 
opposition to what many religions teach, Edward Wilson (1978:143) 
suggests that homosexuality is ‘normal in a biological sense’ and 
further points out that homosexuality is a human universal. An 
interesting fact in this regard is that there are not only two sexes. 
Certain researchers already speak of five identifiable sexes (Fausto-
Sterling 1993:20–24). Tables that incorporate the wide range of 
diagnostic anatomical and physiological sexual characteristics 
show a continuum of up to 15 transition stages between a 
heterosexual man and a heterosexual woman (Jost 1970:94–108).
Sexuality is related to our need for physical and spiritual unity 
with another person, and a human’s quest for the deepest form of 
intimacy. It wants to serve one’s being – the person one is. It aims 
to be the expression of a God-given love which alleviates one’s 
loneliness. It should be granted to all people, regardless of their 
sexual orientation, reasons Flip Theron (2000:n.p.). In this regard, 
it is important to realise that one’s body is not something that one 
has, but what one is. A person’s sexuality is as much part of that 
person as his or her heart and brain. It is not all one is, but without 
that one cannot be truly oneself, according to Botha (2002:31–33). 
There is thus the inner self and body, reason and desires which 
are inextricably woven together. To try to unravel and polarise 
them, as has been done for centuries and is still being done in and 
by the church, is not only painful, but also brutal. Life before (and 
for) God can only be a complete bodily life.
Resolutions
Celibacy
How biblical is it to demand celibacy of someone? Isn’t it a 
‘structural error’ in reasoning when it does happen, because 
Paul refers to celibacy as a charisma – a gift of grace from God? 
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According to Thielicke, a celibate life must never be a ‘forced 
choice’ (Barnard 2000:108). It is very unreasonable, according 
to Barnard (2000:109), to ‘demand’ celibacy, except, of 
course, in the case of anomalous sexual behaviour where 
another  person  may be harmed such as in the case of a 
paedophile.
Brownson reasons:
 • While the Old Testament envisions occasional short-term 
avoidance of sex for the purposes of holiness, it does not 
envision celibacy as a lifelong calling.
• Jesus, in his commendation of those who have ‘made 
themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven’ 
(Mt 19:12), recognised that God calls some, but not all, to a 
single life.
• Paul addresses this question extensively in 1 Corinthians 7 in a 
carefully balanced way, recognising some circumstances 
under which married people might avoid sex for brief periods 
of time, but discouraging married people from avoiding sex 
altogether. Paul invites single people to remain unmarried, but 
clearly recognises that not all people are gifted with lifelong 
celibacy.
• The modern awareness of the persistence of sexual orientation 
thus raises an important question: Are all gay and lesbian 
Christians whose sexual orientation is not subject to change 
necessarily called to a celibate life? If so, then this stands in 
some tension with the affirmation – of both Jesus and Paul – 
that lifelong celibacy is a gift for some, but not for all (Brownson 
2013:145–146).
Vines (2014), too, comes to the conclusion that the:
Church’s explicit requirement that gay Christians commit to lifelong 
celibacy is new [...] the purpose of celibacy [...] is to affirm the 
basic goodness of sex and marriage [...] Mandatory celibacy for gay 
Christians does not fulfil that purpose. It undermines it. It sends the 
message to gay Christians that their sexual selves are inherently 
shameful. It’s not a fulfilment of sexuality for gay Christians, but a 
rejection of it. (pp. 41, 57)
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In his rejection of forced celibacy, Paterson (1984) argues:
It has often been pointed out that the condemnation of all homosexual 
activity amounts to insisting that all homosexuals are called to 
chastity. But making universal what Paul considers to be a charism is 
simply folly [...] Also, the condemnation of homosexual action per se 
seems to be singularly inhuman. (pp. 45–54)
When celibacy is mandated and not chosen, it cannot be a calling.
Human dignity, marriage and cheap piety
In many churches’ resolutions, as indicated above, members 
are summoned to accept gay people, but they simultaneously 
do not approve the expression of their sexuality within a 
permanent relationship. Nevertheless, they are asked to respect 
the dignity of such people, because human beings are all 
created in the image of God. However, can one say that gays 
(queer bodies) are created in the image of God and, then, in 
one’s decision-making with regard to the expression of their 
sexuality which is essentially part of how they were created, 
draw a line through that image of God? Does it not affect such 
people’s God-given identity and human dignity profoundly? 
According to their understanding of the Bible, many churches 
are of the opinion that only the commitment between one man 
and one woman could be considered to be a marriage, but such 
an opinion is based on a heteronormative understanding of the 
Bible. Where ‘hetero’ is the norm, ‘homo’ will be the deviation, 
says Dreyer (2006:463). This absolutises heterosexual 
marriage. The fact that only one option is left for the expression 
of human sexuality (the only alternative being celibacy) is 
invalid and unacceptable, according to Dreyer (2006). The 
Bible describes different types of marriage. Over the centuries 
and across the world, marriage is dynamic, flowing and 
changing, according to Christina Landman (2010:22–27). There 
is not just one normal, natural form and/or model of marriage. 
When human institutions are held up as divine and unchangeable, 
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as we do with marriage, we deceive people and it can cause 
psychological harm. The Bible does not contain a single explicit 
prohibition against the dedicated covenantal love of same-sex 
couples who want to be a family, argue Johnson (2012:115–162), 
Thatcher (2011:155–188) and Vines (2014:133–148), among 
others. To give oneself in love to someone, is God-given and 
that should be respected by allowing these people to unite 
themselves in marriage.
Many people see gay civil unions as a life option or life-space 
which is clearly in line with the core intention and values of 
traditional marriage, and in which people of the same-sex must 
be given the freedom to make a particular value-driven 
commitment to each other in which they can raise children who 
can be baptised. If we do not allow gays this possibility of life, 
what then do we grant them? Or should they live under some 
ecclesiastically formulated view of sin? Such churches will 
seriously have to reconsider their theological and ethical 
reasoning and underpinning of marriage, according to Johnson 
(2012:243–251).
Many churches are also guilty of ‘cheap piety’ in their 
decisions regarding gays (queer bodies) and same-sex 
relationships. Theron (2000) asks the following question: What 
understanding of Christian love is it when you deny someone 
his or her deepest expression of love; that divine gift that just 
wants to serve our being human and to relieve loneliness and 
makes us better people? One sees therefore that this is an 
injustice. Every form of injustice should be regarded as equally 
important and must be addressed urgently in church decisions. 
Justice seen is justice done. There does not seem to be any 
evidence that these churches actually account for the massive 
literature in various disciplines about homosexuality. The only 
way for these churches to get out of this dilemma will be to 
recognise that their decisions on this matter are theologically 
and constitutionally (in certain countries) untenable, and that, 
for faith communities, the time has come to give gay couples 
(queer bodies) full access to the institution of marriage. 
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Spiritual maturity implies freedom from prejudice. So many of 
our attitudes rest on narrow-minded suppositions far removed 
from reality, argues Botha (2002:31–32). Conditional acceptance 
of gays (queer bodies) remains rejection.
Queer theology
Background
A radical rereading of Scripture that counters heteropatriarchy,32 
heterosexism, heteronormativity, celibacy and the understanding 
of marriage as between one man and one woman, paves the way 
towards Queer Theology. A theology of inclusion is queer in its 
very nature. From a biblical perspective, it constitutes meaning 
to the embodied experience of sexual orientations of LGBTIQ+ 
identities to be part of the faith community.
Although gay and lesbian theologies offered reflective space 
for gays and lesbians to analyse their experience, it, however, 
failed to offer theological support in the AIDS crisis of 1980s and 
1990s (Stuart 2002:65–76). Stuart is of the opinion that this 
failure to reflect theologically on care and death has hindered 
the flourishing of these theologies. Queer theology, however, she 
argues, is the fruit of gay and lesbian theologies. Queer theology 
is a breakaway from assimilatory practices to heteronormativity 
towards the celebration and consecration of human sexual 
diversity. Although Queer Theology is still new, it offers a 
theoretical and theological framework methodologically to 
discover new ways in practising theology regarding the full 
32. In footnote 4 in their article When faith does violence: Reimagining engagement between 
churches and LGBTI groups on homophobia in Africa, West, Van der Walt and Kaoma 
(2016:1) provide the following definition of heteropatriarchy: ‘[I]s a term that intersects the 
systems of oppression identified by feminist and gender scholars (namely, patriarchy and 
queer scholars), that is, heteronormativity. Heteronormativity refers to the understanding 
that heterosexual practice and desire is considered normal and anything deviating from this 
norm is somehow perverse, impossible or deviant.’ 
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inclusion of LGBTIQ+ persons in the church, and the liberation of 
the body of Christ from injustices.
Traditional connotations of the word queer invoked adjectives 
like ‘odd’, ‘strange’, ‘non-normative’ (Thatcher 2011:140). To be 
queer is to refuse to be aligned with the status quo of binary 
definitions on identity. Queerness is a rebellion. The term has 
progressed in meaning through the self-identification of LGBTIQ+ 
people who defined this term for themselves. ‘Queer goes against 
the conventional understandings of sexual identity and further 
deconstructs the categories and formulas that sustain them’ 
(Dilley 1999:458). Judith Butler (1993:15) ‘asserted that “queer” 
could not be made into an identity in a similar manner to how 
“woman” or “homosexual” exist as identities’. It is a term which is 
‘contingent and constantly shifting. Queering is not just about 
highlighting the absence of justice, but it opens up possibilities 
for “more bodies to matter”’. A queer perspective ‘goes beyond 
male or female binaries and even beyond gay and lesbian identity 
politics to an explicit politic of difference and diversity’ (Judith 
Butler 1993:15).
The words queer and theology in the same construct disrupt 
heteropatriarchal Bible reading and ecclesiastical practices that 
define human sexuality and methods of theology within a 
framework that, for centuries, subjugated and dehumanised 
non-normative sexualities, gender identities and expressions. 
Furthermore, heteropatriachy undergirds disembodiment of 
human beings that is dualistic in nature. Contrary, to this 
disembodiment Body Theology, as a theology and method 
affirms the embodiment of all bodies, in this case queer bodies. 
Though Body Theology is constituted stands in the continuum 
with process, liberation and feminist theologies, Queer Theology 
on the other hand is the embodiment of queer bodies’ critical 
reflection of their experiences of God in their bodies (West, Van 
der Walt & Kaoma 2016:2). Cheng (2011:9) defines Queer 
Theology ‘as people talking about God in a consciously 
progressive manner, especially in terms of challenging societal 
norms about sexuality and gender’. It is ‘“talk about God” that 
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challenges and deconstructs the natural binary categories of 
sexual and gender identity’.
Thus, the method of Queer Theology is to disturb, disrupt and 
destabilise normativity, and to apply hermeneutics of 
deconstruction in order to discover meaning. The sources of 
Queer Theology are Scripture, tradition, reason and experience 
(Thatcher 2011:33–53). Thatcher (2011:33–53) discusses these 
sources and the application thereof to speak theologically about 
sex. Two key principles are of vital importance for Thatcher, 
namely, (1) ‘treat the Bible as a Witness to the Revelation of God 
in Christ, (2) focus on the development of tradition at least as 
much as on its repetition’ (2011:51–52). Cheng (2011:11–20) 
describes how these sources, over a few decades of scholarly 
work from a queer theological method, have added new 
knowledge on how heteropatriarchy oppresses queer bodies. 
Queer Theology thus became a hermeneutical lens creating 
awareness of the intersectional struggle against injustice. 
Intersecting Body Theology – towards 
African Queer Theology?
Queer bodies are the site of reference for their own meaning and 
understanding of life in communion with God and others. Because 
Queer Theology is in its developmental phase, a contextual 
development is of utmost importance. Here Queer Theology, can 
draw from the wells of black and African Theologies. 
The struggle against colonialism, segregation and apartheid in 
South Africa and Africa united people, especially black people, 
to liberate themselves from structural subjugation. Prominent 
leaders in the South African church like Beyers Naudé, Allan 
Boesak and Desmond Tutu fought against the theological 
justification of a white domination in the church and state. Their 
prophetic voices were informed by how they read and understood 
Scripture, tradition, reason and experience. The site of struggle 
for Naudé, Boesak and Tutu was freedom and justice for all 
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bodies, irrespective of race, class or gender. The church united 
against the racial oppression of apartheid.
In the 20th century the embodied experiences of oppression 
resulted in the formation of black theology and liberation 
theology. The primary purpose of black theology for theologians, 
clergy and ordinary members was to ‘restore the full humanity of 
black people and to imbue them with the confidence that they 
are creatures of God’ (Pityana 1994:174, 177) – thereby framing 
the ‘black experience’ as a key source of liberation. Black theology 
derived from America (the civil rights movement and Black 
Power) and South Africa (the struggle against apartheid and 
Black Consciousness Movement). Black peoples’ experience of 
racism under colonialism, segregation and apartheid was key. 
Liberation theology developed in the Latin-Americas out of the 
socio-political contexts of the poor, whereby the preferential 
option of God for the poor stands central (Villa-Vicencio 
1994:187).
The doctrine of Christology for both these theologies, formed 
a solid theological basis for them. Christ stands in solidarity with 
black people (Cone 1975:136) and the poor who are marginalised, 
destitute and wronged. African Theology, on the other hand 
‘refers to a theology that holds to essential orthodoxy in relation 
to the foundational doctrines of the Christian faith’. Furthermore, 
‘its task must keep, as an important goal, the creation of 
possibilities for the Gospel to answer questions raised in the 
interior of the African world view’ (Magezi & Igba 2018:4). Here 
the call for an African Queer Theology (West et al. 2016:4), is 
correct and timely because of the current inhumane conditions 
that queer bodies are subjected too. 
For the church confessing, Christ is the essence of church 
identity. The church’s prophetic voice and mission shifted to 
‘confessing Christ is inseparable from following Christ’ (Migliore 
2004:207). The Confession of Belhar (1986) is a good example of 
confessing the triune God’s creative-redemptive work through 
Jesus Christ in context of the most vulnerable. Confessing 
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becomes the embodiment of the prophetic voice and witness to 
subjugation based on race and socio-economic positions. Belhar 
called for unity, reconciliation and justice under the brutal 
governance of apartheid South Africa. This embodied resistance 
led to the theological rejection of the white minority rule.
The church in South Africa played a vital role to restore black 
people’s humanity and the dignity of the poor. Injustices were 
fought in a non-violent manner, reconciling faith with the 
everyday life of suffering under the draconian rule of apartheid. 
However, critique from feminist scholars challenged the 
phenomenon of oppression as understood by black and liberation 
theologies. In the early 1990s South African feminist theologian, 
Denise Ackerman (1994:201–202), in her article entitled ‘Faith 
and feminism: Women doing theology’, mapped the task and 
method of doing theology as feminist theology. Ackerman 
(1994:201–202) emphasised the experience of women under 
oppression and how their embodied experience became a 
theological praxis. The church, in the mid and late 20th century, 
realised that to confess Christ in context, liberates people from 
racism, classism and gender.
Sadly, the church who stood against the dehumanising system 
of apartheid is struggling to reclaim her prophetic voice for the 
inclusion and affirming of LGBTIQ+ people. The church became 
the ‘oppressor’. The exclusion of LGBTIQ+ people from the faith 
community ought to invoke an action of solidarity as an 
intersectional33 (Simien 2007:265) struggle against oppression. 
South African theologian, John de Gruchy, in his seminal work 
The Church struggle in South Africa (De Gruchy & De Gruchy 
2005:241), argues that the church ‘is faced with the challenge of 
talking with and being shaped by the insights and faith of 
homosexual Christians, pastors and theologians’. The recognition 
of the existence of racism and sexism within the church, is the 
33. ‘[I]s an analytical tool that rejects the separability of identity categories, as it recognizes 
the heterogeneity of various race-sex groups’ (Simien 2007:265).
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work of black and female Christians, pastors and theologians. 
Mutua (2011) says that any fight and struggle against the 
powerlessness that victimises gays and other vulnerable groups 
must be carried out through the prism of three concepts: 
intersectionality, multidimensionality and anti-subordination.
Intersectionality means that discrimination is both vertical 
and horizontal, and takes place at multiple levels among various 
identities. Thus, racists are likely to be homophobes and sexists. 
Multidimensionality suggests that oppression takes place in 
multiple dimensions. People can be oppressed as women, but 
also women who are lesbians.
Anti-subordination is the notion that it is futile and hypocritical 
to fight one form of oppression or discrimination while supporting 
another form of oppression. Thus, it is hypocritical to fight sexism 
if we support homophobia. Genuine liberation requires that all 
oppression be fought on all fronts at the same time.
Finally, societies are judged by how they treat their most 
vulnerable populations and their minorities, and not how they 
treat the strong, the wealthy and the powerful. That is why it is 
odious to exclude gay people from legal protection or to propose 
the barbaric idea of putting them to death on the basis of their 
sexual preference or otherwise (Connell 2002:93–108; Mutua 
2011:461).34
These ‘insights’ are drawn from the multidimensional and 
intersectional experiences – with the frame of reference, the 
body, because ‘[h]uman beings’ existence is embodied existence’ 
(Migliore 2004:142). Thus, embodied experiences expose the 
subordination behaviour and policies of the church community. 
Intersectionality becomes the hermeneutical lens for the church 
to listen to the multidimensional struggle of LGBTIQ+ persons as 
was the case in liberation, black and feminist theologies.




For Christian theology, the body is not strange, but part of its 
metaphysical narrative (Rogers 1999:17) and tradition (Compaan 
2016:187). Traditionally the body was viewed from an essentialist 
perspective ‘as a reality, as a thing, as a subject’ and in post-
modernity ‘as a product and construct of society’ (Punt 
2005:372). The division of the sexes resulted in that the body 
itself is being understood as dualistic.35 For many centuries 
Christian anthropology was influenced by natural law theology 
(Migliore 2004:18). Pityana (1994:49) states that the moral and 
philosophical system of natural law ethics ‘deduces rules of moral 
behaviour from rational observation of natural phenomena’. 
Thus, sexuality within the frame of natural law is denoted in 
procreation (Thatcher 2011:182). Many ecclesiological conceptions 
of sexuality in Africa, especially in Southern Africa, stand firmly in 
the natural law of sexual ethics – a heritage constituted by ‘a 
conservative sexual ethical mix of our Dutch Calvinism, British 
missionary piety and up-right Victorianism’ (De Gruchy & De 
Gruchy 2005:236). Colonialism destroyed ‘complex African 
sexual practices and expressions’ (Blessol 2012:224) that (in)formed 
identities of gender and sexuality within various socio-political 
contexts. Many LGBTIQ+ bodies experience exclusion within 
their churches as well as the policing of their sexualities from the 
side of the state.
The struggle against heteropatriarchy and heterosexism 
consists of an intersectional liberation struggle to decolonise 
what it means to be a human being in Africa. Ackerman (1994:202) 
expresses her sensitivity towards the different embodied 
experiences of black and white feminist theologians,36 calling this 
35. ‘The mind-body dualism was built upon a foundationalist philosophy of meaning, and re-
inscribed the person in essentialist categories, even if ironically ascribing permanence to the 
transcendental mind which replaces the bodily as the basis for immanence’ (Punt 2005:372).
36. ‘A critical analysis of white women’s place in our society reveals that our experience is 
one of being both oppressors and oppressed […] Black women analysing their context and 
experience reveal the multi-dimensional nature of their oppression, which incorporates race, 
class gender […]’ (Ackerman 1994:201–202). 
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sense of sensitivity ‘vulnerability [...] that involves pain’ and ‘being 
both oppressor and oppressed’. For the African Church to practise 
inclusion and affirm LGBTIQ+ sexualities, ordination and blessing 
of same-sex unions as marriage, indigenous understanding of 
sexuality that is part and parcel of African human sexuality is 
essential. Inclusion and affirming LGBTIQ+ sexual orientations in 
the South African and African Church include a process of 
decolonisation.
It is essential to point out that alongside liberation, black and 
feminist theologies, embodied resistance by LGBTIQ+ people 
also took place during the 1960’s in America. The Stonewall 
riots of 1968 led to the rediscovering of the definition of people’s 
sexuality and embodiment thereof within socio-political 
contexts (Stuart 2002:79). Out of this movement, gay and 
lesbian theologies flourished, with focus on the body. Isherwood 
and Stuart (1998:10) are of opinion that ‘[t]he body is both the 
site and recipient of revelation’. The church must ‘listen to the 
body’s own speech, to think theologically with and through our 
bodies’ (Nelson 1995:46). Practising theology from embodied 
experiences gave rise to three theological strands. These three 
strands contributed to the development of what is now called 
Body Theology in gay and lesbian theologies. Firstly, process 
thought that describes the teleological movement of natural 
and rational fulfilment rather than ‘dualistic thinking’ 
(Isherwood  & Stuart 1998:33–41); secondly, it is about the 
liberation theology’s ‘concern with justice as the direction of 
God who is unfolding through the bodies of individuals, and in 
the lives of the oppressed’ (ibid.); and thirdly, it’s about feminist 
theology that reasons ‘individual experience is identified as the 
creation and touchstone of theology, with the body being the 
site of experience’ (ibid.). ‘[W]omen and gay men […] came to 
understand that the way society viewed their bodies was the 
site of their oppression’ (Isherwood & Stuart 1998:20). The 
theological impetus of Body Theology is the doctrine of 




Through the incarnated Christ, God is experienced as the 
‘Absolute Other, utterly transcendent’ (Nelson 1995:38–60). 
Furthermore, the incarnated Christ frees masculine bodies from 
anti-body ideas. Nelson (1995:49) argues that masculinity creates 
a dualism by ‘fundamental lessons of masculinity through 
separating, through cutting the erotic bonding with our mothers, 
through identifying ourselves over against anything feminine – 
including gayness’. He further points out that ‘anti-Body Theology 
disconnects men from feeling the immediacy of body issues – 
such as racism, violence and environmental abuse’ (Nelson 
1995:49). Thus, even the suffering and pain of unwelcoming 
practices towards LGBTIQ+ bodies cannot be experienced by 
them. Heteronormative unwillingness to stand in solidarity with 
the body experience of LGBTIQ+ people can be ascribed to 
power and fear.
The second Christian affirmation is the crucifixion. The 
crucified Christ stands in solidarity with the oppressed, 
marginalised and separate – even with LGBTIQ+ people. Christ’s 
solidarity, according to Nelson (1995:50), can be described as 
‘the holy vulnerability of incarnate sacred presence still entering 
into the depths of human pain’. The incarnated Christ in the 
suffering of LGBTIQ+ people exposes the power relations and the 
guilt of the world. In the third instance, a crucifixion Body 
Theology advocates for vulnerability. Nelson (1995:54) argues 
that genital vulnerability of the male testicles establishes sensitive 
vulnerability against the fear of feminising the masculine body. 
A  crucifixion Body Theology liberates heterosexists’ fear of 
LGBTIQ+ people. Lastly, a Body Theology states that we stand 
with God through the resurrection. Nelson (1995:50–60) 
advocates that a resurrection Body Theology stands against 
death.
African understanding of holism ‘stresses interdependence 
and harmony among people, as well as between human beings 
and their natural environment’ (Richardson 2013:38). Contrary 
to body-mind dualism, holism challenges the exclusion of 
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LGBTIQ + persons. African personhood, as argued by Munyaka 
and Motlhabi (2009:66), is centred in the concept of ubuntu and 
‘[r]egardless of their social status, gender and race [and LGBTIQ+ 
persons], persons are recognised, accepted, valued and 
respected for their own sake’. Ubuntu, as a concept of liberation 
against the struggle of apartheid, stands now as hermeneutic 
tool to disturb, disrupt and destabilise heteropatriarchy and 
power.
From a Christological perspective, holism and ubuntu finds 
theological meaning in the incarnation-crucifixion-resurrection 
of Christ. Christ’s incarnation brings interdependence between 
human beings. The church’s exclusionary practices of blessing 
marriages and ordination of LGBTIQ+ persons stand in 
opposition to Christ’s redemptive work. Holism and ubuntu 
that define the dignity of all people from an African worldview 
liberate the normative metanarrative reading of Scripture, 
tradition, reason and experience beyond confinement. 
Intersectionality ‘queers’ the African worldview and pleads for 
the full inclusion of LGBTIQ+ persons. By ‘focusing on 
experience the body becomes the site of personal redemption 
and redemptive interdependence’ (Isherwood & Stuart 
1998:39). Intersectionality, as a method, creates the awareness 
of redemptive interdependence, simultaneously beckoning 
towards indigenous theologians to ‘queer’ Christianity in Africa 
and culture to (re)discover human sexuality and human dignity 
of LGBTIQ+ identities. It possibly paves the way towards an 
African Queer Theology rooted in African worldviews, values, 
beliefs and practices.
The church in Africa’s rediscovery of the indigenous 
knowledge of human sexuality and practices will help to 
challenge hetero-power relations as a heritage of colonialism. 
African queer bodies’ identity would therefore not be apologetic, 
but rather proudly celebrating through diverse cultures, 




Graham Ward (1999:163) ‘proposes that the body of Christ is 
considered to be a “multigendered body” and, as such, “the body 
of Christ is queer”’. It goes beyond ‘categories that are confined 
to gender and sexuality, but becomes the embodiment of a 
radical love that does away with sexual and gender boundaries’. 
According to Thatcher (2011):
This androgynous nature of the body of Christ could be considered 
blasphemous. However, the concern is that the Christian church 
has much to learn about how to ‘perform’ gender by a continuous 
reflection on membership within the body of Christ, especially seeing 
that the same body resists the application of all categories of sexual 
orientations or gender identities – even those considered ‘queer’ or 
‘androgynous’. (p. 139)
Furthermore, Peterson (in Motsau 2015) asserts that: 
Queering seeks to challenge the normative social arrangements of 
identities and subjectivities within the heterosexual or homosexual 
binary. It can be argued by many lesbian, gay, queer and feminist 
authors that this heteronormativity maintains the hegemonic order 
within the church, social institutions and social relations. With that 
said, queer theory and Queer Theology share a common vision of 
highlighting the invisible, the unseen – those marginal identities 
that are considered to be unintelligible to the  social matrix of the 
family. (p. 115)
The incarnation of Christ is a revolutionary move to affirm the 
lives of people, irrespective of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity. The church is already queer and is to be inclusive of the 
queer people in society, because it is part of the amorphous body 














Fresh water is a hot topic these days. Water has become an 
important locus for theological reflection. Christiana Peppard’s 
remark (2014:19), quoted above, voices the concern that the 
availability of fresh water – but also the warming of water, 
particularly the salt water of the oceans, as a consequence of 
climate change (cf. pp. 121–129) – require theological reflection. 
This means doing theology amidst climate change37 in an era 
37. Northcott and Scott (2014:1) argue that climate change refers to ‘the scientific realization 
that human industrial activities, especially burning fossil fuels, clearing or burning forests and 
making cement, are taking place on such a scale that they are changing the earth’s climate.’ 
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that some refer to as ‘the Anthropocene’ (Northcott & Scott 
2014:4),38 for ‘[w]ater is at the heart of the new climate reality’ 
(Peppard 2014:129). How water is portrayed and described, 
analysed and interpreted, imagined and situated may have 
serious repercussions for the future – and therefore requires the 
best that theology can offer – not only as a response to a 
looming crisis, but also because ‘water charts human history’ 
(Peppard 2014:19).39 In South Africa, water ethics and water 
stories are no less important. Serious water shortages in South 
Africa – not only at the time of writing this chapter, but also for 
the foreseeable future – emphasise the need for theological 
(re)imaginings of water. This chapter presents contours for 
such reflection by drawing on the work of three South African 
theologians: Steve de Gruchy, Ernst Conradie and Robert 
Vosloo.
(footnote 37 continues...)
‘This’, they write (2014:1), ‘is manifest in more extreme weather, drought, flood, melting ice, 
rising oceans, and strengthening storms’ (Also see Christiana Peppard’s chapter on ‘Climate 
Change and Water in the Anthropocene’ (2014:115–141).
38. Christiana Peppard (2014:128) also uses the language of ‘the Anthropocene’, because 
this language ‘enables us to convey ethical concern about negative effects of environmental 
disruptions, especially climate change’. Moreover, ‘[i]t recognizes that the effects are, 
and will continue to be, unjustly borne by people living in poverty – precisely those who 
have, for the most part, neither caused these disruptions nor benefited from the industrial 
processes that led to them.’ Vandana Shiva (2002:50 quoted in Peppard 2014:128) writes 
that ‘[i]t is the poorest people in the Third World who will be most severely affected by 
climate change, drought, melting glaciers, and rising sea levels’ – which means that ‘[t]he 
peasants, pastoralists, and coastal communities will become environmental refugees as rains 
disappear, crops collapse, and rivers go dry’.
39. Gary Chamberlain summarises (2008:1–3) this ‘looming crisis’ as a collection of challenges, 
‘at the beginning of the twenty-first century the waters around me and around the globe 
face unprecedented challenges – pollution from agriculture, industry, and human waste; 
oceans heating up and rising due to global warming; growing populations with increasing 
demands for clean water and more food grown through irrigation; expanding industries 
discharging waste into streams and rivers and ultimately the sea; increasing salinity of fresh 
water; blockage of the natural flow of rivers and dams or diversions for other needs, often 
preventing once-rushing rivers from reaching the seas.’ The title of this chapter is therefore 
somewhat provocative in that it has in mind the warming of ocean water and the devastating 
consequences of climate change. It also recalls a French film released in 2013 with this exact 
title wherein female sexuality, bodiliness and a network of relationships are explored.
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However, this requires asking from the outset (Peppard 2014):
What kind of a thing is water? There is no simple answer to this 
seemingly straightforward question. Yet how we answer it will shape 
the face of the twenty-first century, with profound consequences 
for human individuals, communities, societies, and ecosystems 
worldwide. (p. 43)
Wading deep waters? Theologies of 
water
There is no denying that water will become an ever more 
important locus of academic reflection, including theological 
reflection – for ‘in the coming decades global water shortages’ 
will be ‘increasingly dire’ and ‘increasingly fought over’ (Ferris 
2008:197). Christiana Peppard (2014:19, 36-51) echoes the 
concern that ‘wars of the future will be fought over water, not 
oil’,40 and thereby raises important questions: What is water 
worth? Is water a human right or an economic commodity?
Water is closely connected to peace and justice issues 
and  therefore regarded as no less than a human right; for 
water  itself is ‘so basic a need that each person has a right 
of access to a minimum amount’ (Ferris 2008:196). Yet water 
is simultaneously regarded as a valuable resource for 
‘economic exchange’ (Ferris 2008:36) which complicates ‘how 
societies  ought to value water’, argues Peppard (2014:36).41 
40. See in this regard the book with the significant title Water Wars, written by Vandana 
Shiva (2002).
41. This point may require a longer quotation (Peppard 2014:43–44), ‘For the past two 
decades, a debate has been raging [...] about whether water should be viewed primarily as 
a commodity or as a human right. A commodity is something that can be owned, traded, 
and sold for profit. To define water as a commodity is to assume that water can and should 
be owned, that it can and should be sold and traded in the market economy, and that the 
profit motive is a reasonable component of this process [...] A human right, by contrast, 
is something due to all people, regardless of their ability to pay. The language of rights 
suggests equity is far more important than profit; that the commodification of fresh water 
leads to inequities in distribution; and, therefore, that fresh water should not be valued 
primarily as an economic commodity [...] Juxtaposing the logic of commodity with the logic 
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Such questions and such language – including both the view 
that water is a human right and that water is an economic 
commodity – assumes an ‘essential connection between access 
to clean water and human welfare’ (Ferris 2008:197), or 
between water and human flourishing (Peppard 2014:13). And, 
indeed, as Ferris (2008) claims:
[T ]he academic theological community has a long tradition of 
addressing ethics and issues of social good [...] [which means 
that] theologians must look, and indeed some are looking, at this 
emerging crisis and field [of ] ethical responses that speak to religious 
communities as well as the larger international community [...] [Blue 
theology] calls for theologians to join the voices that advocate 
change and work towards solutions locally and globally. (p. 197)
The South African theologian, Steve de Gruchy, would also focus 
on the theological significance of water towards the end of his 
life (Warmback 2012:34), particularly in two articles (De Gruchy 
2009:53; 2010:188) wherein he grapples with water from his work 
on sustainability and development. In the first article, entitled 
‘Dealing with our own sewage’ De Gruchy (2009:57) points out 
that ‘[t]here is only one stream of water from which we all drink’ 
which confronts us with dealing responsibly with our waste.42 In 
the second article, entitled ‘Water and Spirit’, De Gruchy 
(2010:197, 198) elaborates on the insight that ‘[t]here is only one 
(footnote 41 continues...)
of rights reveals that these designations are oriented towards fundamentally different goals, 
as well as means of achieving those goals. To call fresh water a commodity is to emphasize 
the goal of profit [...] By contrast, to call fresh water a human right is to emphasize the goal 
of justice.’
42. This involves the ‘recognition that environmental constraints are legitimate constraints’ 
(De Gruchy 2009:62). Indeed, ‘[w]e cannot be free “from” water, from top soil, from clean 
air, from sewage’ for ‘[w]e all live downstream, and we cannot be free from that reality’ 
(De Gruchy 2009:62). Steve de Gruchy’s response to this challenge is an ‘olive agenda’: a 
blend between ‘a brown agenda that focuses on poverty’ and ‘a green agenda that focuses 
on the environment’, instead of a choice between ‘the cry of the poor’ and ‘the cry of the 
earth’ – a choice that would be ‘to the detriment of both’, he adds (De Gruchy 2009:58; 
cf. 2007; also see Ernst Conradie’s article entitled ‘From land reform to poo protesting: some 
theological reflections on the ecological repercussions of economic inequality’ 2014). 
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stream of water’, and argues that life itself – including fullness of 
life – is given within the hydrological cycle.43
In a four part popular series on a theology of water, Steve de 
Gruchy writes on such themes as water as life’s foundation 
(De  Gruchy n.d.a), water as God’s gift (De Gruchy n.d.b), and 
water as divine symbol (De Gruchy n.d.c). Such theological 
portrayals of water share three important insights in thinking 
about water: firstly, that water is a sine qua non, ‘an essential 
condition’ (Peppard 2014:17, 20); secondly, that water is sui 
generis, ‘unique in its characteristics’ (Peppard 2014:17, 20); and 
thirdly, that water is not just limited, but also unevenly distributed 
(De Gruchy 2010:193; cf. Peppard 2014:32–33). Together these 
three insights guide the intuition that water has soteriological 
significance, seeing as it has bearing upon ‘the possibilities for 
human life’ (Peppard 2014:32). Yet, there is some variety in the 
portrayal of theologies of water which invokes different 
descriptions in the naming of theologies of water.
A first description is hydrotheology which Colin Russel 
(2007:182) describes as ‘a natural theology for water’. Among 
different aims and motivations – among others, situating this 
kind of theology within ‘natural theology’ – hydrotheology 
emphasises ‘the importance of water in our world’. As such, 
hydrotheology is a ‘natural theology of water’ (Russel 2007:162) 
that draws upon the work of 18th and 19th century so-called 
‘physicotheology’ (ibid.:164–166). An example of this kind of work 
is the description of ‘hydrotheologie’ presented by Johann-
Alberto Fabricius (1668–1736), namely that it is ‘an attempt 
through observing the properties, distribution and movement of 
43. This requires a longer quotation from this article (De Gruchy 2010:198), ‘There is only 
one stream of water. What passes through the bodies of humans passes through the bodies 
of animals, insects, and plants. It flushes through our sanitation systems, flows through the 
rivers, seeps through wetlands, rises to the heavens to become clouds, and returns to us to 
nourish us and all living things. There is no life outside of this cycle, and theology has to get 
real about it.’ In short, there is no life without water, argues De Gruchy (2010:198), for water 
gives life. 
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water, to encourage human beings to love and admire the 
benevolence of the powerful Creator’ (Russel 2007:165).44
A second description is aquacentric theology which Steve de 
Gruchy (2010:198–199) describes as ‘a theology that is willing to 
listen to those traditions that speak of the sacredness of water, 
of rivers, of wells’. Aquacentric theology becomes a concrete 
expression in his ‘Jordan River motif’ which he describes as ‘an 
aquacentric moment in salvation history’ wherein ‘the crossing of 
the waters that flow from life (Sea of Galilee) to death (the Dead 
Sea)’ becomes an important ethical turning point (De Gruchy 
2010:200). Not only is the Jordan River motif itself about water, 
in linking ‘the living water of the Sea of Galilee to the dying water 
of the Dead Sea’ (De Gruchy 2009:61, [emphasis in original]), but 
the theological reflection on water is placed within a very specific 
context, namely, that of ‘human choice, human responsibility, 
human praxis focused on the question of sustainability, of one’s 
descendants living long in the land’ (ibid.:62). The choice that 
he  (ibid.:61) refers to is the choice between water of life and 
water of death, for ‘[t]his water itself is ambiguous’. Aquacentric 
theology thereby links ecological theology directly with (Jordan 
River) ethics – with choices ‘about lifestyle, culture, land, 
economy, and justice’ (De Gruchy 2009:61–62).45
44. Christiana Peppard (2016:416) points out that, in the encyclical Laudato Si’, fresh water 
is foregrounded as an urgent contemporary issue and ‘papal commitment to the human 
right to water’ is a core concern (p. 435). She (Peppard 2016:421) identifies what she calls ‘a 
hydrological hermeneutic’ in this encyclical, which firstly, highlights ‘key insights’ regarding 
(fresh) water; secondly, provides a ‘map’ to ‘moral possibilities and fissures’ in reflecting 
upon (fresh) water; and thirdly, ‘suggest future lines of inquiry and analysis for Catholic 
environmental ethics, ecological theology, and moral theory’. Here she again argues (Peppard 
2016:423; cf. also 2014:52–67) that, ‘[f]or the church, the grounding for the idea of a human 
right to water is theological. Water is a gift from God. It is good of creation that is intended 
for everyone, without discrimination, across time and space. It is a human right because it 
is fundamental to the achievement of any and all other rights. It should not be owned or 
controlled by the few at the exclusion of the many.’ In short, Peppard (2014:52) describes 
fresh water as ‘a right-to-life issue for the twenty-first century’. Gary Chamberlain (2008:7) 
agrees that ‘access to water is a fundamental right and not a result of market supply’. See 
also his chapter entitled ‘Rights to Water and a New Water Ethic’ (2008:131–153).
45. See also Christiana Peppard’s chapter on ‘The Jordan River’ (2014:96–114).
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A third description is blue theology, which Margaret Ferris 
(2008:195) describes as ‘a theology of water conservation that 
teaches that all water, salt and fresh, is precious and sacred’. Blue 
theology is ‘a derivative field of ecotheology’ and therein an 
‘emerging theology’ (Ferris 2008:201). As ‘a new branch of 
ecotheology that is emerging as a leading voice for conservation 
of all the world’s waters’, blue theology offers both ‘new 
methodologies of reunderstanding water’s spiritual significance’ 
and ‘a means towards actions to protect the aquatic environment’ 
(Ferris 2008:211). Indeed Ferris (2008) claims that:
[B]lue theology identifies water as important and loved by God, both 
for its intrinsic value and also for its instrumental value to all creatures 
and ecological systems on earth. Blue theology finds that water is 
precious to God, and therefore precious to faith communities and 
should be protected and conserved by human beings. (p. 201)46
Theologies of water have been shaped by a number of contextual 
theologies, including ecological theology, feminist theology and 
liberation theology in that, according to Margaret Ferris 
(2008:198–204), a number of ‘influences’, ‘lessons’ ‘themes’ or 
‘principles’ shape emerging theologies of water. Yet, in Ferris’ 
description (ibid.:206), such a theology of water also claims to 
stand in the traditions of process theology and practical theology 
(ibid.:208) in that it takes seriously the notions of ‘praxis’, ‘action’ 
and ‘activism’ (ibid.:203–205, 207–208). In addition to these, 
‘blue theology must also be consciously ecumenical and inter-
religious’, argues Ferris (2008:208). In short, theologies of water 
46. Steve de Gruchy (2010:199) also draws on Margaret Ferris’ suggestion for a blue 
theology, and quotes extensively from her earlier work on blue theology in his own reflection 
on water. Ferris (2006:2) explains the rationale for her suggestion of ‘blue theology’ as 
follows, ‘The re-evaluation of water through a theological lens is part of what I have termed 
‘Blue Theology’, and it is a valuable exercise for both secular and faith communities. For 
faith communities, examining underlying assumptions about water uncovers the traditional 
significance of water as shown in the biblical texts and in the Christian tradition of justice. 
For secular communities, such an exploration is a model of how a community might discover 
unarticulated yet detrimental assumptions about water. Further, for both communities it is a 
call to action to devise their own models of value of water – to discover how water is valuable 
and how it is to be cared for by all communities.’
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are concerned with human and ecological flourishing (cf. Peppard 
2014:14).
Margaret Ferris (2008:197) also points out that ‘bodies of 
water have been almost entirely overlooked in [ecotheological] 
debates’, and has only recently become the focus for a number 
of theological studies. Recent theological work on water include 
such provocative titles as Dying for water (McDonagh 2003), 
Troubled waters (Chamberlain 2008), and Just water (Peppard 
2014), but it may not be enough to field ‘the coming crisis of 
water scarcity and safety around the world’ (Ferris 2008:197). 
However, Christiana Peppard (2014:19–20) warns that ‘a good 
deal of hype surrounds the question of fresh water supply’ and 
that much of this ‘hype […] is insufficiently nuanced’. What is 
important to note is that ‘[f]resh water is a baseline requirement 
for survival and flourishing – for human beings, societies, 
civilisations, and ecosystems’ (Peppard 2014:20).
Because the task of exploring theologies of water involves 
not only taking seriously water as a site of theological meaning, 
but also requires ‘a common vocabulary that will enable [us] to 
understand one another’s language’ (Conradie 2013:16), ecological 
theologies arguably provide the landscape for theological 
reflection on water. This is explored in the next section.
Journey with water?47 Water and 
South African ecotheologies
All of us drink from different sources, but the ways in which we 
blend these sources together may be imagined as various 
tributaries flowing into a river, that is, from mountain streams 
and larger lakes.
47. ‘Journey of Water’ is a campaign that was launched in 2017 by World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) South Africa. The campaign is concerned with water stress, the availability of water 




The journey with water is a journey into ecological theology. 
As such, it is a journey shaped by different sources (Conradie 
2013:8–9). A variety of (South African) ecological theologies is 
therefore the focus of this section. Yet, it is by no means a given 
or, for that matter, self-evident that churches or theology could 
or should contribute constructively within wider environmental 
discourses. As the South African ecotheologian, Ernst Conradie 
(2007:228), points out, ‘Christianity itself stands publicly 
accused as one of the root causes of the environmental crisis’ 
(cf. also White 1967).48 Gary Chamberlain (2008:3) agrees, 
particularly as this pertains to water. Chamberlain (2008:3) 
writes that ‘we live from earliest years in religious traditions that 
have been harmful to the earth and water’ and which therefore 
require ‘examinations of religious traditions in the hope that 
they can offer new ways of acting and new worldviews of 
relationships among humans, non-human users of water, and 
the earth’. Conradie (2011) says that:
Why should Christians engage in earthkeeping as Christians and 
from Christian communities? What is the source of inspiration that 
provide [them] with the energy to sustain their efforts despite 
setbacks and often overwhelming odds? What is the vision that 
lurks them forward? How do they explain the deepest motivation 
for their work? What is their theological rationale? (p. 1, [emphasis 
in original])
48. Ernst Conradie notes (2007:229) that Lynn White’s famous essay, entitled ‘The 
historical roots of our ecological crisis’ (1967), has had a profound impact on the work 
of ecological theologians, and elicited a number of responses to its argument that 
‘Christianity itself stands publicly accused as one of the root causes of the environmental 
crisis’ (Conradie 2007:228). This is discussed ‘in almost every major work in ecological 
theology’ (Conradie 2007:229; footnote 8). More particularly, ‘[i]n the context of wider 
environmental discourse, Christianity has all too often been criticised for a form of world-
denial, for fostering human alienation from the rest of the earth community and for 
justifying anthropocentrism’ (Conradie 2011:1). As such, ecological theology ‘began in the 
early 1960s in response to the growing awareness of how human economic development 
was dramatically and negatively affecting the earth’ (Ferris 2008:198). In South Africa 
‘there has been a steady stream of Christian contributions to ecological theology’ since 
the early 1990s (Conradie 2007:230). 
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In his book entitled Christianity and Earthkeeping, Ernst Conradie 
(2011) explores no less than 19 reasons for earthkeeping  – 
structured as a portrayal of a variety of ecotheological discourses, 
including the discourses on religion and theology, sustainable 
development, nature conservation, social ecology, ecofeminism, 
animal welfare, deep ecology, stewardship, sacramentality, 
eschatology, oikotheology, and the triune God.49 In a contribution 
on Christianity and the environment, Conradie (2007)50 gathers 
many of these discourses together into four (South African) 
theological approaches to environmental degradation51 which is 
49. These are discussed in separate chapters, dedicated to each of these reasons, with 
the following titles, ‘Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt’ (Conradie 2011:5–9); 
‘Local Christian communities can make a major contribution to earthkeeping’ (pp. 11–17); 
‘Earthkeeping is in our own best interests’ (pp. 19–28); ‘Simplicity is more rewarding than 
luxury’ (pp. 29–37); ‘We need to recognise the value of national parks and wilderness areas’ 
(pp. 39–42); ‘We need to think of our grandchildren’ (pp. 43–45); ‘We need to consider the 
victims of environmental injustices’ (pp. 47–51); ‘We need to move away from relationships 
of domination in the name of difference’ (pp. 53–58); ‘Animals have rights too!’ (pp. 59–64); 
‘We have to show respect for all forms of life’ (pp. 54–68); ‘The land is more important than 
any one form of life’ (pp. 69–74); ‘We are all in this together’ (pp 75–80); ‘God has given us 
the command to care for the earth’ (pp. 81–94); ‘The earth is a sacred gift to us from God’ 
(2011:95–99); ‘The vision of a new earth encourages us to care for this earth’ (pp. 101–105); 
‘Caring for the earth exemplifies the need for wisdom’ (pp. 107–114); ‘We are members of the 
whole household of God’ (pp. 115–122); ‘The earth is integral to God’s economy’ (pp. 123–137); 
‘God is loyal to this earth’ (pp. 139–145). 
50. All further references to Conradie (2007) will only be indicated by page numbers.
51. These ‘dominant approaches’ are Ernst Conradie’s attempt (pp. 227, 230; cf. 2013) 
to ‘map the terrain’ of South African ecological theologies as ‘models’ or ‘ideal types’ 
‘which help to identify some core characteristics’ (p. 230) of each of these approaches. 
However, see in particular the explanatory and qualifying remarks (p. 231, footnote 15) 
that accompany Conradie’s outline of these four approaches, specifically regarding 
the influence of ‘several strands of ecofeminism present in the South African context’ 
(pp.  231,  239–240, footnote 42). Conradie (p. 230) notes that ‘[i]t is not possible to 
provide a full review of such contributions here’, and therefore he refers interested 
readers to the annotated bibliography of Conradie and Warmback (2002; Conradie 
2007:230, footnote 14; see also Conradie’s indexed bibliographies for further research in 
ecological theology 2001; 2006).
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presented below as a broad overview of Christian ecotheologies 
in South Africa.
 • A first approach is nature conservation (Conradie 2007:231–
233, footnote 20). This requires ‘responsible stewardship 
of natural resources’ (p. 232), and focuses on such issues as 
the protection of wildlife, game parks, biodiversity, and 
ecotourism (p. 231). The  impetus for this approach comes 
from Christians’ ‘love for (unspoilt) nature’ and emphasises 
human responsibility, but may create the impression of ‘a 
leisured middle class’ that is ‘more concerned about wildlife 
than about the welfare of other human beings’. Ernst Conradie 
explains that the ethos of this approach is conservative, in 
that it focuses on the protection of ecosystems and the 
management of  natural resources. An ethics that gives 
expression to this approach focuses on the protection, care 
for and promotion of ecosystems – including the protection of 
water sources and resources.
• A second approach is restoration of the ancestral land 
(Conradie 2007:233–236, footnote 21). The focus of this 
approach is ‘the living conditions of impoverished rural 
communities in Africa’ and relies upon ‘a retrieval of the 
ecological wisdom in traditional African culture and religion’ 
that recognises and affirms ‘the sacredness of life’. This 
approach values ‘interrelatedness, mutual dependence, 
reciprocity, ecological balance, wholeness, the integrated 
web of life and, especially, community’ – for it recognises and 
affirms ‘the sacredness of life’ and the importance of ‘cosmic 
balance’. Conradie describes the ethos of this approach as 
communitarian, in that it focuses on maintaining ‘harmonious 
relationship[s]’ between humanity and nature. An ethics, 
which is shaped by this approach, values partnership with 
nature, and is concerned for ‘the living conditions of 
impoverished rural communities in Africa’ – including access 
to and restoration of water resources.
• A third approach is sustainable development (Conradie 
(2007:237–239, footnote 39). This language – ‘the dominant 
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language adopted by entrepreneurs, industry leaders and 
politicians who are concerned about environmental 
degradation’, notes Conradie – is embedded in ‘development 
discourse’, and focuses on such issues as economic growth, 
efficient resource management, and job creation. An important 
caution in this approach is ‘against expansionist notions of 
economic growth’ and ‘the greening of global capitalism’. 
Ernst Conradie portrays the ethos of this approach as strategic 
in that it attempts to deal with ‘economic scarcity’ by 
attempting to adjust production and consumption patterns 
for the sake of the survival of human beings and the earth. An 
ethics that shares in the conviction that limitless economic 
growth is responsible for environmental degradation, is 
critical of consumer culture (also in the form of ‘the gospel 
of  prosperity’) and values frugality – including frugality 
water use.
• A fourth approach is advocating for environmental justice 
(Conradie 2007:239–241). Within this approach the (unjust) 
consequences of environmental degradation is in view such 
as ‘the working conditions of people in factories, mines, on 
farms and in offices’ and ‘the living conditions of the urban 
poor’. Environmental justice – or ‘ecojustice’ – is interested in 
‘the abuse of power that results in a situation where poor 
people have to suffer the effects of environmental damage 
caused by the greed of others’, and in particular ‘the 
interconnectedness of the different manifestations of violence 
(whether political, military, industrial, domestic, gendered, 
racial, ethnic, or structural’. Human rights abuses and ‘the 
formation of a human rights culture’ is in view here. Ernst 
Conradie (2007:241) depicts the ethos of this approach as 
activist, in that it ‘seeks to express Christian convictions within 
the public sphere’. However, Conradie warns that an ethics 
that emphasises only the moral vision, which Christianity 
offers, tends towards ‘ethical reductionism’ and should take 
care to avoid ‘an anthropological logic’ that is only interested 
in ‘the impact of environmental degradation on human 
communities’, to the exclusion of ‘concern for the non-human 




In short, this collection of approaches, which Ernst Conradie 
describes (2007:241) as a ‘conflicting variety’, provide 
possibilities for (South African) theological reflections on 
water,52 but also point towards the necessity of ‘a new vision of 
a sustainable society’. This, however, requires ‘dreaming a 
different world’ (cf. Boesak, Weusmann & Amjad-Ali 2009) and 
thereby journeying together in doing ecological theology 
(Conradie 2013:4). Stated somewhat differently, this journey is 
one with a destination, which ‘suggests a close correlation 
between aesthetics and ethics’ (Conradie 2013:8). This includes 
what Ernst Conradie (2011:1) has described as the ‘search of 
an  inspiring vision’. As such, the environment – and water, 
in particular – is a concern for ‘public’ or ‘popular’ imagination 
(Conradie 2007:229), which may require theological 
reimaginings of water itself.
52. It is worth mentioning that a number of South African theologians who have written 
about water – including Conradie (2007), De Gruchy (2009) and Veldsman (2015) – opt 
for theological reflection on water from the locus of the doctrine of the Trinity, and more 
specifically the metaphor of the household of God (oikos). For Veldsman (2015:7), water 
represents the fullness of life made possible within the oikodome, and therefore recalls 
soteriological images such as building, healing, restoring, reconciling, making peace 
and transcending borders. Within the household of God the vulnerable and powerless 
cannot be refused fresh water, for the triune God is the Giver of Life (Veldsman 2015:7). 
For De Gruchy (2009:58), ‘[t]he development of the oikos motif’ is ‘a powerful reminder 
that the earth is one home for all of us’. Co-habiting ‘the one homestead’ calls for ‘an 
ethics of sustainability’ that aligns with ‘the ecological rhythms of the earth’. For Conradie 
(2007:242), the conviction that the earth is the household of God provides crucial 
theological reorientation for considering the theological significance of natural resources – 
including water. Conradie points out (2007:242) that, ‘[t]he power of this metaphor lies in 
its ability to integrate especially three core ecumenical themes on the basis of the Greek 
word oikos (household) – which forms the etymological root of the quests for economic 
justice (the nomoi or regulations within the household), ecological sustainability (the 
logos or underlying principles of the household) and ecumenical fellowship (oikoumene – 
participating as members of the whole household of God.’ Within this discourse ‘the 
whole household of God is best understood within the context of the whole work of God 
(creation, providence, redemption, completion)’ which is described as the ‘economy of the 
triune God’ or the ‘economic trinity’ (p. 242). See the article based on his inaugural address 
entitled ‘The earth in God’s economy’ (Conradie 2008) as well as his book with this same 
title, The earth in God’s economy (Conradie 2015).
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Give me this water! Water, 
imagination and ethics as optics
Like the river’s flowing, the ethical stream shapes the landscapes 
of our lives. It springs forth from hard rock, cuts deep canyons, 
carries and deposits the alluvium of our hopes and dreams. Its 
ripples echo through the soul.
Such an understanding of ethics (Smith 2001:189 quoted in 
Chamberlain 2008:6) calls for the creation of ‘a new water ethic’ 
that is able to account for ‘the story of water’ (Chamberlain 
2008:1–3).53 Such a ‘lived ethic’ may require a number of responses – 
also in the form of ecumenical work done by churches, including 
the SACC,54 the WARC,55 and the WCC.56 Indeed, the WCC would, 
already from the 1970s, explore the moral challenges related to 
climate change – as representing ‘a radical challenge to the 
contemporary belief in the intrinsic relationship between progress, 
defined as economic growth, and the welfare of humanity and the 
human habitat’ (Northcott & Scott 2014:5–6). This would, for 
instance, lead to the focus on Justice, peace and the integrity 
53. Ultimately, this calls for an ‘earthkeeping ethos’ (Conradie 2013:8), because Christian 
ethics is foundational to addressing the ecological crisis – as ‘the contested grounding 
of Christian ethics in the biblical roots of Christianity and Christian doctrine’ (p. 12). 
Moreover, Gary Chamberlain (2008:4) insists on ‘a new ethos around water’ that will be 
able ‘to guide our decisions for the present as well as future uses of natural resources’. 
Chamberlain (2008:8) calls this ‘a new water ethos and ethic’ – an important distinction 
between ‘a master viewpoint’ and consequent reflection upon actions, institutions and 
character, respectively (p. 9). Stated simply, such a water ethos and water ethics require 
‘[securing] water for all peoples, creatures, and the Earth itself’ (Chamberlain 2008:5). 
Gary Chamberlain (2008:3) prefers to speak about stories instead of story which, for 
him, includes ‘several stories about water – religious stories, scientific stories, stories of 
people struggling to find safe sources of water and sanitation, stories about the Earth 
and its needs’. 
54. See Climate change – A challenge to the churches in South Africa (SACC 2009).
55. See Water – God’s gift of life (Fisher 2006 – WARC). 




of creation in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1975 (Northcott & Scott 2014:5),57 
and lead to a number of ecumenical initiatives – including the 
formation of the EWN.58
However, without ‘ethical commitment’ and the formation of 
‘the new community’ such initiatives ring hollow (De Gruchy 
2010:200). As such, the ‘Jordan River motif’ calls for ‘Jordan 
River ethics’ (De Gruchy 2009:60–63). Steve de Gruchy draws 
specific attention to five ethical principles or implications of 
Jordan River ethics (De Gruchy 2009:61) that may guide water 
ethics (2009:61–63; 2010:200): firstly, accepting responsibility 
for water; secondly, respecting the earth as a communal gift; 
thirdly, maintaining the legal limitations necessary for living 
together; fourtly, taking care of one another and the earth; and 
fifthly, celebrating the gifts made for flourishing. These principles 
rely on the insight that theological reflection on water cannot 
only contemplate the ‘sacredness of water’, but must also 
respond to ‘the struggle for life’ and ‘the longing for running 
water’ (De Gruchy 2010:200; cf. Gebara 1999).
57. Ernst Conradie (2007:228) explains that Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (JPIC) 
was ‘an ecumenical response to the famous MIT report on Limits to Growth presented to 
the Club of Rome in 1972’ (which would be followed by subsequent reports, such as the 
1992 report entitled Beyond limits to growth). The ‘basic thesis’ of this report would be ‘that 
infinite growth is impossible on a planet with finite resources’ (Conradie 2007:228). Conradie 
also lists a number of South African reflections on this WCC project, including Hulley (1991), 
Kandusi (1991) and Richardson (1992; see footnote 2 in Conradie’s (2007:227) article entitled 
‘Christianity and the Environment’ for a comprehensive overview). 
58. Steve de Gruchy was involved in the EWN for a number of years and also explains the 
genesis of the EWN in one of his academic articles (De Gruchy 2010:119), ‘The Ecumenical 
Water Network has come into being in the last few years [...] [and is] an initiative of the 
World Council of Churches, Lutheran World Federation, World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches (WARC), All Africa Conference of Churches, Latin American Council of Churches, 
Church of Sweden, Bread for the World (Germany), Norwegian Church Aid, Church World 
Service (USA), Kairos Canada and others.’ For samples of the EWN’s work, see for instance 
the documents entitled Water of Life – An invitation to participate in the Ecumenical Water 
Network (WCC 2006) and Ripples in the water – Success stories of churches striving for 
water justice (WCC 2014). Other publications include, for instance, a series of sermons 
on water to accompany the Seven Weeks for Water in 2017 (see EWN 2017a; for more 
information, see EWN 2017b).
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Yet, is it enough to outline such sets of ethical principles? Can 
praxis alone save us – and the earth? Could the mere insistence 
on (new) water ethics make a difference? Are modernistic ethical 
theories themselves not problematic insofar as they distil ethics 
to rules, laws, and – indeed – principles? Can a chapter on water 
ethics end here or is there something left to say?
The South African theologian, Robert Vosloo (2004:137, 143), 
argues that ethics cannot be separated from aesthetics, because 
(Christian) ethics are optics. He (Vosloo 2004:139) points out 
that Christian ethics cannot be reduced to making choices in 
light of so-called objective, rational, universally valid rules and 
laws (as important as rules and laws are) – and therefore calls for 
a broader understanding of morality wherein the focus is not 
solely on actions, but also on the person that acts.59 Yet, this may 
require more than ‘searching for an inspiring vision’ (cf. Conradie 
2011) or ‘upholding an alternative moral vision’ (cf. SACC 2009), 
for it may also call for ‘conversion of vision’ (cf. Vosloo 2004:137). 
This means that Christian moral life finds expression not only in 
vision,60 but also in imagination, for a sophisticated moral 
59. Robert Vosloo (2004:140) argues that Christian actions are the consequences or 
expression of Christian vision. As such, Vosloo (2004:138–140) draws upon virtue ethics and 
illustrates that there are close relationships between what he calls ‘an ethics of observation’ 
or ‘ethics of discernment’ and virtue ethics (pp. 144–145). For him, this is important, because 
Christian ethics is not only concerned with what we see, but also with how we see (Vosloo 
2004:145). In a consideration of the relationship between Christian imagination and moral 
life, the choice of moral vocabulary plays an important role (Vosloo 2004:146). Vosloo 
(2004:145–146) wants to retain concepts such as solertia (the ability to see clearly, to choose 
well and to do the right thing at the right time), studiositas (the discipline of seeing and 
ascetism of cognition – for the sake of seeing well), and caritas (the accompaniment of love – 
for the sake of seeing rightly). Such virtues form part of the Christian imagination that Vosloo 
(2004:146) describes and explores in this article.
60. The SACC document on climate change makes this very point, namely that climate 
change is ‘a matter of moral vision’ and therefore ‘more than an ethical issue’ (SACC 2009:xiii, 
[author’s added emphasis]). Indeed, ‘in the context of consumerism Christians have to reflect 
anew on the dangers of idolatry’; particularly those idols that become ‘surrogates for trust in 
God’ (SACC 2009:xiii). The SACC document (2009:xiii), ‘explore[s] such surrogates and the 
dangers of heresy [...] [for t]he very purpose of this document is to confront and expose new 
ways in which the Christian faith is being distorted amongst ourselves.’
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imagination is necessary in order to discern ‘icons’ from ‘idols’ 
(Vosloo 2004:137–138, 141–144). In short, imagination forms, 
reforms and transforms vision (Vosloo 2004:141).
Imagination is not, however, synonymous with fantasy (Vosloo 
2004:137) or creativity (p. 138). Neither does imagination signal 
withdrawal from reality (Vosloo 2004:137) or opposition to 
rationality (p. 138). Christian imagination is instead grounded in 
participation, in Christ and through the Spirit, in the life of the 
triune God (Vosloo 2004:138, 150). As such, imagination is neither 
accidental nor individualised, but deeply participatory (Vosloo 
2004:150): embedded in a faith community (p. 148), shaped by a 
faith tradition (p. 149) and expressed in faith practices (p. 150). 
Robert Vosloo (2004:149) mentions reading Bible stories wherein 
the ‘narrative self’ participates in (Christian) stories and is 
transformed by ‘the storied practices’ of the church (p. 148). The 
Bible therein not only requires communal reading and 
interpretation, which makes it possible ‘to imagine otherwise’, 
but also shapes Christian imagination by way of stories, images, 
visions and metaphors (Vosloo 2004:149). Yet, it is as images, 
namely images of the triune God that we interpret images around 
us, and live imaginative lives (Vosloo 2004:151). This is the focus 
of the conclusion of this chapter.
Playing with water?
Water is our most precious resource – essential for all living 
things and for the life of the planet itself.
This insight (Chamberlain 2008:1) marks only the beginning 
(and not the end) of theological reflection on water. Much work 
has been done on considering the value and exploring the role of 
water (Peppard 2014:51). Much has been written about what needs 
to be done (and not done) in order to care for water and to ensure 
water’s ‘continued flourishing’ (Shaw & Francis 2014:2). Many 
questions have been raised around the theological significance of 
water (Veldsman 2015). All things considered (Conradie 2007:227) 
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‘[t]here can be little doubt that environmental concerns will remain 
a crucial issue for public theology in the (South) African context in 
the foreseeable future’.
Yet, this does not mean that theological (re)imagining of 
water such as the (re)telling of water stories, (re)reading of water 
dynamics and recognition of water figures, has played itself out, 
for water ethics may very well require hermeneutical insights 
from theological studies of optics as well as rhetoric.61 Robert 
Vosloo (2004:147) offers such an imaginative possibility by 
proposing the image of the moral self as bricoleur, namely artists 
who gather and play with fragments that they themselves did 
not create – and moral imagination as moral bricolage – wherein 
such playing with (fragments of) images and visions takes place. 
Herein the artist becomes a player, imagination becomes 
interplay and ethics becomes play. This presents theological 
reflections on water with hermeneutical possibilities.
Such possibilities may include be playing with water stories, 
water figures and water ethics through exploring different 
biblical stories wherein (young) women are encountered at wells. 
Such stories include some of the most important female figures 
in the Biblesuch as Rebekah (Gn 24:10–27), Rachel (Gn 29:1–12), 
Zipphora (Ex 2:11–23) and the nameless Samaritan woman 
(Jn 4:1–42); and this notwithstanding an even greater variety of 
stories that associate women with water, including Hagar 
(Gn 21:8–21) and Miriam (Ex 2:1–10, 15:1–19). The recognition that 
many biblical stories ‘would collapse if there were no river, no 
flood, no well, no pool, no sea, [and] no fountain’ suggests that 
theological reflection on water is both necessary and urgent 
(De Gruchy 2010:199).62
61. See, for example my as yet unpublished exploration of the rhetorical interplay between 
drought, thirst, and the water of life within the encounter between Jesus and the Samaritan 
woman at the well (Jn 4:1–42), entitled ‘#rainmustfall’ (cf. Marais 2016).
62. Steve de Gruchy (2010) argues that there are at least five implications for theological 
reflection on water struggles, water shortages and water deaths: firstly, theologians must do 
theology in response to the realities of water struggles (pp. 196–197); secondly, theologians 
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Yet, not only water itself, but also figures associated with 
water have played important roles in religious imagination such 
as mermaids, sirens, water nymphs, water sprites and water 
goddesses;63 also in South Africa where the figure of the Zulu 
fertility goddess, Inkosazana, is of central importance (cf. Barnard 
2008:49–65).64 In many such religious water stories, the 
encounter between a (water)woman and a man also takes place 
at sources of water which, resonant with the stories of Rebekah, 
Rachel and Zipphora, leads to marriage (Gerten 2008:43–44).65 
Perhaps this too calls for playing with water and asking such 
imaginative questions (Gerten 2008:42–45) as: ‘What became of 
the water sprites?’
(footnote 62 continues...)
must take seriously the interpretive complexities between water, life and death (pp. 197–198); 
thirdly, theologians must be willing to listen and appreciate all ‘water-affirming spiritualities’ 
(including those outside of the Christian faith) (pp. 198–199); fourthly, theologians should 
recognise that water plays a central role in biblical stories and metaphors (pp. 199–200); 
and fifthly, theologians who work on water cannot only reflect theologically on water, but 
must integrate ‘liberation and creation, economics and ecology, poverty and environment’ 
(p. 200) in their theological interpretations.
63. See Dieter Gerten’s historical overview of such mythical figures from antiquity to 
today, entitled ‘Water of life, water of death’ (2008). This overview includes sections 
on ‘water in ancient Greek and Roman worldviews’ (pp. 34–37), ‘[w]ater in Celtic and 
Germanic worldviews’ (pp. 37–41), and ‘Christianity and the fate of sacred wells and 
streams’ (pp. 41–42).
64. Inkosazana (or Nomkhubulwana) is ‘a singular feminine mermaid deity’ who is regarded 
as ‘the source of all fertility and water’, and is an important figure in ‘South African diviner-
healer traditions’ (Barnard 2008:49). Inkosazana is associated with water – particularly 
pools, rain, mist and waterfalls (pp. 57–61). She is variously described as a mermaid, water 
spirit and water goddess (Barnard 2008:60–61). 
65. Dieter Gerten (2008:43–44) explains that, ‘[t]he core theme of mermaid tales from 
medieval times until the present is the “nightmarish marriage” [...] between an otherworldly 
female (e.g. a waterwoman) and a human male who is in a state of emergency at the time of 
the first encounter.’ Medieval folktales tell the stories of such waterwomen as Melusine and 
Undine who inspired the fairytale The Little Mermaid, written by Hans Christian Anderson and 
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Gharajedaghi (1985) reminds us that development – and, in 
particular, human development – is not the same as economic 
growth. This is especially relevant in the context of South 
Africa  and its socio-economic performance since 1994. 
66. Various sections of this chapter include extracts from an amended and updated version 
of a position paper (Roux 2015) for a National Development Plan Civil society dialogue: 
Indaba at University Stellenbosch Business School. This position paper has never been 
submitted for publication in a peer reviewed, credit bearing journal.
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Development should be seen as an increase in the autonomous 
competence of society to sustain itself and be prosperous under 
changing conditions. This assumes societal aspirations which 
move beyond the purely economic. In keeping with this approach, 
Gharajedaghi (1985) identifies five classical societal aspirations 
(see Table 6.1), the achievement of which may be obstructed by 
a state of scarcity and/or a state of maldistribution, and/or a 
state of insecurity. The five aspirations include those with tangible 
expected yields (e.g. economic and scientific) as well as, 
importantly, those with intangible yields (e.g. ethical or moral, 
and aesthetic). The clear implication is therefore that a society 
cannot develop economically over the long term if, for example, 
it is found lacking in its search for truth (scientific and education) 
and in its respect for liberty (political aspiration), for ethical 
behaviour and for beauty (the aesthetic aspiration). Moreover, as 
these first-order (primary) obstructions interact between one 
another, secondary obstructions are produced such as alienation, 
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of identity & 
individuality
• Fear of 
loneliness 
and isolation
Source: Adapted from Gharajedaghi (1985:64).
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polarisation, and corruption. These become so endemically 
entrenched that they cannot be resolved through strategies that 
merely focus on the primary order obstructions.
The economy of a country can be compared to a railway 
junction – a place where all the social, political, institutional, 
technological and natural resource endowments of a country 
converge to influence people’s ability to improve their level of 
prosperity. These qualities, together with the particular economic 
arrangement of a country, determine the structure – the 
supporting framework – within which the economy pursues a 
cyclical path of recovery and recession.
A sound knowledge of the macroeconomic environment 
enables us to consider the ‘big picture’; to identify external 
drivers that may lead to change. However, while a knowledge of 
economics is crucial for planning and strategy, it would be naive, 
simplistic and self-defeating to assume that economics can exist 
in a vacuum.
It is therefore important to stress the point that economic 
performance is not determined exclusively by economic variables. 
Economic behaviour, economic decisions, economic policy and 
the outcome of all of these actions are affected by a host of 
environmental factors. The interaction between these factors 
produces a web of dependencies – a complex, vibrant, dynamic, 
ever-changing maelstrom – that ultimately results in either 
prosperity or poverty, progress or decline, excitement or 
despondency.
The main objectives of this chapter are reflected in its 
structure:
• A synopsis of the global environment within which South 
Africa has to achieve a higher growth trajectory.
• A review of South Africa’s macroeconomic performance from 
the pre-1994 period until today.
• The meaning and implications of being stuck in a middle-
income trap.
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• The prognosis for the South African economy in the absence 
of meaningful structural changes.
• The requirements for sustained economic growth and 
balanced human socio-economic development.
• Concluding remarks.
The contextual and global backdrop
Economic growth is in and of itself not the panacea for all the 
country’s socio-economic ills and shortcomings. Nonetheless, it 
is generally accepted that a growth path of 6% per annum for a 
period of at least 20 years is a necessary (if not sufficient 
condition) to make meaningful inroads with regard to 
unemployment, poverty and income inequality. Moreover, this 
target has to be achieved in a global economic environment that 
is less friendly and more volatile than 10 years ago.
There are, for instance, indications that the global economy 
has entered a new era of more subdued growth – at least for the 
foreseeable future. The consumer and government responses to 
the excesses and over-exuberance, engendered by significant 
debt accumulation during the first 15 years prior to 2008 and 
2009, have brought about slower economic growth in the 
advanced economies. Many less developed economies are also 
experiencing more moderate growth as a result of inter alia major 
structural adjustments (e.g. China), significantly lower commodity 
prices (e.g. Russia, Nigeria, Angola), and political and economic 
mismanagement (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela).
Further considerations include the future impact of major 
demographic changes such as ageing in the advanced economies 
and rapid urbanisation in Asia and Africa. The former has 
potentially profound implications for the sustainability of 
societies where the growth in the number of elderly people is 
outstripping the annual increase in the number of people of 
working age. At the same time, the 4th Industrial Revolution is 
changing not only the nature and duration of work, but possibly 
also questioning the very meaning of what it means to be human. 
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Mason (2016) suggests that, because of new technologies, 
capitalism, as we know it, is in decline and is likely to be replaced 
by an entirely new socio-economic system: post-capitalism. This 
utopian global system will be spearheaded not by the organised 
working class, but by the networked class who will harness zero 
marginal cost production, use copious amounts of real data 
to  understand, model and test ideas for change, promote 
collaborative, non-profit forms of work, and ensure that everyone 
is paid a basic income. In this way, it is suggested, it is possible to 
create from the ashes of the Great Recession a more socially just 
and sustainable global recovery.
While there are signs emerging of advanced economies 
retreating to protectionism and economic nationalism, in the 
longer term global economic growth could remain robust, as 
economic production and consumer buying power continues to 
shift towards less developed economies in Asia, Africa and South 
America.
South Africa’s economy: From stagnation, 
to mild euphoria, to disappointing reality
The purpose of this section is not to reinvent the wheel, but to 
rather provide a synthesis of those issues that are co-producing 
South Africa’s current economic woes.
The trials and tribulations of the South African economy in the 
two decades leading up to 1994 are well known. Sentenced to be 
an outcast by (most of) the world’s major producers, buyers and 
investors, the economy became inward-looking, unable to enjoy 
the potential benefits of global trade and transnational capital 
flows, nor having to contend with the realities and the discipline of 
global competition. Along with a dwindling domestic appetite 
for fixed investment and deteriorating terms of trade, the 
economic growth rate followed a path of ‘erratic stagnation’, 
with prices rising at an average annual rate of 14%, government 
failing to come even close to balancing its fiscal books, the 
poverty headcount rising and the inequality gap widening.
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The advent of democracy ushered in an era of (mild) euphoria 
at various levels of societal experiences – not least of which the 
economic dimension. Capital haemorrhaging was stemmed 
almost overnight, South Africa was able to export and import 
goods and services without having to contend with restrictions 
imposed on the basis of moral objections, consumer and business 
sentiment favoured infrastructure investment and foreign 
tourists (re-)discovered the country. As a consequence, the next 
decade and a half saw an elevated growth path and the inflation 
rate moved to a lower (on average) level. Buoyed by an expanding 
tax base, the finance minister was able to narrow the budget 
deficit (at times small budget surpluses were recorded), slash 
the government debt burden and still provide regular personal 
income tax relief. To be sure, unemployment remained chronically 
high, but by 2005 millions of South Africans found themselves in 
a vastly improved economic position, as economic growth burst 
through the 5% level, the rand exchange rate strengthened, and 
interest rates approached 30-year lows.
Although South Africa was fairly immune to the financial 
shenanigans that were the prelude to the global ‘Great Recession’, 
the country was certainly strongly hit by the after-shock in the 
form of the impact on the real economy. In 2009, South Africa 
recorded a negative economic growth rate, bringing to an end 
the longest ever recorded upward phase of the business cycle. 
Western Europe, one of the major ‘victims’ of the Great Recession, 
is also South Africa’s major trade and investment partner. 
Economic decline in Europe translated into a significant decline 
in exports to that region. For an open economy like South Africa 
that is bound to suppress economic activity. More than 800 000 
jobs were lost between 2008 and 2010 (StatsSA 2012:3–3) – the 
highest proportional job loss in the world. The recovery since 
then has been sluggish, lacklustre and uninspiring.
The global recession, the ongoing tepid growth in Western 
Europe, the growth slowdown in China, the significant decline in 
resource prices and a debilitating drought have, undoubtedly, 
had a negative impact on South Africa’s growth performance 
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over the last seven years. These external factors are naturally 
beyond our control. What is more worrying, however, is the fact 
that these external constraints have highlighted a number of 
domestic – largely structural – obstacles to growth, development 
and job creation.
Underpinning the current constraints in the domestic 
economy is the fact that South Africa has become a deficit 
nation. Government expenditure exceeds government revenue, 
imports of goods and services exceed exports of goods 
and  services, household consumption expenditure exceeds 
household disposable income and the demand for investment 
goods exceeds the availability of domestic savings. In short, 
Gross Domestic Expenditure (aggregate demand) has been 
higher than Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (total output) for 
a number of years.
As a consequence (SARB, historical series):
• The household debt-to-disposable income ratio has averaged 
80% since 2006, compared to a long-term average of between 
50% and 60% in the previous few decades.
• The ratio of household savings to disposable income has been 
negative since 2006 (in 1992 it was as high as 6.1%).
• Total loan debt of national government increased to 51% of 
GDP at the end of fiscal year 2017, compared to 26% at the 
end of fiscal year 2009 (SARB, historical series).
• The ratio of foreign debt to GDP was 48.3% at the end of 2016, 
compared to 18.9% at the end of 2005.
• Fixed investment spending in 2016 exceeded gross domestic 
savings by 3.4% of GDP (in 2002, savings exceeded investment 
by a factor of 2% of GDP).
The overarching and cross-cutting implication of the growing 
indebtedness of ‘SA (Pty) Ltd’ is that the country lives in 
perpetual hope that its various deficits will be financed by non-
residents at an affordable cost. Until about 5 years ago this 
outcome was generally achieved, as foreign savers found the 
country to be sufficiently attractive to warrant a meaningful 
investment in shares, bonds, plant, equipment and other forms 
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of direct  investment. But this might have been not so much a 
vote of confidence in South Africa, but rather a motion of no 
confidence in the short-term economic outlook then prevailing 
in the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Today, investors are 
probably finding it more difficult to formulate good reasons for 
financing South Africa’s fiscal, household, foreign and savings 
deficits. In fact, early in April 2017, two credit rating agencies 
decided that the sustainability of South Africa’s government 
was  too vulnerable to various social, economic and political 
forces to justify the retention investment grade status. The new 
sub-investment (‘junk bond’) status will have a range of adverse 
effects on the country’s ability to attract foreign investment, 
generate a faster growth trajectory, create jobs and allocate 
public funds to the social wage.
Therefore, on reflection, South Africa’s relatively robust 
economic growth performance during the first few years of the 
2000s was largely driven by consumer and investment spending 
which, in turn, was accommodated by rapidly expanding debt 
levels. The latter are not sustainable; in fact, as both the household 
and government sectors attempt to restore the integrity of their 
balance sheets, growth in these sectors is being curbed.
In this regard it is worth recalling a fundamental view of 
sustainable development, viz., an increase in the autonomous 
competence of society to sustain itself and be prosperous 
under changing conditions. The macroeconomic performance 
over the last decade seems to reflect, firstly, a continued 
over-reliance on ‘other people’s’ largesse (i.e. lack of 
financial autonomy); and secondly, an inability to adopt 
quickly and efficiently to changing circumstances (e.g. the 
major changes in the global architecture  – the recessionary 
conditions experienced by our major trading partners). 
Could this be indicative of a feeling of complacency, or an 
acceptance of mediocrity? Or is it a lack of awareness of 
the realities imposed by being a small component of an 




An additional implication of being a deficit or indebted nation 
is the inherent upward pressure it places on prices – at both 
domestic and international levels. The rand exchange rate 
has displayed a secular depreciating trend for more than three 
decades. Since the beginning of this century this downward 
trend has also been characterised by extreme volatility – at times, 
the value of the trade-weighted rand has weakened by 40% 
within 2 years, and then recovered that loss within the next 
3 years. To a large extent, this volatility can be ascribed to ebbs 
and flows in foreign financial investment. As mentioned earlier, 
such flows tend to be opportunistic and sporadic, and the value 
of the rand exchange rate tends to follow suit. A stronger 
currency therefore occurs more by accident than design, and as 
long as the country relies on foreign savings to finance deficits, 
the rand exchange rate will remain vulnerable to the whims of 
non-residents (of course, if South Africa’s domestic savings rate 
were to be substantially higher, the effects of capital account 
inflows and reversals on the exchange rate would be far less 
profound).
Turning to domestic prices, as long as aggregate domestic 
demand exceeds domestic output, there will be a propensity for 
inflation rates to flirt, on average, with the upper end of the 
3%–6% target range – unless real interest rates are raised to and 
kept at punitive levels. Moreover, with South Africa’s inflation 
rate being consistently higher than those of our major trade and 
investment partners, the argument for a systemically depreciating 
exchange rate is strengthened.
Besides being a deficit nation, South Africa also has to contend 
with a labour market that is clearly not working. Successful labour 
markets should, inter alia, contribute to the achievement of 
efficiency (maximising output), equity (equality of opportunity 
for all) and growth (increasing employment, productivity and 
incomes). The realities in South Africa include chronically high 
unemployment, high and rising labour costs, and only marginal 
improvements in productivity. These failures are both a cause 
and effect of below potential economic growth. For instance, the 
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fact that one-quarter of the labour force is not being utilised, 
means that the economy is nowhere near to operating at full 
potential capacity, while low growth inhibits the derived demand 
for labour. If we add to that, the fact that the unit costs of labour 
in the non-agricultural sector have risen by 180% since 2000, we 
observe a declining trend in the labour intensity of expansions in 
economic output. Further underlying dynamics include the 
legacy of historical misallocations of education resources, and 
the powerful role played by trade unions and the collective 
bargaining system which contribute to the rapid increase in the 
cost of labour. Consider the following combination of figures 
from the perspective of a potential international investor to gain 
some inkling of the paradox: The economy and the productivity 
of labour are stagnating per annum, while wages are rising in 
excess of 5% annually. The upshot is a continuous erosion of the 
domestic and international competitiveness of South African 
produced goods and services.
South Africa is stuck in a middle-income 
trap
The meaning of and concerns about a Middle-Income Trap (MIT) 
are gaining traction. A MIT is typically described as a condition, 
where middle-income countries have (Kharas & Kohli 2011):
[B]ursts of growth followed by periods of stagnation or even decline, 
or are stuck at low growth rates. Instead of steadily moving up over 
time, their GDP per capita simply gyrates up and down. (p. 282)
This is in contrast to a steady rise in GDP per capita over time to 
higher income levels. It is also argued that countries are caught 
in an MIT, because, with rising wages and declining 
competitiveness, they are unable to compete with low-income, 
low-wage economies in manufactured exports or with advanced 
economies in high skill innovations. Put differently, countries in 
an MIT are not able to make a timely transition from resource-




Felipe (2012:21–23) analyses historical income transitions to 
determine the number of years that a country has to be in the 
lower and upper middle-income groups to fall into the MIT. His 
findings are that a country has to spend more than 28 years in 
the lower middle-income group to fall in the MIT, and more than 
14 years in the upper middle-income group to fall in the MIT.
The implications are that a country that becomes lower 
middle-income has to record an average annual economic 
growth rate of at least 4.7% to avoid falling into the lower MIT, 
while a country that becomes upper middle-income needs to 
grow at an average annual rate of at least 3.5% to avoid falling 
into the upper MIT.
Felipe (2012:27–28) categorises 52 middle-income countries 
in 2010 into three categories, viz. those in the MIT, those at risk 
of getting into the MIT and those likely to avoid it. For countries 
in the lower MIT, it is largely a Latin American and African 
phenomenon; 19 countries (including South Africa) have been 
there for at least four decades; Botswana and Sri Lanka are 
borderline cases in the sense that they are at the 28-year 
threshold; South Africa is expected to be in the lower MIT for 
another two decades; and Brazil, Colombia, Iran, Jordan, Panama, 
Peru, Sri Lanka and Tunisia could graduate to upper middle-
income status within the next 10 years if their income, per capita 
growth rate recorded between 2000 and 2010, is maintained.
Kharas and Kohli (2011:284) point out that ‘the continuation of 
the very strategies that help the countries grow during their low-
income stage prevents them from moving beyond the middle-
income stage’. It therefore makes sense to compare the growth 
strategies necessary for low-income economies with those 
needed for middle-income economies. According to Kharas and 
Kohli (2011:285) the major difference between the growth 
strategies of low-income and middle-income countries is that 
the latter focus more on demand. Often, in middle-income 
countries, traditional exports cannot expand, because wages are 
higher and competitiveness declines. This means that export 
Meaningful economic reform for South Africa – Is there a prescription?
154
growth requires the introduction of new production processes 
for new markets. This, in turn, requires an understanding of the 
quality and price preferences of the global market. Because 
this is a daunting task, most firms often start by developing this 
understanding in domestic markets. If successful, they can then 
develop into global brands. It therefore appears that a stagnating 
middle class (and, by implication, a skewed concentration of 
income) stunts growth in middle-income countries.
Also important in middle-income countries are innovation and 
product differentiation. All in all, domestic demand and new 
export demand are key drivers of growth in middle-income 
countries, while a transition must also occur towards service 
sector firms. Thus, in order to avoid becoming trapped, middle-
income countries need to develop, inter alia, modern and agile 
institutions for property rights, capital markets, venture capital 
and competition. This has to be complemented by a critical mass 
of highly skilled people able to innovate.
The prognosis: Business as usual
In the short-term economic growth in South Africa is expected to 
be lacklustre and below par, as exports remain sluggish (due to the 
tepid global growth performance), and domestic consumers 
continue to restore the ‘health’ of their balance sheets. Even the 
low-key forecasts by, for instance, the World Bank, require a 
normalisation of labour market conditions. Furthermore, domestic 
constraints are expected to play heavily on growth with economic 
performance continuing to underperform against most emerging 
market economies. On the positive side, recoveries in key export 
markets, such as the USA, should mitigate to some extent the 
slowdown in China. Nonetheless, the current account deficit is 
expected to remain high, partly as a reflection of the structurally 
low level of savings.
Moreover, the risks to outlook remain high. These include:
• Continued uncertainty about the future direction of policies.
• Insufficient progress in securing the security of energy supply.
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• Labour relations tenseness.
• Rising interest rates in the USA.
• The slowdown in growth in China (with the corresponding 
implications for commodity prices).
• Negative investor sentiment, due to, inter alia, policy 
uncertainty, the ANC leadership struggle, and the apparent 
inability or will to stem the tide of state capture.
In the medium term, an annual growth path of 6%–7% would go 
a long way towards alleviating poverty and towards reducing 
unemployment. However, given the vast chasm between the 
conditions in the First and Second Economies, there is uncertainty 
about the ability of the market economy alone to effect trickle-
down effects that will close the gap.
If, by 2020, there has not been a substantial increase in the 
pool of domestic and foreign savings, accompanied by a 
discernible improvement in the quality of the labour force, the 
economy is destined to muddle along the path of growth 
mediocrity, stuck in a MIT with very limited redistribution of 
wealth and income. Poverty and unemployment become 
entrenched, and spending power is confined to a relatively small 
group of middle class consumers (more of whom will be black 
Africans).
Alternatively, a well-managed economy, able to inspire foreign 
and domestic investment by virtue of an attractive, relatively 
crime-free and stable business environment inhabited by 
productive, motivated and appropriately educated and skilled 
workers, could generate economic growth rates of 7% per annum 
or more. In this case, a meaningful redistribution of wealth and a 
burgeoning middle class group can be expected.
Future socio-economic success will clearly rest largely on 
the nature and application of economic policy in the years that 
lie ahead. One of the greatest challenges facing policy-makers 
over the next few years, especially while economic growth is 
sluggish, is to avoid the temptation of creating the illusion of 
wealth creation by resorting to macroeconomic populism, for 
example extravagant government expenditure and artificially 
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low interest rates. The success of attempts to ‘spend your way 
into growth’ will be cut short by the accompanying hyper-
inflationary tendency and the total distortion and disruption of 
the allocation of scarce production factors. Sooner rather than 
later, draconian policy measures will have to be introduced to 
prevent economic decay and disaster.
The prescription
Back to basics
South Africa is living beyond its means in the sense that various 
deficits are being incurred, giving rise to growing levels of 
indebtedness. Not only are these deficits becoming more and 
more difficult to finance, their existence is putting continued 
upward pressure on a range of key prices in the economy – the 
general price level, the cost of foreign exchange and the cost of 
credit remain unaffordably high because of the fundamental 
disequilibria that seem to be entrenched in the economy. At the 
most elementary level of analysis, it follows that the solution to 
restoring equilibrium (and therefore achieving sustainable 
growth) is to lower domestic demand and/or raise domestic 
production.
Reducing aggregate demand: 
Arithmetically logical, but 
practically unlikely
One way of narrowing the gap would be to reduce one or more of 
the components of aggregate demand. The major ingredient of 
total demand is personal consumption expenditure by 
households. However, it seems unlikely that consumers will 
willingly spend less on goods and services, especially in light of 
the growing number of middle-income consumers and their 
attempt to reduce their asset deficits. As far as gross fixed capital 
formation (fixed investment) is concerned, any decline in 
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spending would be profoundly regrettable – if anything, a 
meaningful increase is called for in order to improve the 
productive capacity of the economy. That leaves government 
consumption expenditure. Here, a reduction is probably 
justifiable, based on economic efficiency reasons, but inexpedient 
for socio-political reasons. There are, nonetheless, strong 
arguments to be made for a reprioritisation of government 
spending and/or the more effective spending of tax revenue. 
The public sector wage Bill, for example, accounts for some 40% 
of government’s non-interest spending or 12% of GDP, while in 
‘requisitioning’ 30% of the profits and salaries of the private 
sector, government is denying the market the opportunity to be 
as efficient as it possibly could be.
A sustained campaign of deliberate austerity could be, at the 
very least, politically unpalatable and injudicious (although 
the future allocation of resources and the improved efficiency of 
the spending of those resources – especially in respect of some 
dimensions of government expenditure – needs to be well 
thought out).
Raising aggregate supply: Better use of 
existing production factors
Therefore, on balance, a decline in aggregate demand seems 
unlikely. The other option for restoring some sense of equilibrium 
is to raise aggregate supply, that is, expand production at a faster 
rate than the growth in aggregate demand.
In the most fundamental sense of the word, a country’s ability 
to expand its productive capability is determined by the quantity 
and quality of its production factors. If a country is operating on 
the PPF it is achieving production efficiency, that is, society is 
getting the most it can from its scarce resources. Should a 
country not be on the PPF, it is clearly under-utilising its resources. 
This is where South Africa is. Therefore, as a first step towards 
expanding production, bold and, at times, unpopular steps need 
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to be taken to ensure that the majority of resources are mobilised 
to produce goods and services. A prime example in this regard is 
labour. At present, the labour market and its mechanisms are 
clearly failing dismally – in accordance with the narrow definition, 
some 5.9 million active job-seekers (StatsSA 2018:1) are 
languishing in a state of unemployment, as various measures and 
mechanisms impede the achievement of labour market 
equilibrium. A more liberal labour legislation framework is 
required to not only make it easier and more attractive to employ 
labour, but also to enhance the competitiveness of our labour 
force.
The same general ideas can be applied to entrepreneurship. 
When allowed to do so, entrepreneurs (and especially small 
business entrepreneurs), as they apply their innovative, creative 
and risk-taking capabilities, mobilise and galvanise the other 
production factors (natural resources, labour and capital) into 
meaningful and productive action. But in South Africa, various 
obstacles impede the entrepreneurial spirit. These include 
inadequate financial support, restrictive taxes and bureaucratic 
‘red-tape’, inadequate entrepreneurial education at primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels, and physical infrastructure 
constraints. In short, small business owners have to contend with 
a high tax burden, an often militant workforce and ‘unfriendly’ 
legislation.
Thus, as a first step towards achieving supply-demand 
equilibrium, the country’s existing resources need to be used 
more efficiently. The quest for this goal is bound to be unpopular, 
because a trade-off is implied between efficiency and equity. It 
will not be easy to sacrifice the latter (equity) in a society 
characterised by inequality and a growing resentment by the 
poor towards the relatively better-off members of society. The 
government would, for example, probably deem it unthinkable 
to reduce the number of civil servants and social grant recipients 
and thereby run the risk of losing voter support. In addition, any 
relaxation of labour legislation would be seen in some circles as 
a move towards an exploitative neo-liberal paradigm.
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Growing productive capacity: Becoming 
more competitive
The next step would be to shift the PPF to the right, that is, to 
expand the productive capacity of the economy by either 
acquiring or creating more resources and/or further enhancing 
the productivity of the existing production factors. The latter 
includes becoming more competitive. For the past number of 
years, the combination of high wages and falling competitiveness 
in South Africa has resulted in the country, finding it more and 
more difficult to compete against low-wage low-income 
countries. At the same time, we are not able to compete against 
high value-adding high-income countries. Consequently, South 
Africa has been de-industrialising for the past decade. The 
country’s export penetration ratio is treading water at a 
disappointing 30% of GDP (compare this with the ratio of global 
exports of goods and services to global GDP of almost 50%).
South Africa’s competitive deficiencies are well known. 
A recurring theme in virtually all analyses of the economy is that 
of education and training being inadequate, ineffective or 
inappropriate, and therefore less productive than in most of our 
trading partners and competitors. This lead, inter alia, to rapidly 
rising labour costs – the growth in average wages tends to 
overshoot the increase in productivity by a considerable margin. 
The longer-term solution is to radically transform the education 
sector to ensure relevance and enhanced productivity. This 
transformation could include new curricula, increased autonomy 
for schools, paying teachers what they are worth and diluting the 
role played by unions. The short-term solution to low productivity 
is, at the very minimum, wage moderation – wage increases in 
excess of the growth in the economy and the growth in 
productivity are simply untenable.
The competitive advantage of nations is also rooted in 
innovation. In this regard, South Africa still relies too heavily on 
its natural resources to generate some degree of wealth and the 
technology content in products or processes is relatively low. 
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Technological know-how is often acquired as opposed to being 
generated domestically, and there is a strong domestic focus. 
Various indicators of technological competitiveness potential 
show that, while South Africa fares better than most countries 
in Africa, the country does not hold up well to countries elsewhere 
at a similar stage of development. South Africa needs a policy and 
attitudinal revolution that emphasises an integrated approach to 
utilising the intellectual potential of the nation through the 
application of advanced technology and a high degree of 
networking that creates competitive advantage through the 
entire value system.
Escaping from the MIT
As pointed out earlier, South Africa is in a MIT. Typically, countries 
find themselves in a MIT by continuing with the very strategies 
that helped them grow during their low-income stage. It therefore 
makes sense to compare the growth strategies necessary for 
low-income economies with those needed for middle-income 
economies. Some of the generalised characteristics of rapid 
growth in low-income countries include the following (Kharas & 
Kohli 2011:281–289):
• The labour force migrates from low productivity to high 
productivity activities (e.g. the movement of surplus 
agricultural labour to become industrial wage earners).
• Rapid urbanisation growth.
• The availability of jobs is crucial. This accentuates the 
importance and attraction of an export-led strategy (in, for 
example, manufacturing in East Asia or tradable services in 
India).
• Diversification – building domestic production capabilities in 
most goods and services.
• By saving or borrowing enough, they can accumulate sufficient 
capital to build infrastructure – both physical and social.




After comparing the failures, recorded by many Latin American 
countries, with the successes recorded by some East Asian 
countries, Kharas and Kohli (2011:281–289) identify three critical 
transitions to avoid the MIT, viz.:
• From diversification to specialisation in production.
• From physical accumulation of factors to productivity-led 
growth.
• From centralised to decentralised economic management.
Although South Africa is one of the first countries outside the 
traditional core (North America, Western Europe and Japan) to 
have reached middle-income status, it has arguably failed to 
adjust its growth strategies accordingly. For instance, while the 
South African economy has benefited in the past from 
diversification, it has largely failed to specialise in production. 
The latter is necessary to countervail the current South African 
reality of rising wages and declining cost competitiveness which 
result in an inability to compete with advanced economies in 
high skill innovations or with low-income, low-wage economies 
in the production of manufactured goods. Unfortunately, there is 
limited evidence of meaningful specialisation in the South African 
economy. For instance, only 6% of South Africa’s merchandise 
exports are comprised of high technology goods. This compares 
unfavourably with an average of 20% for middle-income nations 
and 32% for the East Asia and Pacific region (World Bank 
2017:Table 4.4).
An important component of a middle-income growth strategy 
is an emphasis on total factor productivity growth. This requires 
a concerted effort to direct all forms of education to discovery; 
to educate for a knowledge and innovation economy. The 
shortcomings in and of South Africa’s education system are well 
known. The fact that the country’s tertiary enrolment rate is only 
19%, compared to a world average of 36% and an upper middle-
income average of 47% (World Bank 2017:Table 2.8) or that 
South Africa is ranked last for quality of maths and science 
education in the 2016 and 2017 Global Competiveness Report 
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(World Economic Forum 2016:324–325), clearly impedes the 
country’s ability to accumulate a critical mass of professionals 
able to take the country into the knowledge and innovation era.
One of the most important and uncomfortable lessons for 
South Africa is that middle-income growth strategies need to 
focus on demand (as opposed to the supply side focus that is 
typical of low-income growth strategies). This requires a mindset 
change about social programmes and a realisation that poverty 
reduction itself does not generate large consumer markets, and 
the investments in education needed to sustain economic 
growth. Thus, social policy should target the middle class 
through, for instance, low-cost housing for first-time home 
buyers and programmes that ensure that recent graduates get 
suitable employment (Kharas & Kohli 2011:281–289). Necessary 
transitions therefore include specialising in production, innovation 
(through retuning the education system for a knowledge 
economy) and decentralising policy-making. There also needs to 
be a particular strategy aimed at enlarging and growing the 
middle class, although this might come at the expense of poverty 
programmes. Above all, political leadership is required to sustain 
the ambition to grow faster, even when it seems that the elite are 
the biggest beneficiaries.
Conclusion
The few thoughts and ideas above merely reflect an attempt to 
scratch at the surface of the issues involved. To point out that 
failure to transform the essence of our way of thinking about the 
South African economy will guarantee, at best, a steady slide 
into perpetual mediocrity. One of the risks of mediocrity is that it 
offers a comfort zone for the elite who will continue to prosper 
and thrive in the current economic dispensation – but at the 
expense of the millions of South Africans stuck in poverty, 
unemployment and low-wage jobs. The country’s economy has, 
in some ways, shown remarkable resilience in the wake of periodic 
Chapter 6
163
barrages of economic broadsides. We somehow managed to 
weather the isolation storms and, in the first 15 years of democracy, 
the macroeconomic performance was satisfactory. The problem 
now is that the speed of democratic development has overtaken 
the speed of economic reform, creating a plethora of unmet 
expectations. It is now time for meaningful economic reform, 
aimed at, inter alia, generating a large pool of appropriate and 
marketable skills, remunerating labour in accordance with 
international rates (as determined by scarcity and productivity), 
incentivising savings (to finance investment and reduce the 
country’s reliance on foreign savings), improving the effectiveness 
and efficiency of state spending and fostering an entrepreneurial 
revolution.
But, arguably, the most pressing requirement for economic 
transformation is a change in mindset – a move away from a 
psychosis of entitlement (as opposed to empowerment). South 
Africans need to be aware of the realities of global economics. 
As harsh as it may sound, success in the 21st century is at least 
partly about ‘survival of the fittest’; no one owes us (South Africa) 
a living; no one owes anybody a job. Wealth does not just 
happen – it has to be created through hard work, industriousness 
and tenacity. And there is no ‘quick fix’ – large booming goals are 
not achieved overnight.
One of the biggest concerns regarding the economic growth 
and development of South Africa is the risk that the current 
feeling of despair translates into a pathological state of mediocrity 
and hopelessness. It is worth considering that never before has a 
period of economic stagnation not been followed by a phase of 
recovery and growth – although the timing, strength and duration 
of the latter is not predictable. So, while, in the short run, we are 
in survivalist mode, it is also important not to be caught napping 
when the economy does recover. It is therefore a time for debt 
consolidation (private and public), for enhancing efficiencies and 
productivity, and for honing those managerial skills needed to 
convert innovative ideas into commercial opportunities. It is a 
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time for scanning the environment and exploring new markets – 
internationally, in the rest of Africa and at home. As we look 
beyond and through the current sobering situation, we should 
remind ourselves that many investors want a positive story. We 
should remind ourselves that South Africa boasts a number of 
important strengths. These include the following:
• An upper middle-income economy.
• Among the 30 largest in the world.
• Widely-respected and progressive legal framework.
• Recent confirmation of the sanctity of the constitution.
• Sophisticated and respected financial infrastructure.
• Diversified economy.
• Monetary policy sanity prevails.
• A nascent window of demographic opportunity.
Above all, we need to visualise the longer-term picture and not 
only fixate on the current economic woes and turbulence. The 
importance of appropriate skills development, well-functioning 
infrastructure, an entrepreneurial revolution, and visionary 
political, corporate and civil society leadership cannot be 
emphasised enough. If these issues are addressed in a systematic 
and systemic fashion South Africa could rise above its current 
malaise of economic mediocrity.
Therefore, bold and visionary leadership, at both the 
governmental and corporate level, is required above all. 
Leadership has to be bold enough to have the courage of their 
convictions to make unpopular choices and visionary to be able 
to make decisions now with longer term outcomes that are not 
immediately discernible.
Health and brokenness: 
Aren’t we all clay jars? 
An ethical reflection on 
health and brokenness
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Talking about the Life Esidimeni67 tragedy (Raborife 2017; 
cf. SAMA Communications Department 2017):
On 01 February, Health Ombudsman, Professor Malegapuru 
Makgoba, revealed that at least 94 patients had died after being 
moved from  the Life Esidimeni facilities to 27 non-government 
67. ‘Esidimeni means “place of dignity”’ (Capri et al. 2018:153).
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organisations across the province in 2016. They died of thirst, hunger 
and cold. The department cancelled Esidimeni’s contract as part 
of cost-cutting measures. Gauteng Health Member of the Executive 
Committee, Qedani Mahlangu, stepped down in the wake of the 
scandal. In February, Makgoba told Parliament’s portfolio committee 
on health that the death toll would continue to rise after more than 
100 patients were reported to have died. Makgoba said his office 
was continuing to receive data from the public since his report on 
the disastrous move was made public on 01 February. His findings 
included that the 27 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were 
under-resourced, under-financed and ill-equipped to take on the 
influx of psychiatric patients. (p. 11)
In the meantime, 144 patients, who had initially been well cared 
for by the privately controlled Life Group, have died. Esidimeni is, 
however, more than a story of medical negligence and abuse; it 
is a socio-political narrative of utmost cruelty against persons 
who only count once they die (Capri et al. 2018:153).
The ‘Esidimeni-massacre’ in Gauteng, South Africa’s 
wealthiest province, delves deep into the seriousness of the 
disparity discourse. It justifies the existence of suspicion about 
corruption, mismanagement and theft in the ruling party, the 
ANC. The ANC, with a rich history in the struggle for justice 
and equity for all and an ethos of ubuntu, is being contaminated 
and captured by forces of self-interest and greed under 
President Jacob Zuma’s68 rule. The people of our country are 
ill-served by him and his cadres. But it would, of course, be 
naive of me to put the full blame for the delivery of a broken 
healthcare system on a bad regime, because health systems 
are diverse and complex.
Meanwhile, the activism of the TAC has shifted from being 
mainly HIV and AIDS-related to resisting the dysfunctional public 
health service (Low 2015:3). The health service crisis clearly 
68. Mr Jacob Zuma resigned as the president of South Africa on 14 February 2018.
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poses an ethical dilemma: the dignity, justice and integrity of 
God’s creation is at stake. The TAC, with its successful track 
record and other social agents for change, also need the support, 
if not the partnership, of committed persons and agencies, for 
example Faith-based Organisations (FBOs) and others who are 
inspired by their faith to work for the right to proper healthcare 
and human dignity that every person deserves. According to 
Benn69 (2011):
The faith community should be a major voice using all possible means 
to advocate for equity and health at national and international levels, 
paving the way for a just world order. (p. 14)
The church, as a community of faith, should always be a church 
for the other (Bonhoeffer 2010:589; cf. Jonker 2008:70). It should 
be a church for the world (Hoekendijk 1966:41; cf. Jonker 
2008:62). A relevant and faithful church would also be a church 
for the poor and the sufferer (Bonhoeffer 2010:589; cf. Jonker 
2008:71), and a church that follows God’s example in acts of 
compassionate justice to the vulnerable and marginalised (cf. The 
Confession of Belhar 1986).
A contextual, public and transformative theology advocates 
the empowerment of people ‘who experience discrimination and 
marginalisation within the church and society’ (WCC 2012:153). 
A  theology that develops in response to people’s existential 
questions (Rahner in Smith 2015:1–13), matters.
The church should be concerned about the state of our public 
healthcare system and ought to listen to the cries of our people. 
A reflection on South Africa’s ‘broken’ healthcare, which raises 
ethical concerns, follows.
69. ‘Christoph Benn is a physician [...] with several years of experience in Tanzania [...] He 
is currently the Director of External Relations and Partnerships at the Global Fund to Fight 




The inequality and discrimination of the healthcare system in 
South Africa is well known. ‘Accessible, affordable, and quality 
healthcare is not as available to many South Africans as it should 
be’ (Nel 2017:3). Most South Africans are familiar with the poor 
public healthcare on offer. Especially those who are most 
vulnerable and have first-hand experience of the sub-standard 
state system are on the receiving end of the maltreatment often 
provided. The ‘Esidimeni-massacre’ substantiates not only the 
overall health crisis, but also reflects the intensity and seriousness 
of the unjust and sometimes inhumane health service offered. 
People are dying owing to both insufficient healthcare and 
carelessness (Capri et al. 2018):
Countless Esidimenis are currently happening to people who are 
still alive. The extent of neglectful and abusive care will only come 
to light once they also die of starvation, dehydration, cold and 
infection. Abominable as the crisis is, it is our (current) high-water 
mark of an ongoing silent catastrophe which implies that abuse 
of the living matters less, if at all, than being neglected to death. 
(p. 153)
Negative reports on local healthcare such as ‘[l]ong queues, 
medicines shortages, rude staff, undignified facilities’ describe it 
well and is unfortunately coupled with the fact that ‘many users 
of the public healthcare system simply just accept it as the way 
things are’ (Low 2015:1). These snippets are from a report on a 
township in the Western Cape, a province with a clean audit of 
100% for the year 2015/2016. Even there, patients are ‘used to be 
treated in an undignified manner’ (Low 2015:1). It further states 
that: 
[E ]ven as the Minister makes the ‘test and treat’ announcement 
and as the world applauds, there will be many clinics in this country 
without key medicines. There will be out-of-order ambulances 
gathering dust in quiet parking lots. (p. 3)
It is not only most state clinics that are in a poor operational 
state, but many state hospitals countrywide are also in a crisis 
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situation (cf. Mayosi & Benatar 2014:1344). A nurse at the Elim 
Hospital in Limpopo said (Mukwevho 2017):
The situation […] is very poor. Patients are being treated like animals. 
If you move around the wards you will see many of them are naked. 
The hospital is also very dirty – like the hospital does not have 
cleaners. (n.p.)
Coovadia et al. (2009:817) list various factors in sketching both 
dysfunctional healthcare in South Africa and the needs that 
should be addressed:
• Health policies which still contain evidence of ‘colonial 
subjugation, apartheid dispossession, [and] the post-apartheid 
period’, and the combined effect of epidemics of communicable 
and non-communicable diseases.
• A health system which reflects discrimination based on race 
and gender; the legacy of the migrant labour system and the 
consequent (and general) ‘destruction of family life’; income 
disparities, and ‘extreme violence’.
• Huge health challenges faced by the health system – and 
inherited by the new government – when apartheid ended in 
1994.
• ‘Macroeconomic policies fostering growth rather than 
redistribution’ maintaining ‘economic disparities between 
races despite […] expansion of social grants’.
• ‘Failures in leadership and stewardship and weak management’, 
resulting in the inadequate implementation of often good 
policies aimed at transforming the public health system into a 
comprehensive national service.
• Failure to put in place the ‘pivotal facets of primary 
healthcare’.
• Inadequately resolving the crisis in human healthcare 
resources.
Our country has already celebrated 23 years of democracy and 
freedom. Modern legislation is being implemented which confirms 
the dignity and protection of our citizens and which also 
presupposes justice and equality. The Constitution compels the state 
to promote progressive health rights (Coovadia et al. 2009:824). 
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South Africa has, in fact, made a serious effort to restore social justice 
and equity to the victims of apartheid by implementing numerous 
policies, for example ‘progressive and far-reaching health policies’ 
(Rispel 2016:17; cf. Mayosi & Benatar 2014).
Yet, the health and well-being of most South Africans remain plagued 
by a relentless burden of infectious and non-communicable diseases, 
persisting social disparities and inadequate human resources to 
provide care for a growing population with a rising tide of refugees 
and economic migrants. (p. 1344)
Rispel (2016:17; see also Coovadia et al. 2009:831–832) identifies 
three problem areas or factors she calls ‘fault lines’ as reasons 
why South Africa’s health system fails so many people:
• Tolerance of ineptitude as well as leadership, management 
and governance failures.
• The lack of a fully functional district health system which is the 
main vehicle for the delivery of primary healthcare.
• An inability or failure to deal decisively with the health 
workforce crisis. 
According to Rispel (2016:17), these ‘fault lines’ undermine 
patients and health professionals, as well as implementation 
of policies, and worst off are patients who have little say over 
adversarial experiences and inadequate care. Healthcare workers 
also suffer: upholding their professional code of ethics and 
practising good medicine turn out to be difficult without support 
from management and with too few staff and gaps in the system.
Coovadia et al. (2009:817–818) remind us that, while South 
Africa is seen as a middle-income country in terms of the 
economy, in terms of health statistics it fares worse than many 
lower-income countries. Rated according to the Millennium 
Development Goals baseline, set in 1990, child mortality has 
increased instead of declined in 12 countries only – South Africa 
is one of them. At 69 deaths under the age of 5 years per 
100 000 live births, South Africa ‘outranks’, among others, Peru 
(25 deaths), Egypt (35 deaths), Morocco (37 deaths) and Nepal 
(59 deaths) (Coovadia et al. 2009:817–818).
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Despite the fact that 8.5% of South Africa’s GDP, 
approximately R332 billion is spent on healthcare, the health 
services outcome is poor if compared to a similar middle-
income country such as Brazil (Rispel 2016:18). Only half of the 
money is spent by the public health sector to cater for the poor 
(84% of the population) – the other half is spent by the private 
sector (Rispel 2016:18; cf. Mayosi & Benatar 2014:1345–1346). 
Only 30% of the country’s doctors serve more than 40 million 
people in the national public health sector, while the other 70% 
of doctors serve 8 million people in the private health sector 
(Mayosi & Benatar 2014:1344).
The majority of South Africans find themselves in a position of 
vulnerability. This is due mainly to socio-economic living 
standards which have a detrimental effect on their health and 
well-being. The relationship between health and wealth is both 
striking and multifaceted (Mayosi & Benatar 2014):
When extreme poverty affects a large proportion of the population, 
as in South Africa, health is predominantly affected by a lack of 
access to the basic requirements for life – clean water, adequate 
nutrition, effective sanitation, reasonable housing conditions, access 
to vaccinations, good schooling, and the childhood and adolescent 
nurturing that, with the availability of jobs, set the scene for improved 
health and longevity. At less severe levels of poverty, improved 
access to basic and then more sophisticated health care adds to the 
prospect of healthier lives. (p. 1344)
Our country consists of huge pockets of vulnerable and broken 
communities. This is clearly visible in the main cities and towns, 
but is most acute in the less visible and often difficult-to-reach 
rural areas. For example, according to the Vulnerable Groups 
Indicator Report (Statistics South Africa 2015), 85% of children – 
aged 17 years or younger – do not have access to a medical aid. 
The figure is even worse at 95.9% for children living in rural areas. 
Furthermore, public health is mostly not easily accessible and 
also limited in rural areas.
The incongruity in the provision of healthcare is a main 
ethical issue. ‘At the basis of these discrepancies is the 
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inequality between nations and within nations. South Africa is 
a good example of such inequality’ (Nel 2017:1). South Africa’s 
health crisis is, however, not unique – poor public health is 
universal. Cochrane, Schmid and Cutts (2011:xvi), inter alia, 
compassionate researchers in health and religion, reflect 
extensively on the public health crisis of sub-Saharan Africa 
and elsewhere which exists despite the incredible development 
in scientific and health-related research and expertise over 
the previous almost two centuries. Rhetorically, they ask: ‘Why 
do so many people in so many places face so much ill health 
when, as never before, the knowledge and the means to deal 
with it are available?’ (Cochrane et al. 2011:xvi). Cochrane et al. 
(2011) first focus on the extrinsic problems and limits of public 
health:
In any specific historical and geographic context, a number of basic, 
outside factors are required to attain the goal of universal health, 
such as the provision of clean water, shelter, food, safety, sound 
community structures and the like. Also required are exceptionally 
able human planners with clear and impeccable ideological 
perspectives and thinking, brave enough to see off any opposition, 
and with access to the required physical resources. The lack of these 
factors creates ‘extrinsic problems’, making clear what lies outside 
the limits of public health. (p. xvi)
Secondly, but most importantly, they (Cochrane et al. 2011) 
reflect on the intrinsic restraints on public health:
These are the limits of the current consensus and inherent restraints 
of official thinking and practice. It includes that central sources 
and  resources integral to the initial aims – those dubbed as the 
‘religious’. (pp. xvi–xvii)
The affinitive, systemic, cognitive and metaphysical or spiritual 
are often suppressed. They propound that it has been the practice 
for some time that, in setting the ideals of public health thinking, 
the religious (more generally, the subjective) is restricted, largely 
by exclusion, from the agenda. Some leaders have indicated this 
might have been a mistake and needs correction – but there is no 
indication how this turnabout would proceed.
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In spite of growing secularisation, it is significant that, among 
the 84% of the world’s population who consider them to be 
religiously affiliated, the established belief in caring for those in 
need thrives (Olivier et al. 2015:1766). According to the Pew 
Research Centre, every congregation is an entry point to care, 
along with informal and volunteer community-based initiatives. 
In one instance, it was found that 9000 volunteers informally 
supported 156 000 children in six African countries (Olivier et al. 
2015:1766). Interestingly, in various African languages ‘religion’ 
and ‘health’ are synonymous concepts. For example, in SeSotho 
the word bopelo refers to both religion and health (Cochrane 
et al. 2011 in Van der Merwe 2016:591), while placing the ‘individual 
body’ within the social context (p. 592). Nel (2017:1) reminds us 
that ‘[t]he views of the WHO70 already represent a sound ethical 
framework for health. From a theological point of view it is 
difficult to improve on that.’
The role of the faith community in 
health and brokenness
It would seem that history is repeating itself. In the same way as 
thousands of years ago, recognition is again accorded to faith 
and worship – which have been returned their rightful positions 
in terms of healthcare. From the earliest days, it was clear that 
there were organic connections between healthcare and 
communities of faith such as in examples of sick people visiting 
Egyptian and Greek temples to be healed (Winslow et al. 
2016:186). In the history of Judaism, health and healing have been 
put into words in the holy books as a direct manifestation of 
what it means to be created in the image of God (Winslow et al. 
70. ‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO 2006). Article 1 of the WHO reads: ‘The objective of 
the World Health Organization shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health’ (Nel 2017:1).
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2016:186). If all people were created in God’s image, it presupposes 
equal rights and care for all. According to the traditions of 
hospitality, practised by Abraham, not only the elite had access 
to healthcare – it was available to all (see Gn 18:1–33; cf. Kim 
2015:91; Nouwen 1975:66). Originally, the word healing was 
closely connected to ‘wholeness’, ‘welfare’ and ‘holiness’ (Bosch 
1990:52). In the world of the antiquity, healing meant the return 
to an all-encompassing state of wholeness or bliss (Bosch 
1990:52). It is also to this wholeness that the concept of shalom 
of the Old Testament gives expression – referring to physical 
health, peace of mind, healthy human relations, social justice and 
peace with God (Bosch 1990:52; cf. Harris, Archer & Waltke 
1980:930–931; WCC 2012:16). This concept of being healed from 
having been broken – as in broken-hearted, crushed or shattered 
in spirit – has had a place in the traditions of Judaism to this day 
(Winslow et al. 2016):
Judaism continues to hold wholeness and completeness (shalom 
bayit) at the center of its teaching and practice. Shalom is realised 
through faithful, loving-kindness (chesed). Important dimensions 
of contemporary Jewish life include the concepts of repairing what 
is broken in the world (tikkun olam) and whole-person care for the 
sick (bikkur holim), remaining mindful of the abiding promise: ‘For 
I am the LORD who heals you’ (Ex 15:26, New Revised Standard 
Version). (p. 186)
The Christian faith follows in the Jewish tradition as it was 
articulated in the Old Testament. The connections between faith 
and the delivery of healing remain strong (Winslow et al. 
2016:186). It is in the life of Jesus’ inclusive justice and love, 
hospitality, healing and salvation that God’s preferential option 
for the poor and vulnerable is embraced. Jesus did not have a 
theory of distributive justice, but from his teaching and healing 
ministry it was clear that the core value of his love extended 
beyond justice to everybody, beyond any boundary, to include 
all (Benn 2011:13; cf. WCC 2012:154–155).
From the beginning, the Christian church was, to an exceptional 
degree, deeply moved by people who were physically or 
Chapter 7
175
spiritually unwell and, as we know, she gathered to her bosom all 
victims of circumstances beyond their control (Bosch 1990:51). 
Cochrane (2006) writes:
Christianity has a long history of care for people; healing is an 
important part of the life and work of the Jesus of the gospels, and 
medical missions were a significant part of its spread across the 
world. (p. 60)
The growth of Christianity led, among others, to organised and 
institutionalised healthcare as a ministry of faith (Winslow et al. 
2016:186). The roots of our modern hospitals are to be found in 
the Early Church’s ministry of healing (Bosch 1990:51). This 
ministry illustrated the all-encompassing salvation (Bosch 
1990:51). The Early Church lived a ‘Gospel of love and charity’ 
(Von Harnack in Bosch 1990:51). ‘The new language on the lips of 
Christians [...] was the language of love. But it was more than a 
language, it was a thing of power and practice’, according to Von 
Harnack (Bosch 1990:51).
By the 4th century AD hospitals were coming into existence in 
cities, of which the Basilicas, founded by St. Basil of Cappadocia 
in the year 369, was the best known (Winslow et al. 2016:186). 
During the Middle Ages, monasteries and convents were both a 
place of healing and a place where an all-encompassing ministry 
was practised (Bosch 1990:51).
The religious impulse to provide hospitality to those in need 
continued with the development of monastic orders throughout 
the Middle Ages. Monasteries and convents often included 
facilities that were designed to give both physical and spiritual 
care to the needy. For example, the Alexian Brothers risked their 
own lives in order to provide care for victims of the Black Plague 
in Europe (Winslow et al. 2016:186).
In time, hospitals became independent institutions (Winslow 
et al. 2016:186). During the Protestant Reformation, with its focus 
on purely spreading the word of God, this meant that, in terms of 
the church’s ministry, sickness and healing were marginalised, 
according to Bosch (1990:51).
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However, the ministry of healing continued. In the 19th century, 
hospitals were established by both Catholics and Protestants, 
primarily for the poor. At that time, the well off were usually 
treated in their homes by their private doctors and nurses, and 
even surgery was performed in private homes (Wall in Winslow 
et al. 2016:187).
The public health tradition that started in the 19th and 20th 
centuries was primarily inspired – and continued – by the work 
and commitment of Christians, primarily in Great Britain, 
Switzerland and the USA, by way of the social gospel (Cochrane 
2006:60–61). It is therefore not strange that the WHO’s huge 
jump during the 1960s towards a primary healthcare system had 
its origins in the work of Christian medical missionaries (Cochrane 
2006:61).
In South Africa, at the height of apartheid, the ‘backbone’ of the 
healthcare system in the homelands (Bantustans) were the not-
for-profit mission hospitals (Coovadia et al. 2009:825–826). The 
state took over control of these hospitals in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Coovadia et al. 2009:825–826). Bosch (1990:54) provides a 
tender portrait of a mission physician, Gerrit ter Haar, who had 
joined a hospital in the Transkei in the late 1950s. This was a time 
when a white person’s word was law, and a white mission doctor 
could have ruled a hospital as though it was his private kingdom. 
But when the hospital became a government hospital, Ter Haar 
stayed and was forced to give up his power. In 1986, Ter Haar 
(Bosch 1990) wrote:
I honestly believe that having no power in a worldly sense is to my 
advantage as a modern missionary. I have often complained about 
it, but I have come to the realisation that it is to my advantage. 
When I no longer have power to do what I want to do, I am 
dependent on the [...] Holy Spirit [...] I cannot force my way. It is a 
gentle way. (p. 54)
The apple does not fall far from the tree, as the saying 
goes,  and  in this case, Ter Haar’s son, Reynier ter Haar, is 
the  medical director of Nkhoma Hospital in Malawi. This is a 
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hospital that sets the desired trend for medical care as it was 
understood by those who had established the first hospitals in 
the earliest of times. ‘The hospital and nine health centres 
belongs to the CCAP church and as such the final authority lies 
with the church leadership’ (Ter Haar 2017). Ter Haar (2017) 
continues:
But we fall under the government, have to register our hospital 
and staff with the nursing and medical counsels of Malawi. We are 
together with other Christian hospitals and clinics responsible for 
about 37% of medical care in Malawi. Our long term commitment is 
quality care, compassion for our patients, discipline with awareness 
about grace, service not for earthly rewards, the motto of the hospital 
is serving with love and care. (n.p.)
Today there is a renewed recognition of the value of faith-
inspired entities of health, better known as FBHPs by most 
healthcare role players. It is particularly pleasing that from a 
policy level during the past decade, ‘increased attention has 
been paid to faith-based entities engaged in health’ (Olivier et al. 
2015:1766). Faith-based Health Providers (FBHPs) are important 
role players in several African countries and are predominantly 
to be found in fragile or destabilised health systems (Olivier et al. 
2015:1766). Cochrane (2006:59) states, ‘[i]n the midst of 
enormous challenges threatening the public health systems in 
sub-Saharan Africa, FBOs are making a substantial contribution 
to the health of communities’.
According to Olivier et al. (2015:1765), FBHPs have maintained 
their strong presence in many low to middle-income countries 
despite the end of colonialism and huge changes in healthcare. 
They have, however, been ignored by the world of research and 
policy for decades when the focus shifted to public health 
provision, but also because of the mistrust that had developed 
from controversies surrounding, especially traditional faith-
based healthcare provision which, at times, was coupled with 
proselytising. However, over the last decade, there has been a 
renewed push from organisational, state and other agencies for 
developing a better understanding of FBHPs.
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The magnitude of diversity in faith-inspired entities involved 
in health and healing can be gleaned from the following examples:
• Faith-based community organisations and NGO’s in their 
thousands – at 20% of all agencies involved – are acknowledged 
to have responded to the challenges posed by HIV care (WHO 
2004).
• Basic self-provided estimates of health facilities show a similar 
scale of involvement such as the Salvation Army’s 73 hospitals, 
56 specialist clinics, 135 health centres and 64 mobile clinics 
that operate in 124 countries.
• Various Christian health associations operate and represent 
thousands of hospitals and clinics in sub-Saharan Africa.
• The Adventist Church operates 173 hospitals and sanatoriums, 
and 216 clinics and dispensaries worldwide.
• The Catholic Church operates more than an estimated 5300 
hospitals worldwide (Olivier et al. 2015:1766).
There is concern that the FBHPs do not know of one another or 
join forces. Their actual scopes, assets and challenges are 
unknown. In the words of James Wolfenson, President of the 
World Bank, ‘half the work in education and health in sub-Saharan 
Africa is done by the church […] but they don’t talk to each other, 
and they don’t talk to us’ (Olivier et al. 2015:1765). Cochrane 
(2006:62) has similar sentiments about FBHPs in Africa, claiming 
‘[w]hat is known is fragmented and often ambiguous’. As a result, 
the African Religious Health Assets Programme (ARHAP, today 
known as IRHAP) was established with its driving force the 
Health Desk of the WCC (Cochrane 2006:62). In conjunction 
with practitioners and researchers in Southern Africa, the main 
objective of the ARHAP is (Cochrane 2006):
[T ]o address the gaps in our understanding of ‘religious health assets’. 
This is in order to contribute a greater intelligence for a more mature 
response on the part of people of faith to the challenges, and to provide 
insight for decision makers into how such ‘assets’ may be drawn more 
effectively into public health systems and practices. (p. 62)
A shift was made from a problem-based focus on limitations and 
deficits to a more constructive focus on assets. This approach 
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has its origin in the theory and practice of transformational 
community development, and is known as the ABCD.71 Cochrane 
(2006:64–66) makes a distinction between ‘tangible’ and 
‘intangible’ RHA’s. Religious health missional ministries have 
quantitative and qualitative assets, similar to community 
development that I had been involved in for decades. Obviously, 
quantitative assets are more easily measurable. For example, it 
does not require much effort to make a count of broken people 
who need help, but to determine the extent of passion and 
compassion of health workers is a different matter. When 
Cochrane (2006) contemplates on intangible RHA’s, he states:
Beyond tallying mission hospitals and care units for orphans, 
there is a growing realisation, both theoretically and as a result 
of practice, that a new paradigm for the understanding of the 
relationship between religion and health is necessary. RHA’s are 
important beyond their quantity and similarity to ‘secular’ health 
systems and networks. What makes RHA’s different from other 
health associations, institutions or structures lies in what is not 
visible, viz. in the volitional, motivational and mobilising capacities 
that are rooted in vital affective, symbolic and relational dimensions 
of religious faith, belief, behaviour and ties. (p. 65)
There is a sense of this intangibility found in a newspaper article 
of the political commentator, Matthew Parris (2009), in which he 
has given the impact of Christian faith in Africa a markedly 
favourable testimony. Parris, who describes himself an atheist, 
has been impressed by the remarkable contribution of Christian 
evangelisation in Africa. While secular NGOs, government and 
international projects have limited impact, Christian faith brings 
a change to people’s hearts, and spiritual transformation (a 
rebirth) follows, according to Parris. Humanism is the fruit of 
Christian faith (Van Niekerk 2010:n.p.).
71. The characteristics of successful community initiatives were studied by John McKnight 
and Jody Kretzman of the North West University, Illinois USA. The success of development 
initiatives correlates with the extent to which the talents and abilities, present in a community, 
is emphasised. The Asset Based Community Development approach to development evolved 
from these findings and the process is described in their publication Building Communities from 
the Inside Out: A path toward community assets (Van Niekerk 2006:13; cf. Cochrane 2006:62). 
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Leslie Swartz describes himself as a secular Jew and atheist. 
As a professor of Psychology who gives training to members of 
organisations for people with disabilities in basic research skills, 
Swartz (2013) shares a personal learning:
[F]aith (and this was not a faith consumed in an authoritarian way, but 
a faith struggled with by the people who had experienced religious 
exclusion) may be part of what sustains people, and provides a 
safe and nurturing environment for people whose lives are far more 
precarious than mine. (p. 90)
Therefore, faith in him as the trainer and the relevance of 
spirituality for the trainees, could not be ignored during training 
(Swartz 2013:90).
In the next section, I will focus on the impact and influence of the 
embodiment of God on the cosmos and human nature as well as 
the spiritual impetus and intrinsic value it could have on the 
discourse of healthcare and a just, liberated, healthy and equal 
humane South African society. God’s kenotic love in Jesus the 
Christ should be regarded as an important intangible health asset. 
The peculiar attitude of Jesus does not reflect a spirit of greed, 
predacity, demand, entitlement or fixation (Phlp 2:5), and is a 
summons to many people (Smit 2017:10). Over centuries until today 
this Christian attitude has rubbed off on them and inspired them for 
extraordinary service of compassionate justice and healing.
The presuppositions which lead this second part of the chapter 
are ‘the Christian faith is an “incarnational” faith’ (Behr 2015:79); 
Christianity is ‘a religion of the body’ (Creamer 2012:341); and 
Karl Rahner’s remark ‘[t]he statement of God’s Incarnation – of 
his becoming material – is the most basic statement of Christology’ 
(Johnson 2015:139).
The embodiment of God
God’s involvement with the cosmos through the ages, reaches a 
climax with the dramatic incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth (Naudé 
2004:188; cf. Bauckham 2015:32–33). It is through the incarnation 
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that Jesus not only becomes the presence of God, but also God’s 
representative on earth (Gregersen 2012:235). Jesus makes God 
comprehensible and human (Du Plessis 2003:133) – he is the 
clearest picture of God (Conradie 2006:236–237). Incarnation 
comprises ‘God’s self-embodiment and God’s self-identification’ 
(Gregersen 2013:253).
Furthermore, according to the Gospel of John (1:14), the Logos 
[Word] became sarx [flesh] and lived among us. The Danish 
systematic theologian, Gregersen (2015b:2), refers to the 
‘incarnate Christ’ as the ‘embodied Logos’: ‘God’s own Word or 
Logos (the eternal Son) assumed “flesh” in Jesus of Nazareth’ 
(Gregersen 2015b:3). ‘Flesh’ means ‘material, perishable, 
vulnerable, finite, the very opposite of what is divine’ (Johnson 
2010:n.p.; cf. Louw 2008:398). The Hebrew word for flesh, basar, 
has the meaning of ‘a weak, transitory and mortal creature’ 
(Harris et al. 1980:136; Wolff in Manenschijn 2002:362). According 
to Moltmann (2015:127), basar is best translated with ‘life’ as in 
the phrase kol basar [all flesh]. Gregersen (2015a:ix) translates it 
as ‘from grass to human persons’ (see also Gregersen 
2015c:228–229). In Isaiah 40:6–7 kol basar means ‘whole 
humanity’72 and in Genesis 6:12 it is translated with ‘everything 
that lives’ (Manenschijn 2002:362). God’s incarnation in Jesus 
assumes the nature of all that live (Moltmann 2015:128). According 
to Gregersen (2015b):
God thus became a human being (not only a man), a social being who 
lived with and for others in a sinful world (not an autistic individual), 
a living being vulnerable like sparrows and foxes (not just a member 
of homo sapiens), a material being made out of stardust and earth 
(not bringing with him a special heavenly flesh), thus susceptible to 
death and disintegration. (p. 7)
God does embrace all that live, not only humans; ‘God assumes 
the whole vulnerable, mortal nature in his becoming human, in 
order that it may be healed, reconciled, and glorified’ (Moltmann 
2015:128). Incarnation is thus not limited to a human issue; 
72. ‘gehele mensheid’ in Dutch.
Health and brokenness
182
nowhere in the New Testament it is stated, ‘God became human’ 
(Gregersen 2015b:226; 228). But the embodiment of God needed 
a representative of the human species as ‘anchorage’. As far as 
we know, only human beings could take ‘a self-reflective relation 
to God as the source of all there is’ (Gregersen 2015b:226). 
Humans also have the capacity to be mindful of their surroundings 
as well as the potential to have just concern for other living 
beings (Gregersen 2015b:226).
The scope and depth of Christology have led Gregersen 
(2015b:8) to the development of the provisional concept of ‘deep 
incarnation’. An evolutionary Christology has developed from 
influences of, inter alia, Karl Rahner, Thomas Torrance and Jürgen 
Moltmann (Gregersen 2015d:371–372). Gregersen (2015c) finds it 
vital:
[T ]hat the Son of God shared the heights, breaths, and depths of 
the human condition, and that he did so as one who was genuinely 
grounded in the physical and biological conditions of material beings. 
(pp. 226–227)
Gregersen (2015c) unpacks the concept of deep incarnation:
God’s own Logos (Wisdom and Word) was made flesh in Jesus the Christ 
in such a comprehensive manner that God, by assuming the particular 
life-story of Jesus the Jew from Nazareth, also conjoined the material 
conditions of creaturely existence (‘all flesh’), shared and ennobled the 
fate of all biological life-forms (‘grass’ and ‘lilies’), and experienced the 
pains of sensitive creatures (‘sparrows’ and ‘foxes’). Deep incarnation 
thus presupposes a radical embodiment which reaches into the roots 
(radices) of material and biological existence as well as into the darker 
sides of creation: the tenebrae creatonis. (pp. 225–226)
Deep incarnation puts the accent on the uniqueness of Christ. 
Deep incarnation broadens the anthropocentric scope with the 
focus on ‘biocentric’ and ‘cosmocentric’ facets of Christology. It 
relates Christ with ecology and science (Johnson 2015:133). It is 
important to note that this incarnation theology is not pantheism 
(Bentley 2016:2). According to Bauckham (2015:32), ‘God is not 




The inspiring, creative perspective of the radical embodiment 
of God, on the one hand, makes God’s liberative presence in and 
intimate relation to life intense, it gives divine value to the quality 
of living and provides ethical signposts to a just and transformed 
society. On the other hand, God’s radical presence in flesh, makes 
God part and parcel of nature’s vulnerability, pain and suffering. 
In the face of all malevolence, Jesus the Christ as creature, 
embraces God’s whole creation personally and directly 
(Gregersen 2015b:7).
In a discussion on incarnation, Gregersen (2015b) states that:
Incarnation, here, means to understand human and creaturely conditions 
from an internal firsthand perspective, and not only from a lofty third-
person perspective beyond the engagements, struggles, passions and 
anxieties of being a human-in-the-world-with-others. (p. 8)
The emphasis of Jesus’ ministry is dignity and compassion to all 
living. God’s concern for ‘all bodies, not only those that are 
beautiful and full of life but also those damaged, violated, 
starving, dying, bodies of humankind’ (Johnson 2015:145) is 
reflected. This concrete ‘self-identification’ of Jesus is God’s 
exceptional ‘act of loving solidarity with all people’ (Bauckham 
2015:33). God’s love in Jesus for people goes beyond the daily 
routine of living beings. Jesus is mainly found on the edges of 
what is regarded as politically correct, at the margins of society, 
with the needy and downtrodden, the poor and sick, and ending 
up at the fringes of Golgotha on a cross.
The actions and deeds of Jesus pay attention to physical well-
being, and the acts of healing strikingly emphasise Jesus’ concern 
for ‘people’s bodily suffering’ (Johnson 2015:143). God assumes 
in Christ, the incarnated, to embrace humanity in all its 
comprehensiveness to consecrate and to heal its brokenness, 
according to Gregory of Nazianzus (Speidell 1987:250). Jesus, 
the ‘incarnate humanity’, dwells on earth as the curer of our 
humanity, according to Athanasius (Speidell 1987:250). Partaking 
in the pain of people, Christ gives ointment to those tormented, 
and liberty and wholeness to those who suffer (Webb 2012:199).
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Through the incarnation, the ‘vicarious humanity’ of Christ is 
brought about ‘in which God graciously summons us to 
participate’ in the acts of healing (Speidell 1987:251). God’s love 
for the whole cosmos and God’s solidarity with humanity bestows 
dignity on all living. This has ethical implications to believers: 
They come to be the partners of God in God’s divine care for 
creation (Johnson 2015:140). Through God’s incarnation in Jesus, 
the identity of the church is made visible in an ‘incarnational 
lifestyle’ by which the followers of Christ consciously make 
themselves ‘vulnerable for the sake of others’ (General Synod of 
the Dutch Reformed Church 2013:7).
Kenotic love of Jesus, the broken Christ
Jesus’ suffering not only on the cross, but also during his earthly 
life, forms a central dimension of the redemptive nature of the 
incarnation. It is a poignant illustration of Christ’s solidarity with 
the suffering: ‘[I]n the suffering of Christ, God meets us where we 
are, a meeting that restores us to ourselves and orients us with 
compassion for others’ (Webb 2012:199). According to Mercedes 
(Webb 2012:199), the concept kenosis suggests the generation 
of power towards another. In the context of the incarnation, 
the self-emptying of Jesus is thus understood as ‘the giving of 
the self for another’ (Webb 2012:199). This kenotic attitude is like 
inhaling life-giving oxygen to the followers of Christ; it fills them 
with the capacity to liberate themselves of self-centredness, by 
being available for the other and live a life of self-giving love. Or, 
as Mercedes (Webb 2012:200) contemplates, in kenosis, 
Christians find their identity. ‘[I]n encountering the self-giving 
Christ, our own identity is fulfilled through self-giving’ (Webb 
2012:200).
According to the liberation theologian, Jon Sobrino (Speidell 
1987:251), Jesus is the ‘pathway to liberation’; he is the one who 
‘becomes the Son of God’ to show us ‘the way of the Son, the 
way one becomes Son of God’. The primary test put by Jesus to 
his followers, then, is to duplicate his way of being in themselves 
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and in their lives (Speidell 1987:251). Leonardo Boff (Speidell 
1987:251) pictures believers to be the followers of Christ who has 
already reached the goal. According to him (Speidell 1987:251), 
‘[t]he imitation of Christ [...] connects us to Christ “and allows 
him to act in us”’.
The feminist theologian, Wendy Farley, employs the metaphor 
of a door when contemplating on the suffering of Christ (Webb 
2012:203). Farley’s reference to suffering as ‘a door to Christ’ 
should not be seen as an instruction of imitating the suffering of 
Christ; it is rather an announcement of Christ’s involvement in the 
agony of human life (Webb 2012:203). According to Farley 
(Webb 2012:203), ‘Christ does not invite us through this door so 
we can be like him. He stands at this door, so he can be like us.’ 
There are feminist theologians who are suspicious of the claim of 
salvation through Jesus’ suffering and self-sacrifice, because of 
its potential justification of oppression and the abuse of women 
(Webb 2012:199). They highlight Jesus’ solidarity as well as Jesus’ 
‘embodiment of inclusion and justice’ (Webb 2012:199), with the 
marginalised, the oppressed, women and the poor. The 
redemptive value of Jesus’ incarnation and suffering is denied. 
Jesus’ way of living resulted in his violent and tragic death by the 
imperialist power (Webb 2012:199). Alternatively, other feminist 
theologians hold different views. For example, Johnson (2015) 
puts the emphasis on the crucified God in loving solidarity with 
the suffering of people:
The end of Jesus’ life in death and resurrection provides yet another 
chapter in the astonishing narrative of God’s immersion in matter. 
No exception to perhaps the only ironclad rule in all of nature, Jesus 
died, his life bleeding out in a spasm of state violence. Theology has 
always seen in the cross the love of God writ large: the Son of God 
entered into suffering ‘for us’. Contemporary theology is replete with 
the idea that in Christ God suffered not just once on a certain Good 
Friday, but suffers continuously through history, in solidarity with the 
ongoing agony of the human race. Crosses keep on being set up 
in history. Ecce homo: behold the human being, with tear-stained, 
starving, tormented faces. The crucified God suffers with human 
beings, and will continue to do so until we take all the crucified 
peoples down from the cross. (pp. 145–146)
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The wisdom teacher, Qoheleth, who lived approximately 300 
BC (cf. Ogden 1987:15), employs the metaphor of a ‘golden 
bowl on a silver string’ (Ec 12:6) to describe the precious value 
of life. But there comes a time, he warns, that the cord will 
break, letting the bowl fall to pieces and everything will be 
meaningless (Ec 12:8). In Christian faith the importance of the 
preciousness of life and the well-being of everyone is 
recognised, and most Christians believe that eternal life is 
already lived in the physical form. Jesus says that everyone 
who follows him, has eternal life (e.g. Jn 3:16, 6:47). According 
to Deist (1990:n.p.), this ‘eternal life’ refers to the quality of life 
at present and not to something speculative to be gained 
some day after death. Eternal life has all to do with how 
followers of Christ choose to live now – to what extent they 
become the image of God and, in so doing, a manifestation of 
God on earth (Deist 1990:n.p.). The crux of eternal life-living is 
to protect the golden bowl of life from dropping, and if it 
drops, to be picking up the pieces and putting them together 
again. The healing of the broken requires an attitude of self-
giving love that finds expression in passion and compassion. 
On account of Christ’s selfless attitude of servitude, he has 
become the name above all names (Smit 2017:10).
However, selflessness comes ‘unnatural’ to being human. The 
cost of Christian discipleship could be too high if control is to 
be resigned. For those who believe, the winner takes it all – there 
could be no power in weakness.
The faith, health and wealth dilemma
As astonishing as biomedical technology and pharmacological 
innovation may be, these advances in medical science often 
come at a costly price. As a business enterprise, the medical 
industry inevitably turns individuals into clinical trials, diagnoses 
and pharmacological prescriptions, and success is quantified in 
terms of profit. Sadly, the church could also be lured into the 
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mindset of enterprise. Personal narratives of brokenness and 
healing become unspoken (Winslow et al. 2016):
[T]oday’s health care increasingly runs the danger of losing its 
charitable soul, devolving into yet another commoditised industry. 
The distance from the ministry of healing to the health care industry 
is great. It is not measured in years or miles but in the way people 
understand the essence and meaning of what they are doing when 
they care for the health of another person, and why such care is 
offered. (p. 189)
The increasing cost of medical aid is disturbing, but linked to the 
complexities of actuarial science. The fact remains that it has 
become increasingly difficult for beneficiaries of the private 
health system to pay their medical aid premiums. Nel (2017) 
explains:
Health care as a discipline is for several reasons even more sensitive 
to inequalities in society. Health care inflation rises constantly above 
the average inflation rate of countries. [...] There are multiple reasons 
for it. The health care community (with society’s blessing) chose for 
a scientific medicine, it make health sciences part of the scientific 
and technological revolutions. (p. 1)
The infographic (Figure 7.1) indicates the price of medical care in 
South Africa at present, and a projection of cost in 2026 (Fin24 
2017:n.p.):
In South Africa the private medical service is structured in a 
commodity model (Nel 2017:3). Private healthcare ‘is a service 
like any other service in the market place. Healthcare providers 
pursue their own interests and that of their investors’ (Nel 2017:3).
The South African religious community is challenged by the 
development and implementation of the NHI legislation.73 ‘The 
attainment of universal health coverage (UHC) is a complex 
73. ‘The National Health Insurance White Paper was published by the Department of Health in 
December 2015. The purpose is to “pool funds to provide quality, affordable health services 
irrespective of socio-economic status.” Through the NHI the right to access to healthcare for 




FIGURE 7.1: The price of medical care in South Africa at present.
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process, but a necessary one which has been enshrined as one of 
the Sustainable Development Goals’ (Gray & Vawda 2016:4). 
Churches should participate in the discourse of the viability of 
the proposed NHI. Through the NHI, the right to access to 
healthcare for everyone will be reached. Somebody needs to pay 
for the service, however. The implementation of the NHI is 
complex (cf. Mayosi & Benatar 2014:1349). Nel (2017) clearly 
states:
The funding of the NHI is problematic. Only two percent of the 
South African population is estimated to pay more than half of 
income tax. According to the South African Revenue Service, 57% 
of SA’s personal income taxes are paid by 480 000 high-earning 
individuals. The fact that medical schemes will cease to exist under 
the NHI and direct access to high-quality private healthcare is not 
a certainty in this system, raise serious concerns among this group. 
The private medical sector spends more than R160 billion rand a 
year (Johan Serfontein, Free Market Foundation Health Policy 
Unit) in the economy. Many people are employed by this sector. 
Withdrawing this sector from the South African economy will have 
a drastic impact. (p. 3)
The religious communities, for example the SACC, should 
participate in the realisation of an inclusive national health 
system for every person. Nel (2017) proposes an ethically sound 
healthcare vision:
What we need is a common purpose and vision for health care. 
A vision that is ethically inclusive of all the people and that is ethically 
responsible (sustainable) in terms of the resources of the country. 
This vision should include all the role players. Building trust between 
role players and encourage working for the greater social good of 
everybody. A road map for the future that is built on collaboration 
between the public and private sectors. (pp. 3–4)
From the perspective of Christian faith, the threat, associated 
with the unbelievable growth in the prosperity gospel, is more 
disquieting than the cost of medical insurance. The preaching of 
the prosperity gospel is widely spread and its influence the 
largest growing in sub-Saharan Africa among faith communities 
(Chilenje 2013:13; Kroesbergen 2013:6; Zulu 2013:28). ‘This faith 
movement gives hope to the people, mostly the marginalised or 
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hopeless’ (Chilenje 2013:11), by offering health and wealth from 
God as a right (Gbote & Kgatla 2014):
The basic teaching of the prosperity Gospel is that God wants 
believers to get rich or healthy, but he cannot bless them unless they 
first send money known as ‘seed faith’ to their spiritual leader or 
pastor who tells them about the plan. (p. 1)
Obviously the promise of attaining riches and of health 
guaranteed will be attractive to those who are destitute. However, 
it seems that most prosperity preachers are running their 
‘churches’ as fundraising for their own interests. It is not strange 
to find the preachers extremely wealthy, in comparison with their 
supporters (cf. Gbote & Kgatla 2014:7).
A great concern is the fatalism the prosperity faith advocates 
and creates among marginalised people, that is, the ill health 
and  poor persons whose ‘faith’ is not strong enough to 
overcome  Satan’s power. The shameless, non-compassionate 
and judgemental attitude among some proponents of prosperity 
faith towards the poor and needy, raises serious ethical concerns.
This movement has a different understanding of the 
embodiment of God and the kenotic love of Christ. According to 
the movement’s theology of the cross, ‘God put our sins, illness, 
and poverty on Him so that we may [be] able to enjoy the blessings 
of our salvation’ (Walker in Chilenje 2013:16). Paul’s belief in the 
cross of Jesus, seen as a power in weakness (2 Cor 12:9), is clearly 
absent in their faith. People do not follow Jesus in the hope of 
getting something out of it, they follow Jesus because of who and 
what Jesus is (Bosch 1990:53). The prosperity movement does not 
follow Jesus as the one who ‘rejects power and privileges, identifies 
himself with the poor, takes upon himself their vulnerability and 
allows himself to be broken and crushed’ (WCC 2012:154).
Conclusion
‘[N]one of us is whole, at least not yet. We are a damaged, 
broken, and wounded lot’, writes Hernandez (2006:112) when 
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reflecting on Henri Nouwen who has been known as the wounded 
healer. I have started this chapter with the ‘Esidimeni-massacre’ 
and provided analyses from researchers on the dysfunctional 
healthcare system. I have focused on the detrimental effects of 
poverty on health and well-being. I have touched on the expense 
of healthcare and insurance. Poor or rich, healthy or ill – we all are 
part and parcel of a broken society. Furthermore, every one of us 
is vicariously exposed to risks associated with the powers of 
nature and viruses. We are all clay jars that easily break (2 Cor 4:7). 
‘Our bodies are prone to disease and disability; they are fragile 
and mortal’ (Van Niekerk 2013:151).
I have reflected on the influence and importance of faith on 
health and healing since the ‘beginning’. I have contemplated the 
way in which affordability of medical treatment and the appeal 
of the prosperity gospel confront believers with the ethics of 
health and brokenness. I have also focused on the advantages of 
faith in public health and well-being of human nature. The 
embodiment of God is indicative of his relatedness to the material 
world (Myers 1999:46). Christian faith is embodied faith which 
takes the bodies of humans seriously. Its mission is to fight for a 
dignified health service and equal justice (cf. WCC 2012:153–154). 
Healing is all-encompassing, as De Gruchy (Bosch 1990) explains:
A concern for health cannot be separated from a commitment to 
social justice and transformation. Hence the connection in the Bible 
between social-justice and ‘Shalom’. A healing ministry requires a 
prophetic-critical ministry; the one without the other distorts the 
Gospel of judgement and grace. (p. 57)
Bosch (1990:54–57) pleads with the Christian church to turn into 
a ‘healing community’. The ministry of healing goes beyond 
trained medical practitioners and faith healers. It also involves 
the church, congregations and members. When Christians take 
up the call to a ministry of healing, the reality that we live in a sick 
society is acknowledged (Bosch 1990:56). Sadly our post-
apartheid society still contains the same elements that Bosch 
(1990:56) referred to as ‘a sick South African society’ – tension, 
mistrust, corruption, fear, hate, bitterness and uncertainty. 
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We are called to a ministry of putting people at ease, helping one 
another to accept their fellow human beings, to be honest with 
them and being instrumental in changing fear and hate to trust 
and love (Bosch 1990:56). This is the act of kenosis, of self-giving 
love.
I mentioned before the diversity and complexity of healthcare, 
and that the same applies to faith’s influence on and involvement 
in healthcare (Olivier et al. 2015):
[A]lthough religion is described mainly as a positive value, when 
theology mixes with health-service policy, negative health effects 
have been noted, most strongly documented in relation to sexual 
and reproductive health. However, the slowly emerging evidence on 
FBHPs suggests that they are not simply a health systems relic of 
a bygone missionary era, but still have relevance and a part to play 
(especially in fragile health systems), even if we still know little about 
exactly how they function. (p. 1772)
To conclude, I realise that to strive for a liberated, equitable, 
humane and healthy South Africa is a complex and diverse goal, 
but I refuse to be fatalistic. Therefore, I adopt a Christological 
and ethical perspective of God’s embodiment and kenotic love. 
These are the important and unique values that would enrich the 
discourse on health and brokenness. They are also descriptive of 
the Christological hermeneutical lens through which I approach 
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The Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996) begins with the promising words: ‘We, the people of South 
Africa […] [b]elieve that South Africa belongs to all who live in it’; 
yet, we are very aware of how far our country is from attaining 
the ideals of the Constitution. In December 2016 a new political 
party was registered with the Independent Electoral Commission. 
The South Africa First party, led by Mario Khumalo, hopes to 
drive foreigners out of South Africa. Khumalo sees xenophobic 
violence as a reaction to the government’s failure to address the 
issue of immigration (Davis 2017). Around the same time Khumalo 
formed the party, another group – the Mamelodi Concerned 
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Residents – planned a march against foreigners and immigration 
which contributed to xenophobic attitudes (and some violence) 
in the area (Davis 2017). These examples of xenophobic attitudes 
are not unique as we very well know. Recent years have seen an 
increase in violence, often fatal, directed at foreigners in South 
Africa. The widespread xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 
destabilised the country and confronted us with an ugly truth: 
South Africa does not belong to all who live in it.
In South Africa, anti-immigrant attitudes have been on the rise 
since 1994 (see Southern African Migration Project 2001; 2008), 
with the majority of South Africans adopting a ‘South Africa First’ 
policy (Nyamnjoh 2006:37). The rise in xenophobic or anti-
immigrant sentiments is not unique to South Africa. Migration is 
increasingly becoming a central issue in political debates, 
campaigns and commentary worldwide.
The migration of people is and has always been a fact of life, 
and the causes of migration are multiple. Some flee warfare, 
some seek riches and some merely seek food to feed their 
children. When thinking or speaking about migration, it is wise to 
remember its multifaceted nature. It would be unwise to assume 
that there can be a single, overarching response to global 
migration or a simple solution to the problems it might bring. 
Migration calls up questions of emigration (should we leave?) 
and immigration (should we welcome ‘them’?); questions of 
inclusion and exclusion, belonging, identity, hospitality, and 
assimilation.
Migration in South Africa is an equally complex reality. The 
country is host to millions of seasonal migrants, documented and 
undocumented immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. There 
is no doubt that the presence of these individuals puts a strain on 
South Africa’s limited resources. Foreigners, especially those 
from other African countries, are mistrusted, feared, discriminated 
against and even killed. They are accused of exacerbating the 
unemployment crisis by taking citizens’ jobs, committing crimes 
(especially relating to the drugs and arms trade), and they are 
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seen as parasites on service delivery, healthcare and education 
systems (see Nyamnjoh 2006 for discussion). The country’s 
treatment of foreigners and its immigration policies have earned 
it the reputation of an aggressive state which ‘lives up against, 
rather than with, its neighbours’ (Vale 2002:10).
This situation is not only a threat to the lives and well-being of 
foreigners in South Africa, but to the country and its citizens as 
well. Xenophobic attitudes are, for the most part, directed at 
foreigners from other African countries (Nyamnjoh 2006):
Xenophobia is racist in its application; victims are predominantly 
black and are targeted for their very blackness where skin colour has 
always served as an excuse for whole catalogues of discriminatory 
policies and practices. (p. 49)
Individuals are identified as foreigners based on markers such as 
their skin colour (‘too dark’ to be South African), hairstyles and 
accents. The result of this unreliable method of identification is 
that citizens are often identified, targeted and victimised as 
foreigners (Nyamnjoh 2006:51).
The xenophobic violence, which so often erupts in South African 
communities, not only endangers the lives and property of everyone 
in that community, but it also poses a very real threat to the political 
and economic stability of South Africa and to the survival of its 
democracy. The South African Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of 
the country’s democracy; yet, the values it enshrines – ‘the rights of 
all people in our country [and] the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom’ (The Republic of South Africa 1996:7) – 
are betrayed by the injustices perpetrated against foreigners and 
‘foreign looking’ citizens. In blaming foreigners for taking jobs and 
stealing resources, blame is also deflected from the guilty parties. 
Scapegoating foreigners serves as a smokescreen to sweep local 
economic, political and social issues under the rug. As Sisonke 
Msimang (2017) pointed out in a recent lecture:
[T ]he problem of xenophobia, and the ways in which it is particularly 
directed at African migrants, is a function not so much of economic 
pressure, as it is of political failure. (n.p.)
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Many citizens are denied meaningful political, economic and 
cultural representation for reasons other than immigration: the 
economic inequalities that still remain even after apartheid, a 
corrupt state and global capitalism, to name a few possible 
reasons (Nyamnjoh 2006:230).
What is needed to fight crime, unemployment or disease is 
not more stringent immigration policies, closed borders or a 
foreigner-free society, but rather a return to or a cultivating of 
the democratic values, emphasised in the Bill of Rights which 
would ‘[cultivate] a South Africa of greater equality and justice, 
so that ordinary South Africans can access their citizenship in 
more meaningful ways without having to scapegoat migrants’ 
(Nyamnjoh 2006:79). How to do this is less clear and beyond the 
scope of a single chapter to discuss, and finding a solution to the 
socio-economic problems citizens face, is not the aim of this 
chapter. The focus is rather on the precarious situation in which 
foreigners find themselves and how to remedy it. A good place 
would be to start rethinking our notions of belonging, citizenship 
and foreignness. This chapter will deal with two areas in which 
this should take place. Firstly, with regards to our state’s borders 
and the accompanying notion of nationhood; and secondly, with 
regards to the rights enshrined in the Constitution within the 
context of a universal human rights regime.
Achille Mbembe (2015) sees xenophobia as a form of ‘national-
chauvinism’ and, indeed, it often rests on an idea of foreignness 
or the idea that someone does not belong on this side of the 
nation’s borders. South Africa’s borders take on a special 
meaning – a physical separation between the ‘superior’ South 
Africa and the ‘inferior’ Dark Continent (see Nyamnjoh 2006 for 
a discussion on the racially charged prejudices South Africans 
hold towards other African nationals). In my first section, I will 
question whether a country’s borders should be seen as a fixed 
divider between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
There are, to my mind, at least three reasons why we should 
question nationalist assumptions that rely on the idea of fixed or 
Chapter 8
199
closed borders: firstly, their ever-changing nature; secondly, in 
South Africa, specifically, their colonial roots; and thirdly, the 
(perhaps controversial) question whether democratic self-
determination is, in fact, democratic. The final point will be the 
focus of the section, and drawing on Abizadeh (2008) and 
Carens (1987). I will show why the power of states to determine 
their own borders is limited and why the exclusion of individuals 
should be justified to those individuals.
The second assumption, which I will question, is that the rights, 
contained in South Africa’s Constitution, are only applicable to 
citizens. On the contrary, these rights should be seen as human 
rights and should therefore be guaranteed by the state for 
everyone in South Africa (as, indeed, the preamble to 
the  Constitution implies). This situates the Constitution and 
the democratic state within the international human rights regime 
which further limits the sovereign power of states. The question 
then arises how a modern democratic state should resolve the 
tension between its sovereign rights and its commitment to 
human rights and cosmopolitan norms. Benhabib (2004; 2006) 
suggests ‘democratic iteration’ as a means to mediate the 
tension, and to make cosmopolitan norms relevant and 
applicable  to particular contexts such as the norms regulating 
membership to a political community or a state. Along with 
Benhabib, I argue that we need to rethink our membership norms 
and make membership more readily available to foreigners to 
protect them against xenophobic discrimination or attacks.
This chapter will offer no solutions or final answers to questions 
on migration, immigration or refugeehood. The aim of the chapter 
is neither to give a comprehensive account of migration-related 
issues in South Africa nor an empirical account. My aim is merely 
to cast light on certain assumptions which, if left unquestioned, 
are unjustified, exclusionary and potentially dangerous. It should 
be read as the first step or a small step towards a rethinking of 
our national identity – of borders and notions of belonging, and 
of the foreigner in our midst.
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Borders and belonging
It is easy to assume the naturalness of borders from the 
inevitability of borders. Every distinction drawn, in all areas of 
life, is a border or an act of inclusion and exclusion. We erect 
borders between species (a cat cannot be a dog), between 
academic fields, musical genres, and cuisines. The mistake we 
make is in thinking that this inevitability implies that all borders 
are necessary, natural or set in stone. While a cat cannot be a 
dog, a brief consideration of the other examples, mentioned 
above, indicates that borders can be flexible or porous. We can, 
for example, conceive of a piece of music that combines elements 
of pop and jazz. It may be pointed out that these kinds of 
distinctions differ in important ways from the distinctions or 
borders drawn between states. I do not deny this. However, there 
are important reasons why the borders of states or political 
borders can and should also be questioned. Firstly, even the 
briefest overview of world history should convince one that there 
is nothing ‘set in stone’ about the borders of any state. Secondly, 
the borders of South Africa are a legacy of colonialism and 
apartheid. Thirdly, borders of a democratic country are often 
seen as an expression of the people’s democratic right to self-
determination; yet, it is not clear that the exercise of this right is 
truly democratic.
The first two points are straightforward. From a historical 
perspective, it seems unreasonable to assume that there is 
anything permanent or necessary about state borders. Even in 
areas where states had relatively homogenous populations, as 
with European nation states before the European Union and 
large scale immigration, the borders were formed through war, 
conquest and political alliances, and, consequently, they changed 
relatively frequently (one need only think of the territorial 
evolution of Germany during the 20th century). South Africa’s 
borders are no exception.
The political shape of South Africa, and indeed Africa, is a 
product of colonialism and the ‘Scramble for Africa’ when African 
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territories were subdivided by colonial European powers with no 
regard to existing territorial boundaries. These borders remained 
intact after liberation, even when regarded as ‘artificial borders’ 
(Nkiwane 1993:67). The creation of artificial states, most often 
through colonisation, but also through post-war treaties, throws 
together or divides ethnic, tribal and religious groups with no 
consideration of the individual groups’ aspirations (Alesina, 
Easterly & Matuszeski 2011:245). While there have been some 
attempts at succession from the colonially defined states (the 
short-lived Biafra or, more recently, South Sudan), in many cases 
the colonial borders are not only kept intact, but held sacrosanct 
(Alesina et al. 2011:251). Kwame Anthony Appiah (1998) argues 
that even the idea of ‘Africa’ is a product of colonialism and the 
European imagination. For most of human history, the peoples of 
Africa did not think of themselves as ‘African’ (Appiah 1998):
[T ]hrough the long ages of human cultural life […] most people in the 
continent have lived in societies that defined both self and other by 
ties of blood or power. It would never have occurred to most of the 
Africans in this long history to think that they belonged to a larger 
human group, were defined by a shared relationship to the African 
continent […] Only recently has the idea of Africa come to figure 
more importantly in the thinking of many Africans and those that 
took up this idea got it, by and large, from European culture. (p. 256)
Appiah’s point is not that we should no longer think in terms 
of ‘Africa’ or ‘African’, but that we should be aware of the 
history behind the idea and the danger of thinking of ‘Africa’ 
as a unity with a homogenous culture: ‘[T]he central cultural 
fact of African life, in my judgement, remains not the sameness 
of Africa’s cultures, but their enormous diversity’ (Appiah 
1998:257). Similarly, we should recognise that African states’ 
borders are, for the most part, products of colonialism. 
Furthermore, as we should question the idea that there is some 
essence or unity underlying ‘African’ culture, we should also 
question the supposed unity of nations (be it Nigerian, South 
African or Rwandan). Each state in Africa is home to a diversity 
of cultural groups and many of these groups were crossed by 
the colonial borders. These complexities pose a serious 
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challenge to the simplified nationalist discourses of ‘us’ and 
‘them’, ‘South African or citizen’ and ‘foreigner’.74
Taking this into account, South Africa, as a territory, is ‘the 
product of Western imaginings’ and ‘[t]he power to carve out 
South Africa as a distinctive space was […] an act of great 
violence and force’ (Vale 2002:15). The borders have more or 
less remained the same for the past century, following the joining 
of the British colony to the Boer Republics after the South African 
War. This carving out of South Africa’s territorial boundaries ‘was 
patently linked to understandings of race superiority and spurred 
forward by the irresistible arguments of the purse’ (Vale 2002:15). 
If the decolonisation project is to be taken seriously, it should 
also account for this colonial and apartheid legacy. The space 
and idea of ‘South Africa’ should be questioned and the idea of a 
South African identity should be questioned. Given the high 
prevalence of xenophobic attitudes and violence across all 
sectors of South African society, it seems that this questioning is 
not really taking place.
To my mind, these two brief points should at least convince 
one that one should be sceptical of arguments that rest on 
assumptions that borders are, in any way, natural, permanent or 
neutral such as anti-immigration arguments for closed borders. 
However, there is a more serious challenge to my claim that 
borders should be questioned: The sovereign right of the state 
and, related to that, a people’s right to democratic self-
determination. These two rights are often called upon to justify 
immigration control. Benhabib (2005:673) says that whenever 
an individual or group of people crosses a border into a 
74. Nationalism has, of course, played an important role in anti-colonial liberation struggles 
(see Fanon 2004 for a discussion in this regard). In South Africa, the post-apartheid nation-
building project aimed at creating unity between the separated and antagonistic groups. 
While the intention behind calls for a unified ‘rainbow nation’ was well meant, it had two 
serious negative effects: firstly, it lead to a rise in xenophobia (see Nyamnjoh 2006); and 
secondly, it obscured many of the existing racial and hierarchical inequalities between 
citizens (for a recent criticism and discussion, see Gqola 2017:18–24).
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democratic state, we are made aware of the ‘constitutive 
dilemma’ at the heart of our liberal democracies: the tension 
between the state’s right to sovereign self-determination, and 
universal human rights principles.
Sovereignty and democratic 
self-determination75
Democratic self-determination refers to the right democratic 
citizens have to decide on the structure and future of their 
society. Immigration inevitably impacts that future: ‘decisions 
about whom to admit, how many to admit, and what the terms of 
admission should be are all important matters for a democracy 
to decide’ (Miller 2016:154). Political communities are established 
through acts of self-determination, when a group of individuals 
decide to become a people. In so doing, the ‘people’ erect a 
border between them, the insiders, and those not included, the 
outsiders. This act of self-determination is an act of inclusion and 
exclusion which is justified to those included, as it expresses their 
common will, but importantly not to those who are excluded 
(Cilliers 2014:138).
Democratic states as self-determined communities hold two 
ideals: firstly, self-governance; and secondly, a territorially 
circumscribed nation-state (Benhabib 2005:673). Within its own 
borders, the state is the ‘final and absolute authority in the 
political community’ (Hinsley 1989:1). Benhabib (2009) refers to 
those who argue for absolute sovereignty as the sovereigntist 
territorialists, of which there are two broad categories: nationalist 
and democratic. Nationalist sovereigntists emphasise a people’s 
right to self-determination, understanding ‘the people’ as a 
homogenous entity (an ethnos). The state’s law is an expression 
of the people’s will, legitimated by the right to self-determination.
75. This section is based on the author’s research (Cilliers 2014) she did during her MA at 
Stellenbosch University.
Borders, belonging and human rights in South Africa
204
For democratic sovereigntists, ‘the people’ is not an ethnos, but 
rather a demos (a people or political community which does not 
necessarily share a culture or ethnic nationality). In this view, laws 
are legitimate if, firstly, the people are both ‘the author and the 
subject of its laws’ (Benhabib 2009:693); and secondly, there are 
‘clear and recognised public procedures for how laws are formulated, 
in whose name they are enacted, and how far their authority extends’ 
(Benhabib 2009:693). Benhabib’s distinction between nationalist 
and democratic sovereigntism echoes, for her, Hannah Arendt’s 
distinction between nationalist claims and popular sovereignty. 
Nationalism, often connected to the idea of an ethnos, can repress 
difference as it ‘introduces categories of unity and homogeneity into 
the political sphere’ (Cilliers 2014:29), whereas popular sovereignty 
refers to ‘the democratic self-organisation and political will of a 
group of people who are not necessarily of the same nationality or 
community’ (Cilliers 2014:29). Both these forms are present in South 
Africa. While certain groups (far right Afrikaners, for example) have 
nationalist dreams, the South African citizenry could be seen as a 
demos which wilfully organised itself into a nation in 1994.
If democracy is fundamentally a government by the people 
and that government has a right to determine membership to the 
people and entrance into the territory, it may seem that the case 
is closed. South Africans think of themselves as insiders, of 
foreigners as outsiders, and of the country’s border as the dividing 
line between the two groups. However, we should not forget one 
important detail: in the act of self-determination or any subsequent 
expression of membership norms, those who are excluded from 
the group can, by definition, not partake in the act or the 
expression of such norms (Cilliers 2014:98). Abizadeh (2008) 
argues that the existence and control of democratic states’ 
borders need to be justified not only to those who are included 
(as is commonly held), but also the people who are excluded:
First, a democratic theory of popular sovereignty requires that the 
coercive exercise of political power be democratically justified to 
all those over whom it is exercised, that is, justification is owed to all 
those subject to state coercion. Second, the regime of border control 
of a bounded political community subjects both members and 
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non-members to the state’s coercive exercise of power. Therefore, 
the justification for a particular regime of border control is owed 
not just to those whom the boundary marks as members, but to 
non-members as well. (p. 45)
The theory of popular sovereignty holds that political power can 
only be legitimately exercised if it is justified to the people over 
whom it is exercised, but also by the people, in a way that views 
them as autonomous and equal beings (Abizadeh 2008:41). For 
Abizadeh, this includes those who were excluded without having 
a say in the matter, otherwise those borders would not be truly 
democratic. Either democracies have to reject their unilateral 
right to control their borders or they have to democratically 
justify the control and closure of borders to foreigners. Abizadeh’s 
justification for this claim is the unbounded nature of the demos. 
The demos can, in principle, include anyone and should therefore 
justify its exclusions (Abizadeh 2008:38).
He shows how the three main approaches in contemporary 
political theory (the Rawlsian, the Nozickian and the utilitarian) can 
support the idea of open borders. I will focus on his discussion of 
Rawlsian justice, as this illustrates the impact one’s nationality or 
place of birth has on one’s lived experiences. While Rawls (1993:41) 
assumes a closed system in which immigration is not an issue, 
Carens suggests that Rawls’s liberalist approach can be applied to 
a broader context. In the Rawlsian system, two main principles of 
justice are decided upon from behind the ‘veil of ignorance’: firstly, 
a principle guaranteeing equal liberty to all; and secondly, a 
principle that would only permit inequalities if they were to the 
advantage of the least well off in the society (the difference 
principle) (Carens 1987:255). Behind the veil, the effects of natural 
and social contingencies (such as one’s race or gender) are nullified. 
Rawls does not include nationality or place of birth in the category 
of ‘natural and social contingencies’, but Carens (1987:256) argues 
that being a ‘citizen’ or an ‘alien’ is also morally arbitrary:
[W]hether one is already a citizen of a particular state or an alien who 
wishes to become a citizen – this is the sort of specific contingency 
that could set people at odds. (p. 256)
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If we want to arrive at fair principles of justice, we should therefore 
also exclude knowledge of our membership (or non-membership) 
to any specific polity. We should ‘take a global view of the original 
position’ (Cilliers 2014:35). Furthermore, states cannot restrict 
immigration on the grounds of birthplace and parentage (which 
determine one’s citizenship).
In pointing out these challenges to states’ sovereignty, right 
to self-determination and territorial boundaries, I am not 
suggesting that we should do away with borders. There are 
many reasons why a single world state is undesirable (discussed 
below). Nor am I suggesting that South Africa should radically 
restructure its borders or somehow determine its borders 
through a process of direct democracy which includes all of 
humanity.76 This would be, to say the least, impractical. I merely 
wish to draw attention to the changing and fluid nature of 
national boundaries, and the need to constantly justify such 
boundaries to those affected by them. This, especially, needs to 
happen when people, who are already situated within our 
boundaries, are excluded from meaningful membership and 
participation, and violently so, by the ideas of nationhood, 
belonging and identity those boundaries shape. As Nyamnjoh 
(2006) writes:
[No] boundaries, no matter how taken for granted, are permanent. 
This is a source of both constant hope and constant worry, as it keeps 
alive the tensions of inclusion and exclusion, from the most local to 
the most global levels. (p. 25)
I turn to this tension in the next section.
76. For a critical discussion of Abizadeh’s position, see (Miller 2010). Miller disagrees with 
Abizadeh’s claim that borders are coercive, in the sense that they serve as impediments to 
the autonomous movements of individuals (see also Abizadeh 2010). For Miller (2015), this 
does not mean that states have no duties towards (potential) immigrants – at the very least, 
the state has a duty of care toward those at its borders seeking entrance. Analysing Miller 
and Abizadeh’s positions in depth is beyond the scope of this chapter. Abizadeh’s position 




Citizens’ rights and human rights
There is a final constraint on the right of a democratic state or 
people to control its own borders: cosmopolitan right. 
Democracies, as mentioned above, face a constitutive dilemma 
between sovereignty and self-determination, on the one hand, 
and universal human rights, on the other. The international human 
rights regime is founded on the idea of the moral equality of all 
human beings or moral cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism 
is founded on the idea that, even given our differences of 
language, culture, nationality, or religion (Kleingeld 1999):
[A]ll human beings share certain essential features that unite or 
should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders 
and warrants their designation as ‘citizens of the world’. (p. 505)
Because we share certain basic characteristics, we are equal. 
Every person, as an individual, has equal moral status with every 
other person. Every person ‘has global stature as the unit of 
ultimate moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect 
and consideration no matter what her citizenship status’ (Brock 
2011:455). This does not mean that communities and states do 
not matter in a cosmopolitan world. They just do not matter 
exclusively – they are not ‘ontologically privileged’. They do not 
have, to use Brock and Brighouse’s (2005:4) formulation, 
‘ultimate value’.
This moral cosmopolitanism then also forms the basis of South 
Africa’s Constitution and specifically the Bill of Rights. All the 
rights, contained in the Bill, are attributed to ‘everyone’, except 
the right to political rights (Section 19[1]), the right not to be 
deprived of one’s citizenship (Section 20) and freedom of trade, 
occupation and profession (Section 22). The claim that South 
Africa belongs to all who live in it or that the Bill protects the 
rights of all, is a cosmopolitan claim. Those who live in South 
Africa are not only accorded these rights because of the 
Constitution. South Africa is a member of the United Nations and 
therefore subject to international law and treaties. Such laws and 
treaties limit the sovereign rights of  states, especially when it 
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comes to how non-citizens (e.g. refugees) can be treated. This 
then sheds light on the second assumption that we need to 
rethink: We need to think of the rights, contained in the Bill, not 
as citizens’ rights, but as human rights. We need to recognise 
that foreigners also have the right to life, dignity, safety, and so 
forth.77 Yet, these rights, as universal rights, also have to be 
adapted to our local context. This section deals with the mediation 
between universal or cosmopolitan norms and particular contexts.
Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006:163) identifies three 
fundamental problems with a world state. Such a state would, 
firstly, easily accumulate uncontrollable power; secondly, be 
unresponsive to local needs; and, finally, reduce the variety of 
institutional experimentation. States curb each other’s power, 
which is needed when a nation perpetrates injustices against its 
own citizens (as in apartheid South Africa) or against other 
nations (as in warfare). In a world state, no corresponding 
recourse exists (see Nussbaum 2006:313).
Democratic iteration: A new normative map
The tension between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty is not 
one that can be solved by going one way or the other, but one 
that should be mediated. Human rights and cosmopolitan norms 
are necessary to curb the power of democratic states (e.g. to 
prevent them from mistreating refugees); yet, these rights and 
norms have to adapt to or respond to local needs. Benhabib 
(2004; 2006) offers a possible model of mediation between 
sovereign rights and cosmopolitan norms.
77. It should be noted here that not even citizens have full access to their rights and that this 
indeed leads to frustration and anger when foreigners arrive in our midst, as they are seen 
to be competing for the same rights and resources (see Nyamnjoh 2006 for discussion). 
The articulation and enshrinement of rights in legal documents, such as the Constitution, 
by no means guarantees that people will have access to those rights (and accompanying 
privileges) or that they will be able to exercise their political rights. This is another reason 
why xenophobia in South Africa can be seen as a political failure, as it is the expression of a 
citizenry deprived of their rights and political voice.
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However, international law and theories of cross-border 
interaction are still based on the Westphalian model (see Fraser 
2008:46). It is for this reason that Benhabib (2004:6) calls for a 
new ‘normative map’. Migration, as a global phenomenon, 
especially calls for this. Globally high levels of migration render 
our traditional understanding of borders inadequate, especially 
when dealing with the question of membership. Both international 
and domestic law cling to the traditional model of sovereign 
nation states, especially where the movements of (im)migrants 
are concerned. The upshot of this is that many people are left 
stateless, unprotected, or labelled ‘illegal’ – an indication that our 
current normative tools are inadequate.
In a Westphalian world, citizenship of a nation state is the 
primary, if not only, form of political membership. National 
citizenship is constituted by, firstly, a collective identity (usually 
ethnicity); secondly, the privilege of political membership; and 
thirdly, entitlement to social rights and benefits (Benhabib 
2006:45). These three constitutive elements of citizenship are 
increasingly becoming ‘unbundled’, leading to what Benhabib 
(2004:4) calls ‘disaggregated citizenship’. Porous or open 
borders, accessible international travel, the globalisation of trade 
and information-sharing, and immigration and emigration all 
influence the changing national identities. Even closed political 
communities are influenced by the wider world through electronic 
and social media (Cilliers 2014:91). National identity is no longer 
the sole or often even the primary defining factor of an individual’s 
identity (see Sen 2006).
Benhabib’s proposed that a ‘normative map’ is a 
reconceptualisation of the contradiction or tension between 
human rights norms and sovereignty. Benhabib (2004:19) 
proposes ‘democratic iteration’, a process which mediates 
between cosmopolitan norms and sovereignty. Democratic 
iteration falls within the framework of a discourse or 
communicative ethics. Benhabib relies on the Derridean notion 
of ‘iterability’ to explain how we can possibly reinterpret 
cosmopolitan norms, democratic values and cultural or 
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political symbols. ‘Iterability’ suggests that, when we repeatedly 
use a concept or symbol, we do not simply reproduce its ‘original’ 
usage, but rather, ‘[E]very repetition is a form of variation [and 
every] iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it’ 
(Benhabib 2004:179). Democratic iteration is defined as 
(Benhabib 2004):
[C]omplex processes of public argument, deliberation, and learning 
through which universalist right claims are contested and contextualised, 
invoked and revoked, throughout legal and political institutions as well 
as in the public sphere of liberal democracies. (p. 19)
Deliberative or argumentative processes take place in public 
institutions such as legislatures, the judiciary and the executive, 
but also in ‘weak’ publics such as the media (especially social 
media) and civil society organisations. The authoritative original – 
in this case, cosmopolitan human rights norms – is resignified 
and ‘transformed through the dynamic interaction between 
official legal texts and informal processes of democratic 
engagement’ (Botha 2013:841)
Benhabib (2006:48) sees democratic iteration as a form of 
jurisgenerative politics, a term she borrows from Robert Cover 
(1983:4) who argues that legal institutions are inextricably linked 
to  ‘the narratives that locate it and give it meaning’. Cover 
(1983:18) identifies the radical dichotomy between the social 
organisation of law as power, on the one hand, and law as meaning, 
on the other. Meaning is born from social activity, and therefore it 
can never by fully controlled. Due to this, meaning always has the 
potential to destabilise power. This unstable dichotomy creates 
the potential for a jurisgenerative politics. The powerful write 
and enact the laws; yet, the ‘uncontrolled character of meaning’ 
(Cover 1983:48) gives subjects some freedom to interpret the 
laws. In this way, the demos is the subject and author of the law.
Importantly, the jurisgenerative process can be positive or 
negative. A positive, creative process expands the meaning of 
rights claims and nurtures the political authorship of individuals, 
thus allowing them to make it their own, relevant to their situation, 
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by democratically deploying them (Benhabib 2006:49). Botha 
(2013:842) questions whether such a process would not 
perpetuate existing inequalities, given that those with a 
democratic voice – that is, those that are able to participate – are 
not the ones who are excluded. They are already members of the 
democratic state. I return to this issue below.
The question of membership of the demos or the ‘politics 
of membership’, is precisely the site of this jurisgenerative 
politics. The answer to this question determines who is 
included in the demos, and who is excluded. In authoring 
laws, the demos draws distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, and ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’, thus 
automatically disenfranchising some people. The distinctions 
are kept in place by the erection of borders. Benhabib 
(2004:21) argues that these distinctions and borders are 
‘fluid’ and ‘negotiable’. Democratic iteration enables us to 
constantly redefine belonging, which gives us the possibility 
of including those once excluded and seeking entry. Benhabib 
insists, however, that democracies do require boundaries 
(or borders), as long as such boundaries are fluid, porous 
and continually justified through the process of democratic 
iteration. A demos can, in theory, expand its boundaries of 
belonging to include those previously excluded, as those 
boundaries are not prescribed by a specific culture or ethnicity. 
The demos’ identity can be defined and redefined through an 
unending process of constitutional self-creation (Benhabib 
2004:177). The cosmopolitan or universal norms contained in 
the constitutions of many democratic states in reality often 
only apply to the state’s citizens. In the case of South Africa, 
not even this has happened. Many citizens are deprived 
of or prevented from exercising their basic rights. Where 
membership status remains unresolved, these norms remain 
unrealised. It is precisely in these two areas – disenfranchised 
citizens and excluded foreigners – where the identity of the 
demos should be defined, renegotiated, bounded, unravelled, 
circumscribed and rendered fluid (Benhabib 2004:178).
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Benhabib (2004:183–212) provides several examples of 
democratic iterations which illustrate how transforming 
citizenship promotes the coexistence of people from distinct 
cultures with different and often contradictory values and how 
the process of democratic iterations allows us to mediate the 
tensions created by these differences (for discussion, see Cilliers 
2014:102–104). What her examples show us is ‘the ways in which 
identities, the “symbols” of those identities and the meaning of 
human rights can be reappropriated and resignified’ (Cilliers 
2014:104).
In South Africa, multiple examples of such democratic 
iterations, large and small, can be named. One can think of the 
renaming of university buildings during the #FMF protests 
(Blignaut 2015), the other Fallist protests (Booysen 2016), the 
renaming and resymbolisation of national holidays (South African 
History Online 2014) and, perhaps the most important example 
for our purposes here, the writing of our constitution (Botha 
2013:842). The latter example is directly relevant to the question 
of migration and membership. In the following section, I will 
discuss the potential of a process of democratic iteration to alter 
our ideas of membership, belonging and foreignness. If, as 
Benhabib claims, identities can be resignified, it is conceivable 
that our idea of who belongs in South Africa or who carries that 
identity can become more fluid.
Membership norms and ideas of 
foreignness
A change in the national identity of South Africans would 
reflect  the membership norms of the country. As discussed, 
the prevalence of xenophobia in South Africa indicates that the 
country’s populace is not of the opinion that foreigners are 
welcome inside its borders – let alone as members of the South 
African political community. However, the sheer number of 
people crossing South Africa’s borders forces us to seriously 
consider the question of membership. A brief look at the country’s 
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asylum system will illustrate this point. From 2006 to 2011, 
South Africa was the host country with the highest number of 
asylum claims. In 2013, South Africa received the third highest 
number of asylum claims (following the USA and Germany), with 
70 000 asylum claims made (United Nations’ Refugee Agency 
[UNHCR] 2014:3), and in 2015 tenth highest, with 62 200 claims 
(UNHCR 2015:40). From 2008–2010 the country handled around 
200 000 asylum claims per annum. After the closure of several 
refugee reception offices, the number of cases handled decreased 
sharply in 2011 (Cilliers 2014:3).
While membership to South Africa by no means guarantees 
one’s flourishing or even safety, it does offer slightly more 
protection than non-membership. This is especially the case in 
South Africa where non-members or even, at times, certain 
members78 are subjected to not only criminal violence (faced 
by all South Africans), but also xenophobic violence.79 That 
physical violence causes a moral harm, seems evident. 
However, xenophobia also manifests in other ways: ‘ordinary 
exclusions, hierarchies, and indignities’ (Kim & Sundstrom 
2014:26). Xenophobia includes negative attitudes and beliefs 
about foreigners. The moral harm in xenophobia, according to 
Kim and Sundstrom (2014:24) lies in the fact that it excludes 
some individuals from the ‘civic mainstream’ which remains 
a  precondition for social goods such as individual agency, 
possibilities of political action, recognition of identity and the 
possibility of forming public relationships with people and 
institutions. They therefore see xenophobia as a form of ‘civic 
ostracism’ (Kim & Sundstrom 2014:26).
A crucial aspect of civic ostracism is ‘the attribution of the 
cultural alienness of a subject or the felt sense that the subject 
does not rightly belong to the nation’ (Kim & Sundstrom 2014:26). 
This is important. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
78. For example, foreigners with citizenship or permanent residency.
79. For a distinction between criminal and xenophobic acts of violence, see Muchiri (2016).
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xenophobia is not only directed at those who are foreign, but 
also at those who seem (look, sound) foreign. Research has 
shown that South African citizens’ negative attitudes towards 
foreigners are rationalised by sets of stereotypes that rest on 
specific ideas of what it means to be a South African or a foreigner 
(SAMP 2001:15). When we rethink membership, we therefore 
need to do so on two levels: firstly, legally and institutionally; and 
secondly, in terms of our beliefs of who does and who does not 
belong.
With regards to institutional membership: Benhabib 
(2004:135) argues that a sovereign state cannot deny 
membership in perpetuity. States may stipulate criteria that 
have to be met to become a member, but the criteria may not 
be of such a kind that membership can be permanently denied. 
Importantly, with ‘membership’ Benhabib does not mean 
‘citizenship’. Benhabib is arguing for a more general human 
right to membership. She (Benhabib 2004) sees it as:
[A]n aspect of the principle of right, i.e., of the recognition of the 
individual as a being who is entitled to moral respect, a being whose 
communicative freedom we must recognise. (p. 142, [emphasis in 
original])
National citizenship is no longer necessarily the sole basis for the 
ascription of rights, given the existence of international 
organisations and treaties which protect universal rights, 
transnational bodies such as the European Union, and the 
disaggregation of citizenship (Benhabib 2004:143). Le Roux 
(2009:372) shows how the disaggregation of citizenship is 
already present in South Africa’s Constitution with certain rights 
attached to everybody, while others are limited to citizens. These 
factors, Benhabib (2004:172–175) argues, would allow for 
membership on different levels: the sub-national, the national, 
the supranational and the global; thus, enabling political 
participation for non-citizens in their country or area of residence.
Le Roux (2009) offers an example of how democratic iteration, 
here understood as the interpretation and application of the 
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Constitution, can open the way for political participation by non-
citizens. He (Le Roux 2009:372) refers to several important 
Constitutional Court cases in which membership norms contained 
in the Constitution were contested and given new meaning, for 
example a court ruling that refugees who had not yet entered 
the country can be beneficiaries of the rights in the Constitution, 
or that the reservation of jobs for citizens violated the 
Constitutional rights of refugees. These rulings, however, only 
applied to the rights attached to every human being and not to 
political rights. While this would provide more security to 
migrants and refugees – the rights to equality, human dignity, 
freedom and security of the person are included, for example – it 
does not yet give migrants or refugees a political voice (as 
Benhabib would argue).
The question of who deserves the right to vote has also been 
debated and contested at the Constitutional Court. Le Roux 
(2009:373) disagrees with the court’s 2009 decision to non-
resident citizens who permanently emigrated to vote in general 
elections.80 The issue with this ruling is that it extended the right 
to vote to people who are no longer directly affected by the laws 
and politics of South Africa, but still want to ‘feel’ part of the 
country. This while non-citizen residents who are directly (and 
often violently) affected by the laws and politics of the country 
cannot vote or hope to be represented in government. Le Roux 
(2009) writes:
The right to remain engaged in the political processes of a state and 
to have a say in the making of its laws cannot be acquired as a reward 
for continued national patriotism […] it can, democratically speaking, 
only originate as a precondition of being subject to the jurisdiction of 
that state, its courts and its laws. (p. 24)
Le Roux raises an important point (which, incidentally, continues 
the process of democratic iteration started in the courtroom). 
There does seem to be some unfairness in granting voting rights 
80. His argument has an in-depth engagement with the court cases in question, but due to 
limited space I cannot repeat it here (see Le Roux 2009).
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to non-resident citizens based on nostalgic or diasporic 
patriotism; yet, not allowing it for non-citizen residents who will 
be ‘directly subject to the jurisdiction and the violence of the law’ 
(Le Roux 2009:397). Whether neither, both or only the latter 
group should be granted the right to vote (as Le Roux ultimately 
argues) cannot be debated here.81 However, this debate serves 
as a vivid example of the continuing process of interpretation 
(of  existing human rights norms) and creation (of new 
membership norms) that Benhabib proposes.
Membership on some level would or could extend political 
rights to foreigners in South Africa. As mentioned, the democratic 
decisions made by a people has an impact on the lives of those 
who are excluded from the people. Similarly, the decisions made 
by the South African citizenry and the democratically elected 
government affects, often negatively, the lives and well-being of 
foreigners living here. ‘Illegal’ foreigners are especially vulnerable, 
as they have no recourse or place to go if they are the victims of 
violence – they cannot go to the police or any other authority, as 
this will bring them and their ‘illegal’ status to the attention of the 
authorities. There is a shortage of channels through which 
immigrants can communicate their grievances (Nyamnjoh 
2006:37). Extending political membership to sub-national or 
local levels can, in part, help work against this. This requires that 
we reconsider our membership norms through a process of 
democratic iteration.
The other sphere in which membership norms should be 
rethought is that of individual beliefs and attitudes. As has 
become clear, many South Africans hold the belief that they 
belong in South Africa, while foreigners don’t (regardless of legal 
status or of what the Constitution and other institutions may 
say). Kim and Sundstrom (2014:26) acknowledge the ‘pluralist’ 
nature of xenophobia – it can take an institutional or agentive, 
81. As I pointed out above (with reference to Abizadeh), non-residence does not mean that 
a state’s laws have no effect on an individual outside the state’s borders.
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individual form. Institutional xenophobia can be direct (with 
discriminatory laws) or indirect (where the laws seem fair, but 
their interpretation and application is unjust). If one sees the law 
as an expression of the will of the people or the product of a 
jurisgenerative practice, it becomes clear why it is crucial to not 
only focus on changing institutions, but also effecting change in 
people’s beliefs about foreigners ‘not belonging’ and about 
themselves as ‘belonging’.
It is here, I believe, where Benhabib’s notion of democratic 
iteration, which she perhaps does not emphasise enough, has 
potential. Benhabib has been criticised (Waldron 2006:84) for 
overemphasising the institutional and underestimating the impact 
of quotidian interaction on the emergence and codification 
of cosmopolitan norms. Waldron argues that mundane 
interaction  – travel, commerce, interactions in the streets and 
in communities  – more effectively entrenches cosmopolitan 
norms than a bottom down or institutional approach would. 
Waldron seems overly optimistic. I do not deny that everyday 
interactions can, in some contexts, increase tolerance. Appiah 
(2006:76–77) argues that social change is the result of a gradual 
change in how we see things which in turn is ‘the consequence 
of our getting used to new ways of doing things’. To illustrate, 
he cites the increased tolerance of gay and lesbian individuals 
in Europe. However, it is not clear to me that this is necessarily 
the case in South Africa. The Rwandan genocides and the 
Bosnian war serve as glaring examples of people who lived side 
by side for ages, turning against one another. In South Africa, 
xenophobic violence erupted in communities where foreigners 
have been living and interacting with locals for years.82 Research 
on intergroup relations has shown that increased contact 
between different groups effectively works against prejudice 
82. Jonny Steinberg’s A man of good hope (2015) illustrates this. The book tells the story 
of a Somalian man who came to South Africa as a refugee and who made a living through 
spaza shops. Time and again, he would be the victim of xenophobic violence at the hand of 
his customers – some of whom he came to know very well.
Borders, belonging and human rights in South Africa
218
and promotes inclusion if the following conditions for interaction 
are met (Kumar, Nancy & Karabenick 2011):
• equal status among groups
• intergroup cooperation
• pursuit of common goals
• personal acquaintance
• intergroup friendships
• a social climate which supports intergroup contact. (p. 352)
Everyday interactions have the potential to work against 
prejudice, even xenophobic prejudice, in the right conditions. It 
is, however, clear that the conditions above are not met in many 
South African contexts. While personal relationships and 
friendships can be encouraged, we cannot rely on quotidian 
interactions alone. Such interactions, combined with institutional 
change, would have a larger impact.
One challenge to democratic iteration remains: Botha’s 
question, cited above, of whether democratic iteration could 
potentially entrench existing exclusions, given that foreigners 
are prevented from participating in the process (due to being 
physically excluded or not given a political voice). To put it 
differently: if communicative freedom (Benhabib’s term) is 
denied, how can those excluded, participate in a process of 
communication to ensure that they gain communicative freedom? 
I will make two brief suggestions of how this is possible: firstly, 
representation (Benhabib’s proposed solution); and secondly, 
grassroots protest action.
The process of democratic iteration, as a form of discourse 
ethics, faces the problem of scope (Benhabib 2004:13). Those 
who cannot participate (such as young children) or who 
are  excluded, need to rely on representatives to voice their 
interests. Foreigners would need to rely on individual politicians, 
NGOs, civil rights organisations and sympathetic citizens to give 
them voice. As with any form of representation, there is room for 
misinterpretation and mistakes. There will always be a gap between 
the representative and the represented. However, organisations 
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like the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation or the Scalabrini 
Centre in Cape Town attempt, and with some success, to do 
this through organising discussions, marches, and legal help and 
representation for refugees.
Despite Benhabib’s focus on institutional measures, her 
examples of democratic iteration (2004:183–212), specifically 
the scarf affairs, show that there is room in her theory for 
democratic iteration through protest. One recent societal 
development has changed the nature of protests: social media. 
While there are valid reasons to criticise ‘hashtag activism’, it is 
undeniable that social media has the potential to give voice or 
communicative freedom on an unprecedented scale. Through 
social media campaigns, activists and causes can garner 
support from across the globe within hours. Social media 
played a crucial role in the recent student protests – to the 
extent that many of the protests in South Africa and globally 
are given a hashtag name (#RhodesMustFall, #FeesMustFall, 
#RememberKhwezi, #BlackLivesMatter). This voice-giving 
potential should not be underestimated. Protest action also 
holds the potential to change minds, beliefs and narratives 
while also often effecting institutional change.
Conclusion
Despite South Africa’s strict immigration laws, the high levels of 
xenophobic discrimination and violence, and despite the 
Department of Home Affairs’ inadequacies, the South African 
government remains the largest asylum body in the world with 
an estimated 1 057 600 asylum seekers, outranking even the 
UNHCR (2015:44). This is a conservative estimate, as South Africa 
does not report on the numbers of unaccompanied children 
seeking asylum (UNHCR 2015:44). Migration is and has always 
been a fact of life. Laws prohibiting immigration, policies which 
ensure that asylum is not granted, and even walls erected 
between countries will not prevent people from crossing borders 
if the conditions on their side of the border are bad enough. 
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Democratic states have to find a humane solution which respects 
human rights norms.
The treatment of foreigners in South Africa by the state, the 
police or citizens, is often not humane. This poses a threat to the 
safety of everyone within South Africa’s borders as well as to 
the social, political and economic stability of the country. It is 
imperative that we address the issues of immigration, 
refugeehood and xenophobia in ways that do not incite violence 
or fuel hateful prejudices. I have suggested two areas which we 
need to rethink or critically analyse: South Africa’s borders (as a 
dividing line between us and them, and a determinant of 
belonging) and our ideas about rights. I have shown why we 
cannot use our borders as an argument to keep others out, 
because the origins of South Africa’s borders are questionable 
as is their seemingly democratic nature. The claim that borders 
need to be democratically justified to those excluded by them 
is, perhaps, not one that is widely accepted. This question 
therefore offers fertile ground for further study.
To ensure the safety and well-being of foreigners in South 
Africa, their human rights have to be guaranteed. This cannot be 
done while citizens (who are often also disenfranchised and 
consequently resentful of foreigners wanting a share) view the 
rights in the Bill of Rights as citizens’ not human rights. Human 
rights, having a universal character, limit the power of sovereign 
states. This leads to a tension between sovereignty and 
cosmopolitanism – one which I (following Benhabib) suggested 
we mediate through a process of democratic iteration: formulating 
and applying universal rights in such a way that they answer to 
local needs. This would ensure that foreigners have rights, while 
not taking away the democratic voice of citizens.
The discussion then leads to the question of membership as a 
right that can be extended, and as a product of being ‘allowed in’ 
and seen as belonging. Democratic iteration allows us to 
rearticulate membership norms to be more inclusive. Reform on 
the level of membership norms would lead to institutional reform, 
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which in turn could ensure that foreigners are more protected 
and secure. Democratic iterations and reformulated membership 
norms would not only enable foreigners (specifically vulnerable 
ones such as refugees) to gain entry to the state; these strategies 
could also extend political membership of the state to them 
through giving them access to and a voice in political processes. 
Whether this is possible and how it is to be done, should perhaps 
be investigated by policy-makers and legal scholars, and not a 
philosopher.
The limited scope of this chapter did not allow for an in-depth 
critical analysis of Benhabib’s position. Benhabib has, for example, 
been criticised for not providing a new normative map, but 
merely a reformulation of old universalist ideals (see Honig 
2006). I have briefly considered these criticisms elsewhere (see 
Cilliers 2014), but there is room for further study to see what is 
practically possible, how effective grassroots activism can be in 
bringing about change both in institutions and in people’s beliefs 
and whether cosmopolitan norms can be reiterated in such a 
way that they become responsive to contexts other than the 
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On the 27th of April, South Africans annually celebrate Freedom 
Day. This day commemorates South Africa’s first democratic 
elections held on 27 April 1994 that heralded in a new era in our 
nation’s (hi-)story. Twenty-three years later, a new generation of 
South Africans, the so-called born frees, have entered the higher 
education spaces and job markets of South Africa and the world. 
It is clear that this generation of young South Africans, like many 
before them, have a different outlook on the future and 
possibilities of our country.
Nowhere does this play out as clearly as in the #FMF protests, 
discussions and deliberations that took place from 2015 onwards. 
Although the higher education space has seen many changes 
since 1994, including mergers between institutions, a considerable 
growth in student numbers, restructuring, turmoil and racially 
charged incidents, it can be argued that the student protests, 
formed in 2015 and 2016 under the broad banner of the #FMF 
movement(s), are perhaps the most significant protests that 
came from the ranks of the youth in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The significance is found on two levels. On the one hand, it 
directly impacts on the higher education sector – on how we 
govern, what we teach and what the impact of this sector is and 
should be on South Africa. On the other hand it impacts on the 
political sphere and dynamics in South Africa. As will be argued 
in this chapter, the impact of #FMF, as such, is ongoing and will 
continue to impact on the mentioned levels.
In this chapter I will explore the reasons behind and the impact 
of #FMF in more detail. The notions of student massification, 
decolonising knowledge, curriculum renewal and the role of 
universities in a democratic dispensation in the context of (South) 
Africa will receive specific mention.
In the final instance, attention will be given to the possibilities 
created by #FMF and how these possibilities can perhaps 
positively impact on active citizenship and post-apartheid 
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politics in South Africa. I will argue towards what can perhaps be 
a beneficial outcome of the protests, discussions and deliberations 
on South Africa by highlighting the future impact of universities 
on our nation.
A broad overview of the higher 
education sector in post-apartheid 
South Africa
After the end of apartheid, the higher education space in South 
Africa changed dramatically. Given the multitude of education 
systems and structures reserved for the specific racial or cultural 
groups in South Africa the first democratic government 
consolidated, integrated, merged and, such as in the case of 
education colleges, closed down a number of institutions. This in 
itself changed the higher education space dramatically. Aligned 
with its apartheid policies, South Africa previously had universities 
reserved for white, black, Indian and mixed race84 citizens.85 Post-
apartheid, the environment makes a distinction between 
Historically White Institutions (HWIs) and Historically Black 
Institutions (HBIs) of higher learning.
Today the higher education sphere in South Africa boasts 
with traditional universities (with a focus on teaching, learning 
and research), universities of technology as well as a growing 
TVET sector. The public higher education sector in South Africa 
consists of 26 universities differentiated into 11 general academic 
(learning, teaching and research oriented) universities, nine 
comprehensive universities and six universities of technology.86
84. In the context of South Africa the term coloured is used as a historic classification of a 
race group. It is thus uniquely used in this context and should thus not be confused with the 
term ‘mixed race’. 
85. The same applies to technical colleagues, training colleges and schools. 




Directly linked to the economic realities of South Africa the 
resources of the various institutions differ dramatically and so 
does the direct financial investment of the national government. 
As such, the higher education sector is characterised by 
inequality. Nuraan Davids and Yusif Waghid remind us that, 
following the post-1994 mergers in the higher education sphere 
and here, specifically, how it played out between 1996 and 
2005, students flocked to the better resourced universities, thus 
leaving a lower number of enrolled students at the historically 
under-resourced institutions (Davids & Waghid 2016:n.p.). With 
the increase in the number of higher education institutions and in 
light of changing funding models, it remains to be seen how this 
will play out in the future.
As is the case in many other countries, the autonomy of the 
universities, in relation to the government, always comes to the 
fore. One should remember that South Africa’s top universities 
are all government subsidised and private institutions enrol 
only  a small number of students. However, the idea of 
autonomy  and academic freedom has been part of ongoing 
debates around policy changes and implementation, funding 
models and appointment processes, among others, within the 
higher education sector.
A further, and perhaps the largest, change in the higher 
education sphere is the ongoing process of massification at our 
institutions. Massification in the context of higher education 
refers to a mass increase of student numbers enrolled at 
institutions. South Africa follows a worldwide trend. Or, as 
Luescher (2016)87 notes, the:
[O]ngoing process of higher education expansion in Africa has 
involved an increasing commodification and privatisation of higher 
education, including the establishment of new public institutions and 
the mushrooming of private institutions. (p. 27)




All over the continent higher education is being transformed 
from a privilege of the few to the right of many (Luescher 
2016:33). This stands at the heart of massification as it plays out 
in higher education, specifically in the so-called developing 
world.
In the context of South Africa it had two apparent implications, 
namely a growth in the number of students at our universities 
that, among others, had, as effect, shifts in institutional cultures, 
specifically at the HWIs. The other direct implication is the 
perceived role of universities in the country, and here the impact 
of universities on society, also through graduates, is highlighted.
South Africa has specifically seen a dramatic growth in the 
number of black students at our universities. With massification 
tends to come commodification. In the context of South Africa, a 
university degree can be seen as a ticket into the middle class 
unlike any other educational or experience related industry 
(Southall 2016:119).
Table 9.1 highlights the enrolment numbers at universities and 
technicon’s between 1993 and 1999 in South Africa (Council on 
Higher Education in South Africa 1998/1999:15).88
By comparison, the following table (Table 9.2) shows the total 
number of enrolled students at South Africa’s public universities, 
technicon’s and comprehensives between 2009 and 2014 
(Council on Higher Education in South Africa 2014:3).
88. The data for 1994 is not provided in this specific source. The reason is unknown. 
TABLE 9.1: Highlights of the enrolment numbers at universities and technicon’s between 
1993 and 1999 in South Africa.
Higher education sector Years
1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Universities 193 000 252 000 260 000 261 000 260 000 245 000
Technicon’s 96 000 126 000 140 000 153 000 152 000 141 000
Total 289 000 378 000 400 000 414 000 412 000 386 000 
Source: Council on Higher Education in South Africa 1998/1999:15.
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The tables show towards a dramatic growth in the number of 
enrolled students at our universities since 1995. This number is 
still increasing.
As is to be expected, the worldwide effect of massification in 
higher education impacts on the shifts in the institutional cultures 
of institutions and perceived roles of universities in society. This is 
particularly true in societies where the doors of higher education 
are opened to marginalised groups as is the case in South Africa 
and on the rest of the African continent (Van Wyk 2009). Political 
shifts, economic challenges and a higher level of unemployment 
puts further pressure on the higher education environment, as it is 
believed that this sector is perhaps in the best position to allow 
young people the opportunity towards economic stability.
Shifts in institutional cultures at universities in South Africa are 
specifically true at HWIs. In the context of South Africa where, due 
to the apartheid system, the legacy of HWIs and HBIs has, as a 
consequence, specifically experienced a growth in the number 
of black, mixed race and Indian students at the HWIs. Given the 
deep-rooted nature of institutional cultures, specifically at 
universities, this shift has, at times, gone hand in hand with 
institutional efforts of self-renewal and protests (in various ways 
and forms), specifically at the HWIs. These shifts have also been 
connected to transformation at the mentioned institutions and has 
gone hand in hand with the notion that an increasingly diverse staff 
cohort at the institutions, should feel welcome (Van Wyk 2009:339).
TABLE 9.2: Total number of enrolled students at South Africa’s public universities, 
technicon’s and comprehensives between 2009 and 2014.
Enrolled students Years
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
African 547 686 595 963 640 442 662 123 689 503 679 800
Mixed race 55 101 58 219 59 312 58 692 61 034 60 716
Indian 53 629 54 537 54 698 52 296 53 787 53 611
White 179 232 178 346 177 365 172 654 171 927 166 172
Unknown 2131 5858 6383 7608 7447 8855
Total 837 779 892 943 938 200 953 373 983 698 969 154
Source: Council on Higher Education in South Africa (2014:3).
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Luescher (2016:34) notes that an increase in the diversity of 
the student population has as outflow a clear view of differences 
in the student body linked to, among others, class, race, gender, 
ethnicity, ideology, et cetera – all forms of gender politics that 
have a direct impact on campus politics. This sense of difference 
(identity politics) at times leads to friction among students on 
our university campuses. Numerous examples of this come to 
mind, for example the Reitz incident at the University of the Free 
State in 2007 and the Black Facing incidents at the University of 
Pretoria and Stellenbosch University in 2014.89
It is in light of a growth in numbers (massification), deliberate 
shifts in institutional cultures and a renewed understanding of 
the value of a university degree (commodification) in times of 
economic decline in South Africa that the #FMF movement 
should be understood. What we should also understand is 
that  the mentioned movement was not the first wave of 
student protests in post-apartheid South Africa. Due to its 
impact, it should, however, be seen as the most impactful thus 
far, as it, among others, shook the South African government 
(Booysen 2016:1).
Chikane and Godsell (2016) go one step further when they 
note the following:
In South Africa, two levels of problems, permanent throughout the 
history of HBIs, began to be reflected on HWI campuses. One level was 
the problems of poverty: students lacking food, transport, housing 
and books, on campuses where many staff still expected students 
to have middle class resources. The other level is the problem of 
students who are now ostensibly welcomed on HWIs campuses, 
but discover that they still have no agency or identity. Their delight 
at getting through the gate changed to despair and anger as they 
realised that their outsider status and inability to change things, or 
event to act, remained unaltered. (p. 60)
89. See in this regard the Report of the Ministerial Committee on transformation and 
social cohesion and the elimination of discrimination in public higher education institutions 
compiled by Prof. Craine Soudien (2008).
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For the conversations to allow for the possibility of deep change 
at our institutions, it is important that academics and professional 
support staff take note of this. An understanding of the mentioned 
reality should however not mean the voice of the minorities 
(white, mixed race and Indian students) should be drowned out 
of debates and discourses that affect all students.
South Africa’s universities often resemble university models 
and identities similar to those of the so-called Western world. 
Given the roots of our institutions of higher learning, this is 
understandable. But in the post-apartheid reality and in a space 
where we want to stay relevant to the challenges of our time, we 
will have to renew and deliberately change our institutional 
outlooks and characters, or as Ramphele (2008) notes:
It is to be expected that institutions founded by white males for white 
males would have very strong male cultures. Academic institutions 
worldwide reflect an ethos flowing from the dominant roles that 
men have played as students, teachers and researchers. In South 
Africa’s case, our socio-political history has left a deep imprint on the 
higher-education landscape. Racism, sexism, and authoritarianism 
are deeply imbedded in the cultures of many institutions. Changing 
these cultures requires systematic processes to minimise the risks of 
driving undesirable elements underground. (p. 210)
Any conversation about transformation in the sphere of higher 
education at our public universities should understand and 
critically engage with the historical realities of the institution(s). 
It is perhaps exactly because we did not realise this that the 
impact of #FMF has been more powerful and relevant.
Understanding the #FMF era
#FMF should be understood as a deliberate attempt of students 
to create agency and to bring about change in order to bring 
about a better dispensation, specifically for groups at our 
universities that are marginalised and denied open access to the 
resources, opportunities and possibilities. This was done mainly 
through protests, conversations and policy shifts linked to, 
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among others, student fees, the outsourcing of workers at 
universities, gender-related matters, changes in institutional 
cultures, intersectionality, language exclusion and changes in the 
curriculum. The movement and its effect played out differently 
at the various higher education institutions in South Africa. 
Although the issues of fees and access to institutions of higher 
learning stood central in the movement, it clearly was not only 
about the increase in student fees.
Davids and Waghid (2016:n.p.), among others, help us to 
understand that the #FMF era was not the start of fee-related 
protests in South Africa. In their understanding, the latest wave 
of student protests mostly took place at HWI’s and, as such, 
received more media attention as the impact of the protests 
where more directly felt (Davids & Waghid 2016:n.p.). Although 
this might be true, it remains important to understand, value and 
interpret the #FMF era also because of its possible impact not 
only on the higher education sector, but on South Africa as a 
whole.
According to Booysen, #FMF grew from the #RMF movement 
at the University of Cape Town (Booysen 2016:2). This gave 
rise  to a multitude of ‘variations of Fallism’ over a period of 
time,  including university specific movements such as 
#OpenStellenbosch, #TransformWits, et cetera (Booysen 
2016:2–3). She (Booysen 2016:2–3) agrees that the #RMF and 
#FMF should be seen as a continuation of a series of protests 
against financial exclusion at HBIs over many years.
The South African #FMF movement is not unique by any 
means – neither in terms of its intended outcomes, its foci, nor in 
its structure. In this regard Booysen (2016) notes the following:
In line with (these) international-left trends, the entwined #RMF-
#FMF (like their new black consciousness left ‘antecedent’ of half a 
century earlier), membership range from small numbers of arsonist 
militants to a radical peaceful mainstream, and many thousands of 
moderates (including silent moderates). Almost all participants are 
under forty. They do campaigns rather than constitute organisations, 
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and often fragment within months. While in real-time touch by social 
and digital media across the country #FMF comprises campus-wide 
movements that integrate a host of campus-specific organisations, 
rather than being national in specifics. (p. 12)
Ample examples of the abovementioned were witnessed during 
#FMF protests on various university campuses in South Africa in 
2015 and 2016. Booysen’s comments were made early in 2016 
and relate to the first wave of protests in 2015. However, the 
second wave (in 2016) of protests had a very clear and deliberate 
national focus and strong links between universities. Students 
across the country pushed towards a national shutdown of 
universities in an attempt to put even more pressure on 
government to resolve their grievances. For a period the South 
African news was dominated by scenes of arson and violence at 
our university campuses as students rallied and pushed for a 
response from the national government, the SAPS and private 
security companies brought in by various universities.
#FMF protests and conversations also signalled the end of 
conversations about transformation and led in the era where 
stakeholders realised that they themselves should work towards 
transforming South Africa’s universities (Chikane & Godsell 
2016:57). As such the old understanding of gradually working 
towards transformation, driven by university management 
structures at our institutions, came to a halt, or as Chikane and 
Godsell (2016) note:
The university unrest of 2015 can be traced to the continued use of 
tempered discussions as proxy conversations for transformation. 
These conversations maintained the status quo. For students, the 
proxy conversations took the form of race discussions or workshops, 
university admissions policy debates and the nature of SRC and 
management interactions. For academic staff, the discussion took the 
proxy of employment equity targets, academic tenure and the ever-
present argument about quantity vs quality. For workers on campus the 
discussions were about negotiating outsourcing agreements. (p. 57)
Of further note is the fact that, at the core of the campus-wide 
movements, there was no link between the broader movement 
and mainstream political parties. This seems to be deliberate, 
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perhaps also in an attempt to reject the idea that post-apartheid 
politics can fully comprehend and address the current challenges 
(specifically of the youth) in South Africa. Political parties 
responded and tried to rally behind students, but time and time 
again this was rejected with discontent on university campuses. 
This could be seen in the reaction of students to political party 
representatives trying to meet with them at university campuses 
during the #FMF protests as well as during a student-led march 
to Luthuli house in 2015.90
It should be remembered that protests, and specifically 
student protests, are not unique to South Africa (Van Rooi 2016). 
It is thus important to place student protests in South Africa 
within Africa and the global context of student protests. In this 
regard, Hewlett et al. (2016) make an important observation:
The post-independence period in Africa, from the 2000s to the 
present day, is characterised by two main driving forces towards 
higher education and their consequences for student protests. 
The first set of drivers, external to Africa, includes globalisation, 
with African universities linked to the wider global communities, 
liberalisation, privatisation, and regime change. The second set of 
drivers, internal to the fast-changing dynamics of Africa, includes 
increasing poverty, inequality, access challenges, social change, the 
politics of multiparty democracy and the emergence of different 
culturally, socially and politically driven student movements. (p. 156)
The topic of transformation at our university campuses has 
changed considerably after #FMF. The old debate about 
maintaining standards versus transformation seems to have 
lost its value, mostly also because the idea of what we strive 
towards has changed. The norms of excellence has shifted to 
the extent that it is understood that transformation is no 
longer  a nice-to-have non-essential element of change. True 
transformation is seen as a necessary way to enhance the 
excellence of higher education institutions. This not only applies 
to the value of research outputs at our institutions, but also to 
90. In this regards see ENCA (2015). 
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how we impact society and to the specific attributes that 
students leave institutions with.
However, (radical) transformation cannot be driven in a rigid 
manner. Ramphele (2008:197) reminds us: ‘(F)or many activists 
transformation means replacing the old order with a new one, 
which for them amounts to replacing white male dominance with 
greater representation of black people’. As such we will have to 
continue to find new ways to engage on the topic of transformation 
at our institutions of higher learning in South Africa. As will be 
noted in the section below, the decolonisation process might, 
however, help us in this process.
Black consciousness and 
decolonising knowledge
At the heart of the #FMF philosophy stands the idea of thinking 
new and differently about how knowledge is produced and 
shared in a realm where Africa and blackness stand in the centre. 
As such, the notion of decolonisation (of knowledge, spaces and 
attitudes) and black consciousness takes in centre stage in 
debates around and requests for institutional renewal. The 
impact of the movement, as a whole, placed, in the centre, the 
experiences of young black adults (black bodies), in particular at 
HWIs (Chikane & Godsell 2016:58).
According to Booysen (2016:13), the #FMF movement has 
ideological roots connected to the Black Power Movement in the 
United States of America and the Black Consciousness Movement 
in South Africa. It is therefore no wonder that the names, slogans 
and ideas of, among others, Franz Fannon, Achille Mbembe, 
Steve Biko, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and others popped up regularly 
in slogans and discussions during the #FMF protests. As such, 
students wanted to rediscover post-colonial thought through 
the work of black consciousness scholars. Whether students 
always interpreted the mentioned notions correctly, specifically 
in a historical sense, can be debated. This debate is continuing 
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post #FMF with prominent South African and international 
academics, including Jonathan Jansen, adding their voices to the 
necessary debate. However, it was clear that the #FMF period 
led in a new discovery of the notion of what Biko (2004) describes 
as follows:
[I]n essence the realisation of the Black man [sic] of the need to 
rally together with his [sic] brothers [sic] around the cause of their 
operation – the blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group in 
order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual 
servitude. (p. 53)
At the heart of the decolonisation debate and processes stands 
the project of curriculum change and renewal at most universities 
in South Africa. Post #FMF, this conversation and process 
remains ongoing. Given the nature of academic processes, it has 
become clear that defining decolonisation and bringing about 
curriculum changes, linked to this notion, has become part of 
‘normal’ curriculum renewal processes at most institutions. 
However, many scholars would agree that the forceful nature of 
the protests put the notion of curriculum renewal and a 
deliberately decolonial review of curricula at the centre of a 
conversation that would, most probably, otherwise not have had 
the depth of current conversations and processes. Stellenbosch 
University, like other universities, has formulated reports and 
policies that guide the curriculum renewal conversations (SU 
Decolonisation Report by Stellenbosch University 2016).
The curriculum renewal process cannot take place in isolation 
from other on-campus experiences. In this regard institutional 
values, changes in institutional cultures, symbols on campus, 
gender and class discrepancies, et cetera form part of the 
conversations. Nyamnjoh (2016) states the following:
An intersectional approach to decolonisation is of critical importance, 
one that takes on board how hierarchies premised on factors beyond 
race – factors such as gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, geography 
and generation – render more complex and layered the form 
decolonisation should take to be meaningful to all and sundry social 
categories seeking it. (p. 135)
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According to Chikane and Godsell (2016:59), it is of interest to 
note how the process of curriculum renewal actually brought 
together the process of radical curricular transformation, black 
consciousness and radical black feminism. For the first time in 
post-apartheid South Africa, a debate of intersectionality came 
to the fore – a conversation that will not only continue on our 
university campuses, but also in the public domain in general – at 
least in the foreseeable future.
The process of decolonisation cannot only be a ‘project’ within 
the higher education space. It must become part of our national 
discourse in order for us to redefine the South African idea, our 
interrelatedness as well as our future outlook as a country in the 
south of Africa. As a nation we are starting to see signs of a 
larger conversation emerging in public spaces. Nyamnjoh 
(2016:130) reminds us in this discourse that we will have to 
critically evaluate the notion of decolonisation, aligning it to 
African values. In the process of decolonisation, Nyamnjoh (2016) 
poses the following questions:
When is decolonisation more than simply opening up to engage with 
African and South African issues, knowledge and epistemology? 
What reason is there to quibble about making knowledge production 
focused on South Africa and Africa, and therefore not imply that it 
thinks, teaches and relates to the world from the vantage point of 
being South African and African? What manner of transformation 
is sufficiently accommodating of the complexities and nuances of 
being South African or African [...]. (p. 131)
As was seen during the #FMF protests, the notion of decolonisation 
often became a tool used to disempower others and thus, at 
times, denying a variety of voices and opinions around this topic 
to emerge. This has and can continue to lead to a discourse, 
imbedded in identity politics where the ‘victim’ stands against 
the ‘oppressors’ in a new type of power hierarchy, counter to the 
ideals of decolonisation. Nyamnjoh (2016) sounds a stern warning 
when he notes the following:
Blackness as an attribute of being a particular type of human, whether 
ascribed, achieved or imposed, is not the monopoly of any particular 
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African country, nor of the continent. It calls for a conceptualisation 
and articulation of the decolonisation of knowledge production and 
consumption that is carefully nuanced to provide for the complex 
intersections of race, ethnicity, geography, class, gender and 
generation. Even at our most legitimately aggrieved, we cannot afford 
to resort to the zero-sum games of dominance of the oppressors, as 
this would only compound our subservience and predicament. (p. 137)
More is of the opinion that, should we truly want to understand 
and value the idea of black consciousness, we should understand 
its roots and manifestations, specifically in Africa, the Caribbean 
and the United States of America (More 2014:177). He also 
reminds us that, at its heart, black consciousness:
[F]ocuses (on) black resistance to white racism and white supremacy, 
black racial solidarity, group self-reliance, pride in black (African) 
heritage, black self-love, de-alienation and de-colonisation of the 
black mind, black cultural and racial identity. (p. 177)
Perhaps, unlike other institutions and structures in the South 
African society, the education institutions, and specifically 
institutions of higher education, currently have the opportunity 
to start a deep discourse about what it means to be African in 
the context of South Africa. Our universities can lead the way in 
guiding us to create the spaces to deliberate around this topic 
that can have as outcome a stronger self-value and a society that 
refocuses on its rootedness in Africa. This, of course, is not to say 
that universities should be the only voices in this debate. It also 
is not to suggest that public universities are the obvious beacon 
of change as outcome of the discourse in South Africa. I rather 
want to suggest that institutions of higher learning create the 
platforms for South Africans, on and off our campuses, to debate, 
discuss and deliberate on the mentioned matters. This will not 
only enhance the role that our public universities can play in 
society, but it also allows our universities to transform themselves 
through the voices of those outside of its visible and invisible 
borders. For this debate to have a meaningful impact not only in 
discourse, but also in practice, it should allow all voices to be 
part of and remain part of a discourse that can deepen the social 




Most, if not all universities in South Africa pride themselves in 
being fully part of Africa, while also being directly linked with the 
realities of the global world. The idea that our universities are 
new, African spaces are becoming a common credo in the vision 
statements of institutions. But what does this mean? How should 
we start to unpack this?
Although this notion does not necessarily stem from the #FMF 
philosophy, it has found new meaning in recent debates about 
Africanness, blackness and knowledge production and sharing, 
and how our public universities fit into the context of Africa and 
the global world. A recent article by Wim de Villiers (2017:n.p.), 
Vice-Chancellor of Stellenbosch University highlights the fact 
that universities should indeed engage with the terms decolonise 
and Africanise, because it directly links to what it means to be a 
university in the context of South Africa today. De Villiers (2017) 
notes the following:
At the heart of the conversation the relevance of universities in 
acknowledging African knowledge, in relation to western knowledge, 
and how (if at all) our universities produce relevant graduates that can 
serve South Africa, with its contextual realities, while also delivering 
well-rounded global citizens (with the skills to navigate the global 
world) is tested. To be rooted in Africa means to be firmly connected 
to our continent and bearing fruit for the benefit of its people. (n.p.)
As such, it should be understood that our African groundedness 
allows us to interact with other societies, worldviews and 
contexts and that this is of specific importance when it comes to 
delivering graduates that can serve a multitude of contexts.
From the abovementioned, it also becomes apparent that 
public universities in South Africa can evaluate their identities by 
critically engaging with the notion of decolonisation. The 
intended impact will not only be on curricular renewal, but also 
on changes in institutional culture(s) and values, and, in the end, 
also on the attributes our graduates leave our campuses with. As 
mentioned previously, the notion of changing or expanding the 
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institutional cultures of our universities stand at the heart of 
needed, necessary and continued processes of transformation in 
the higher education sector in South Africa post-apartheid.
For African universities to take their place as world class 
universities, we will have to continuously reconsider our 
structures, curriculum, outputs and, of course, the students we 
deliver. As such, any conversation on decolonisation must also 
take into account the fact that institutions of higher learning are, 
at the same time, both local and global. Public universities will 
have to remain relevant, as various factors, including the world of 
work, will continuously influence our contexts. Never has what is 
taught and how we teach at universities been more relevant. 
Over the ages, this has been contested in everlasting debates 
about the role of universities in society. Whatever the outcomes 
of this swaying and sometimes dividing debate, the ever-
changing job market will continue to influence our universities.
It is exactly at this juncture that the #FMF movement 
challenged our thinking around liberal market-related values and 
output-driven cultures. Southall (2016) reminds us that, like 
schools, universities enforce the values of a capitalist system as 
she notes the following:
Today, while the top schools and universities make much of their 
pursuit of personally liberating models of education, they join the 
lower tiers of the system in almost universally gearing their practice 
to the instrumental end of enabling their learners and students to 
enter the capitalist job market. (p. 123)
This is a reality that we cannot escape and, as such, it should be 
fully part of any debate and discourse about decolonisation, 
institutional cultures at universities as well as the place and role 
of universities in the context of Africa. The debate about fee-free 
education will thus almost always be met with the rules and limits 
of the capitalist realties of our context. To what extent this can 
be challenged, remains to be seen. Perhaps, more importantly, 
this debate will allow South Africans the opportunity to engage 
with its almost split ‘two nation’ realities that face us on a daily 
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basis – a haunting reality of our post-apartheid society. Here, the 
role of higher education in bridging, dividing and creating 
opportunities for everyone and not just for a section of our 
population, will remain high on the agenda.
Chikane and Godsell are of the opinion that this deliberate 
process of finding our place and role as universities in the context 
of Africa, as it plays out in staff, student and worker discourses, 
actually stands at the heart of the #FMF protests (Chikane & 
Godsell 2016:55). As such, the #FMF movement has guided 
universities in South Africa in a process of self-renewal. If done 
correctly, this can indeed have as outflow university spaces, 
curricula and graduates that resemble something of what 
the 1994 dream of a new South Africa wanted to attain. These 
universities can also inspire graduates to fulfil a meaningful role 
in a complex society, both locally and globally, and thus leading 
a discourse about citizenship, identity and political possibilities 
that can benefit a larger portion of the South African society.
Towards a new South Africa?
As indicated in the previous sections, the #FMF movement has 
led to a new discourse in South Africa. This discourse is influencing 
not only the realities of the higher education sector, but also the 
idea of what a truly democratic South Africa looks like. As was 
the case in 1976 during the Soweto uprisings in South Africa, our 
youth (in this case, specifically our university students) are 
leading in paving the way.
But can this road lead to South Africa truly reaching what we 
wanted to do at the end of apartheid? Can it perhaps lead 
towards the true new South Africa? Two scenarios are possible. 
Scenario one has, as outflow, an angry youth that leads us on a 
rampage where populism guides discourses and where dissident 
voices have no place. This is the era of identity politics where 
there is no room for diversity and where black consciousness 
becomes the mantra for an Azania-like movement that disallows 
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difference and undervalues the principles of democracy. This 
plays out in an anarchistic manner where violence takes over 
discourse and where power is transferred and not dismantled. As 
such, deep change cannot take place and the principles of 
democracy must make way for a militaristic approach to 
leadership that is based on the will of the people in power.
In scenario two the youth guides us in re-evaluating knowledge, 
celebrating our diversity as Africans by letting go of the shackles 
of colonialism and working towards a truly democratic society. 
This scenario asks of citizens to take up their role in establishing 
strong structures, and to take part in meaningful discourse where 
power is dismantled and where the voice of the minority is 
respected. The principles of democracy are enshrined in policy 
and practice, and the political elite makes way for political 
structures that place a high premium on good governance. 
Significant in this scenario is that the gap between victim and 
oppressor91 is diminished, leading to the possibility of a more 
equal society on all levels.
Both scenarios are possible – perhaps even equally so. We 
have seen elements of both during the #FMF protests. In the first 
scenario, our university campuses remain spaces where discourse 
from a variety of perspectives are denied, identity politics drown 
out the possibility of deep, transformative change and our 
universities become the playground for extremists who determine 
the identity of the institution. In the second scenario our 
universities do not strive to be the Oxfords of the south (De 
Villiers 2017:n.p.). We let go of the notion of settlers and natives, 
and all of us truly becoming citizens. Post-#FMF debates and an 
ever-changing political landscape in democratic South Africa 
have, in recent times, allowed for discourses that include a 
multitude of voices and opinions.
91. The terms of victor and oppressor must of course be defined in any discourse. The terms 
are used here in a classical sense depicting a history of two sides, oppression and dominance. 
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Many academics have labelled #FMF as a revolt construed by 
young South Africans. Although this might be the case, one can, 
of course, also argue that, for many young South Africans, the 
actions linked to #FMF was nothing more than continuing the 
1994 idea, that is to push for the realisation of the country’s 1994 
liberation and constitutional settlement, while the political elite 
has become complacent (Booysen 2016:10). This has become 
very clear in the debates and conversations about the South 
African Constitution and its enshrined values and rights. As such, 
it has opened an important post-apartheid debate that must be 
allowed and guided by a discourse that highlights the values of 
our Constitution. Conversations about the rights of students, the 
idea of free and decolonised quality education as well what it 
actually means to be born free in South Africa, can guide a 
national discourse on the future of South Africa.
At many universities, the intensity and the continuous waves 
of protests took university managements by surprise. Universities 
were just not prepared to deal with the demands, the new notions 
of protests, the strong mobilisation, the national character of 
protests and the demands from students, for example for free 
education, changes in language polices, enrolment queries, et 
cetera. This, in itself, has had a major impact on universities and, 
in general, South Africa’s public universities are today perhaps 
better geared to deal with student queries and demands on a 
variety of levels. As mentioned in a previous section, this can 
perhaps afford our universities the opportunity to create 
platforms for valuable national discourse around matters 
highlighted during #FMF.
Davids and Waghid (2016) are of the opinion that, based on 
the needs of our country and, specifically, if we are to drown 
out  inequality in the higher education context, our university 
management structures should change. To this effect, they 
(Davids & Waghid 2016:n.p.) call on universities to allow more 
critique (also against policies and management styles), as this 
type of institutional change would allow universities to better 
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respond to the needs of society.92 This will, of course, ask for 
deep change not only in the management structures of 
universities, but in every layer of teaching, learning, research and 
living as it plays in the context of our university campuses. This 
cannot only be left to university managers to influence and 
change, but should be part of pedagogical methods and practices 
both inside and outside of the formal classroom context.
Chikane and Godsell (2016:55) go one step further when they 
note the #FMF protests indeed changed the discourse in the 
higher education space and highlighted the need for a new 
conversation, namely what the role of universities should be in 
the South Africa of today. Hidden behind this statement is an 
understanding that our public universities serve only the elite 
and that they regurgitate knowledge that serves the upkeep of 
current societal discourses and outlooks. To counter this, they 
(Chikane & Godsell 2016:55) are of the opinion that universities 
should allow for spaces where our students, workers, academics, 
et cetera must feel welcome. It is perhaps in the notion of 
welcoming and embracing diversity in all its forms that our public 
universities can change the dominant discourse(s) of our 
society(ies). This will, however, ask for deep and critical reflections 
at our university campuses and must allow for change on all 
levels – also in an attempt to deliver graduates that can serve all 
spheres of society – both locally and globally.
Perhaps the aftermath of #FMF has, as effect, a re-evaluation 
of institutional values and deliberate shift not only in terms of 
student or campus culture(s), but also on the management styles 
and cultures allowing our institutions to better align with 
worldwide trends in managerial processes and styles that allow 
for a more democratic leadership and style decision-making. 
92. ‘Educational leaders must, now more than ever, be bold. They must do the unthinkable 
and remain open to possibilities perhaps not yet explored. This also means they should be 
open to being questioned and challenged – a matter of being provoked to think differently 
in relation to the challenges of our time’ (Davids & Waghid 2016:n.p.).
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These changes must be locally relevant and in tune with the 
realities of a complex society while, at the same time, guide 
thinking that will lead us into the future.
#FMF can be seen as the catalyst in pushing institutional 
change, refocusing our institutions and exploring new identity 
markers as well as a new set of graduate attributes that have a 
positive outflow into our societies and indeed the global world. 
But for this to happen, our institutions should deliberately reflect 
on learning experiences in order to have, as effect, a deep and 
sustainable renewal that will guide our actions, values, focus 
areas and institutional cultures, leading us closer to truly 
becoming world-class institutions that not only serve global 
citizens, but are firmly grounded in local contexts.
As expressed in the abovementioned scenarios, this can have 
positive implications for our country. The fight for realising the 
1994 ideals can guide current discourses in re-evaluating our 
possibilities as a nation. Perhaps the protests against the 
president at the time, Jacob Zuma, should be seen as the next 
wave of #FMF-like protests and discourses that will intensify 
over time, bringing about deep, deliberate and sustainable 
change that will better the lives of all South Africans.
Conclusion
The youth, over all times and places, have redefined societies 
mostly through protests and other deliberate attempts to 
challenge the status quo. Although young people do not always 
take on positions of authority as part of bringing about change in 
societies, it is clear that their, sometimes forceful, action can 
bring about sustainable change that can lead to a better future. 
Clear examples exist in the context of South Africa and globally. 
In almost every arena of deep societal change over at least the 
last century, people have played a pivotal role in forcing 




In South Africa, it has become clear that the so-called ‘born 
free generation’ does not believe that South Africa is currently a 
free, open and reconciled society. It is therefore no surprise that 
the image of an over-reconciliatory Nelson Mandela is often 
criticised. To a certain degree #FMF should be understood as a 
revolt against this notion of a free, reconciled South Africa mostly 
because the signs of a deeply unequal South Africa torments yet 
another generation.
What became clear during the #FMF protests is that most 
protesters, across campuses, separated their ideals from, and 
sometimes against, political parties. This might ring in a new era 
in the relation between citizens and government (Booysen 
2016:15, 18). Perhaps a new phase in post-apartheid politics where 
protests, specifically at our universities, will most probably 
continue to determine who has the power to shape 21st-century 
South African universities (Chikane & Godsell 2016:68). South 
Africa’s liberation history will thus most probably continue to be 
shaped by the youth.
As De Villiers (2017) noted:
Shaping our universities to be more responsive to the needs of our 
time and environment is a responsibility that we should not shy 
away from. We should raise the difficult issues. But we should do so 
constructively. If we want to create a community of social justice and 
human dignity, then it is how we should also conduct ourselves in the 
open conversation about these issues. (n.p.)
This will, of course, ask of all of us to have our say in debate that 
cannot be owned by universities. It will also ask of us to critically 
interrogate terms, ideas, notions and believes in an attempt to 
navigate to the centre of the debate and to find solutions that 
will benefit not only us and our understanding, but also the 
understanding of generations to come.
We should not be mistaken in believing that the impact of 
#FMF is only visible and felt at our institutions of higher learning. 
The #FMF protests have, among others, highlighted the deep-
rooted inequality that persists in the South African society. In our 
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context, inequality has racial qualities and it is therefore no 
surprise that our prejudices are directly linked to our inequality. 
For South Africa to be truly ‘new’, we will have to continue to 
find ways to cross societal borders enshrined in inequality. In this 
regard Nyamnjoh (2016:208) warns us that, although apartheid 
has ended, we will continuously feed from it if we do not speed 
up our transformation as a nation. As such, the effect, also 
of continuous protests, will be felt in many spheres of society. 
Given our current political climate, we are perhaps currently 
experiencing the first wave of exactly this.
As citizens slowly but surely start to actively fight against the 
tendencies of the political elite, we are seeing signs of a post-
apartheid society which understands that we have to learn from 
the lessons studied and experienced over the last 23 years. If we 
do, we hope to not make the same mistakes, and thus perhaps 
reach the ideals of a truly new South Africa. Possibly this 
generation of youth is in the best position to lead us in truly 
realising this.
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In recent times, media reports indicate that incidence of violence 
in South Africa has risen to epidemic proportion (Van der Merwe 
2013:68; Pandey 2012:143). The state of insecurity across the 
nation as well as the horrific nature of many of the reported 
violent acts calls for fresh reflections and an urgent search for 
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solutions from multidisciplinary perspectives. The trauma caused 
by persistent and gruesome violence has become a permanent 
fixture in many South African homes and communities. 
Commentators have observed that South Africa has developed a 
culture of violence which can be traced largely to its (pre)
apartheid past. For example, Vorster (2013) reports that:
South Africa has a violent past dating back to the first contact 
between migrating tribes and the emergence of settlements as a 
result of the process of colonisation. Early history was characterised 
by tribal wars, wars about land, racial conflicts, internal friction 
between blacks and whites, the Afrikaners and the British and violent 
clashes between ethnic groups [...] Violence became a method of 
solving problems. (p. 3)
Vorster (2013) further notes that: 
Systemic violence increased with the official inception of apartheid 
and the simultaneous upsurge of Afrikaner nationalism. Apartheid’s 
aim was to promote white interests at the expense of the interests of 
the indigenous people. (p. 4)
This, he claims, led to a systemic violence as well as ‘counter 
violence of the struggle’ (2013:5).
The question is how the South African society can transcend 
its historical legacy of persistent violence. Could a cultural ethical 
response to the problem of cultural violence and a culture of 
violence contribute to the discourse on violence? Drawing on 
existing literature on violence and, in particular, taking its cue 
from Johan Galtung’s (1990) study on cultural violence, this 
chapter argues that the perceived culture of violence is abetted, 
in some instances, by cultural violence. Whereas certain violent 
acts such as robbery or common assault are products of the 
broader milieu of violence in the society, others are triggered by 
cultural forces and elements – most of which have strong 
historical roots.
The chapter therefore highlights the incidence of rape as an 
example of cultural violence, that is, a form of violence in the 
society which, in many cases, is sanctioned by aspects of culture 
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and which itself has developed into a subculture of violence. 
Although this study recognises that South Africa is not a 
homogeneous society, but that its diversity is marked by racial, 
socio-economic, ethnic, language, religion and other variations, 
it suggests that cultural ethical solutions be considered as a 
viable option in efforts to track and transcend problems of 




Although a universal social phenomenon, violence is viewed as a 
concept that is difficult to define, because it is seen as a socio-
cultural construct whose conception varies from one culture to 
another (Merry 2009:4–5; Hoffman & McKendrick 1990:6). 
People’s perception of what constitutes violence often differs, 
depending, for example, on whether the one who makes the 
judgement about the act is a victim, perpetrator or bystander. 
Hoffman and McKendrick (1990:3) note that, ‘Acts of violence 
deemed as legitimate in one society or in one cultural group in 
society may be considered illegitimate or culturally unacceptable 
in another’.93 The WHO Task Force on Violence and Health (WHO 
1996 in Emmett & Butchart 2000) states that: 
Violence is the intentional, threatened or actual use of physical force or 
power against oneself, another person, or against a group or community 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation. (p. 15)94
Thus, this study recognises the existence of various competing 
notions of violence, but accepts a broad definition of violence as 
93. See also Stewart and Strathern (2002:3).
94. Compare Levinson’s definition of violence (1989:39) as ‘an action of one or more other 
individuals that is meant to cause physical pain to one or more other individuals or nonhuman 
animals, or to destroy material property’.
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an act of violation in which force or coercion is used to cause 
injury or harm to a person or persons or to the personal space of 
another. Remarkably, in recent decades, the definition of violence 
has been broadened also to cover other forms of abuse or 
violation besides physical violence such as mental, psychological 
or emotional abuse and aggression (Merry 2009:181–182).
Approaches to the study of violence take their points of 
departure from various disciplines which include social 
anthropology, ethology, history, criminology, political science, 
religion and psychology, among others (Abbink 2000: xiii; 
Stewart & Strathern 2002:9). However, because violence is 
essentially a social phenomenon, most of its studies emanate 
from the social sciences. This chapter therefore draws data 
primarily from socio-anthropological findings in order to probe 
the prevalence of violence in South Africa and its ethical 
implications.
Types of violence
It is important to note that authors distinguish between various 
forms of violence. For instance, Hoffman and McKendrick 
(1990:4–6) categorise violence into, for instance, violent natural 
disasters or ‘acts of God’, and human violence. Human violence 
can be accidental or wilful, and wilful acts of violence can be 
legitimate or illegitimate. The distinction made between 
legitimate or illegitimate violence refers to acts of violence that 
are deemed justifiable or unjustifiable by either the law or the 
society, for example the extrajudicial use of torture. Of course, 
determining what constitutes legitimate violence is subjective 
and a contested topic just as the definition of violence itself. For 
instance, a revolutionary group and its supporters may justify the 
bombing of a public building with innocent people in it, whereas 
the government deems the act of violence illegal and, in turn, 
responds with what it regards as legitimate violence (Conteh-
Morgan 2004:70; Stewart & Strathern 2002:3–4). Actually, in 
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most situations where the State perpetrates violence, the 
violence is regarded as lawful and warranted, for instance in 
cases of torture or penalty in the form of corporal and capital 
punishment.
Additionally, wilful acts are characterised as those which are 
directed against persons or at property. When directed against 
persons, these could be interpersonal, intergroup or international 
(i.e. other than war). Interpersonal acts of violence include murder 
and manslaughter, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, 
burglary, larceny-theft, et cetera, whereas intergroup violence 
targets a particular group or groups of people as in military actions, 
xenophobic attacks, interethnic conflicts or what is perceived as 
terrorism. A similar classification of violence by the WHO 
distinguishes between interpersonal, self-directed and organised 
violence (WHO 1996, cited in Emmett & Butchart 2000:15). Other 
distinctions of violence include, among others, private or public, 
direct or indirect, and internal or external violence.
Also found in literature are designations for different forms of 
violence such as political violence (including riots, terrorism, 
lynching, vigilantism, xenophobic attacks, religious violence, and 
civil wars), family or domestic violence (spousal abuse, child 
abuse, female genital mutilation, honour killings and female 
feticide), sexual violence including gender-based violence such 
as rape, and media violence, etcetera. It is helpful to note that 
some of the acts of violence can be classified under more than 
one form of violence. For example, an act of rape is classified as 
sexual violence, but it could also come under family violence if it 
occurs in a family setting or it could be a political act if carried 
out in the context of war and used as a weapon of warfare. 
Structural or institutional violence (violence that is ingrained in 
institutions and structures of the society) and cultural violence 
(violence that is perpetrated in the name of culture) are also part 
of the designations of violence observed in literature. The issue 
of cultural violence is significant to the present discussion and 
will be expounded later in the chapter.
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Causes and factors
Various factors are adduced to the prevalence and perpetration 
of violence in society depending on the type of violence. 
However, at the root of many violent acts is conflict. Violence 
may erupt in a situation where there is conflict over who controls 
or distributes limited resources and where inequalities and 
needs-deprivation abound (Conteh-Morgan 2004:2, 277; 
Galtung 1990:294). Economic, cultural or racial factors that 
promote structural inequalities may result in violent acts within 
a society. Severe inequalities within a society could induce, for 
instance, political or ethnoreligious violence and terrorism. 
According to Hoffman and McKendrick (1990:14–21), causes of 
violence include psychological factors (e.g. human need to be 
aggressive), socio-psychological factors:
[T ]he assumption that acts and episodes of violence are located in 
the interactions between persons and other people in their human 
environment, based on the values and attitudes generated by 
them. (p. 18) 
Such values may include views and attitudes held about violence 
such as corporal and capital punishments or retribution and the 
need for self-defence (Hoffman & McKendrick 1990:19). Another 
cause of violence has to do with social-cultural factors ‘such as 
norms, based on beliefs and values; social structures; and 
institutional arrangements’. An example of such norms is 
children being taught to defend themselves in conflict situations 
(Hoffman & McKendrick 1990:19).
Further, social change due to industrialisation, Westernisation 
and modernisation often has direct effect on increase in social 
problems and, in particular, on family violence (Levinson 1989:63). 
Whereas mental behaviour and the use of psychoactive substances 
on the part of perpetrators also induce violent activities, historical 
factors play a central role in the eruption of violent behaviours, in 
particular, in respect of political and family violence, among others 
(Abbink 2000:xii; Hoffman & McKendrick 1990:20–21; Stewart & 
Strathern 2002:153). Thus, causes of violence are said to ‘include 
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basic features of social structure, cultural perceptions, power 
distributions, the emergence of “narratives of opposition” in which 
two sides nurture mutual distrust, and disputes over material 
resources’ (Stewart & Strathern 2002:10–11). In South Africa, the 
escalation of violent crimes has also been attributed to the 
ubiquitous presence of and accessibility to firearms and other 
weapons (Pandey 2012:139–140; Vorster 2013:2).
Impact of violence
The use of violence, whether individually or collectively, often 
has dire consequences for the society. It is widely recognised 
that violence easily begets violence. Individuals or groups tend 
to respond to aggression or force with greater or at least 
commensurate force. The result in the case of extreme violence 
is a society or family torn apart by conflict. Although the victims 
of violence experience its impact directly and personally, violence 
also creates indirect victims who are affected emotionally or 
financially in one way or another (Hoffman & McKendrick 
1990:24). Unfettered violence in society could result in the 
breakdown of law and order as well as various socio-economic 
losses. On interpersonal and family level, violence does disrupt 
individual lives and relationships resulting in fatalities and 
maiming in several cases. Violence leads to the violation of the 
victim, causing pain and devastation (Aijmer 2000:2). Often, the 
psychological and emotional trauma, which the victims of 
violence undergo, far outweighs the physical injury and pain. 
When violence becomes protracted and endemic, the society 
may become tolerant and gradually desensitised to its 
gruesomeness and impact. Its members inadvertently internalise 
violence and the outcome is what literature describes as a 
culture of violence. In South Africa, the level and prevalence of 
violence have also resulted in growing public fear as evidenced 
by the ubiquitous presence of high fences, electric gates, security 
guards and alarm systems in homes and other private or public 
buildings (Pandey 2012:147–148).
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Power relations
At issue in the discourse of violence is the notion of power and 
its role in the prevalence of violence in any given society. When 
violence such as political violence is collective, its underlying 
expression often is the imbalance in the existing power structures 
in the society which could be along class, gender or racial lines. 
In time, the underdog is pitched against the dominant class which 
benefits from the existing structures in a way that makes violence 
inevitable. Conteh-Morgan (2004) affirms that, in many 
developing regions:
Extreme inequality is an instigator of ethnoreligious and other 
tensions that could be politicised and transformed into rebellion. This 
situation of gross inequalities coupled with rapid population growth 
is often a recipe for more future insurgencies and attacks against the 
rich and powerful. (p. 277)
Thus, because power is, in many situations, unevenly distributed 
and abused, the underdog takes recourse in violence in a 
desperate bid to seek alternative strategies for survival and for 
constructing power.
In a number of societies, the power relation between the 
sexes is also uneven, as men and women are accorded different 
statuses and powers. Consequently, some men do use violence 
as a means of asserting the power which culture and history 
already bestowed on them when they perceive that they are 
losing power and control. Gender violence in the form of rape, 
domestic abuse, abduction, et cetera is then used to re-establish 
gender hierarchy and supremacy, to affirm mastery and to 
regain power. Blok (2000:33) affirms that, ‘Violence is 
interwoven with masculinity and the human body often serves 
as a cultural medium, as a source of metaphorical material to 
symbolise power relations.’ Again, the power dynamics that 
take a cue from patriarchal cultural systems could be 
strengthened by androcentric interpretations of religious texts 
which some men use to justify their use of violence to control 
and subdue women. Such interpretations would claim that the 
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Bible, for instance, endorses men’s subjugation of women based 
on the account of the creation and the Fall in Genesis 1–3 and on 
other texts. The man was created first, and the woman is 
regarded as the ‘weaker vessel’, because she was made out of 
the rib of the man and was the one tempted by the serpent in 
the Garden.
Uneven power relations along racial lines also exist in some 
societies where race is used as an organising principle. A dominant 
race employs its power to subdue and control the subordinate 
racial group(s). The latter therefore appropriates violence to 
subvert the power of the dominant group and as a survival tactic. 
A case in point is South Africa which has witnessed the persistence 
of violent activities in not only the apartheid, but also the post-
apartheid era. Although the use of violence by opposing parties 
was mutual during the apartheid regime, in the democratic 
dispensation the underprivileged races and classes have 
continued to employ violence to respond to structural violence 
manifesting in the extreme poverty and deprivation that they 
encounter daily.
Culture of violence or cultural violence?
In this discussion, a distinction is made between a culture of 
violence and cultural violence. A culture of violence is said to 
develop in a context where acts of violence are perpetrated with 
impunity and where ‘violence has now become an acceptable 
means of resolving social, political and even domestic conflicts’. 
In other words, protracted use of violence has consolidated itself 
into a culture (Pandey 2012:143, 137). However, it appears that 
the term culture of violence is sometimes used alternatively to 
refer to cultural violence.
According to Levinson (1989) who views the culture of 
violence theory in light of a dominant culture versus subcultures:
[T ]he theory suggests that some subcultural groups develop norms 
and values that emphasise the use of physical violence to a greater 
extent than is deemed appropriate by the dominant culture. (p. 16)
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He considers a culture of violence as one in which violence is 
an accepted way of life, and in which a particular subcultural 
group (e.g. a gang) sees violence and aggression as a normal 
way of resolving issues. For his part, Van der Merwe (2013) seems 
to use the term culture of violence interchangeably with cultural 
violence as he states:
The term ‘culture of violence’ implies two things about how society 
views violence: Firstly, violence is seen as normative rather than 
exceptional. Violence is seen as a normal response to addressing 
a problem, and therefore attracts little condemnation. Decisions 
to use violence are thus based on whether it works or not, rather 
than on whether it is justifiable or not. Secondly, violence is valued 
in  certain situations. Violence is seen as serving a positive social 
function (in addition to its instrumental value). In this formulation, 
violence thus becomes an effective and commonly used form 
of communication, and those who are good at this form of 
communication are valued members of society. (p. 74)
In other words, violence serves both a practical and a social 
function – it is a language of communication and of sending 
specific messages. However, as his discussion unfolds, Van der 
Merwe shifts from the use of the term culture of violence to 
cultural violence, noting that what he calls ‘culture of violence’ is 
what Johan Galtung refers to as ‘cultural violence’. In my view, a 
careful consideration of Galtung’s term would show that ‘culture 
of violence’ should be differentiated from ‘cultural violence’.
The term cultural violence was first used by Johan Galtung in 
his 1990 study on violence and peace. For Galtung (1990:291), 
‘“Cultural violence” is defined [...] as any aspect of a culture that 
can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or structural form.’ 
Galtung (1990) explains that:
By ‘cultural violence’ we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic 
sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, 
language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, 
mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or 
structural violence. Stars, crosses and crescents; flags, anthems and 
military parades; the ubiquitous portrait of the Leader; inflammatory 
speeches and posters – all these come to mind. (p. 291)
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Galtung’s definition clearly shows that only particular and not all 
aspects of culture play a role in the legitimisation of violence. It is 
also important to note that Galtung defines ‘cultural violence’ in 
the context of structural violence and direct violence. He (Galtung 
1990:294) argues that, like structural and direct violence, cultural 
violence is an overarching category of violence, and that all three 
form a ‘vicious’ triangle of violence in which cultural violence is the 
legitimiser of the other two. Further, Galtung (1990:296) outlines 
six cultural domains – religion and ideology, language and art, 
empirical and formal science – through which cultural violence 
operates, and illustrates how a cultural element from each domain 
can be used to legitimise direct or structural violence.
Chrissie Steenkamp (2005:253) who considers the persistence 
of high levels of violence such as crime and vigilantism in post-
accord societies, argues that protracted conflict in those societies 
has resulted in some ways in a culture of violence. Her (Steenkamp 
2005) definition of culture of violence indicates that:
[T ]here is a direct link between exposure to violence over a long 
period of time and acceptance of violence as a means to solve 
interpersonal conflict or deal with frustration in everyday life. (p. 254)
In other words, in post-accord societies such as South Africa, the 
persistence of violent conflicts has affected ‘society’s norms and 
values in such a way as to foster a greater social tolerance of 
individuals’ violent behaviour’ which has resulted in higher levels 
of violence, and that broader macro-processes often sanction 
the use of violence. However, the definition also overlaps in a 
way with Galtung’s cultural violence as she explains that, ‘[t]he 
concept emphasises that the use of violence becomes embedded 
in the broader shared values and norms of a community’ 
(Steenkamp 2005:254).
This chapter adopts Galtung’s definition of cultural violence as 
aspects of norms and values of a particular culture that are used to 
justify violence, but regards a culture of violence as one in which 
violence has been perpetrated for so long that it has become a 
Cultural violence or a culture of violence?
258
culture or an acceptable trend. Whereas cultural violence, which is 
classified as an overarching category of violence by Galtung, implies 
that certain cultural forces and elements shape and legitimise the 
use of violence in a society in a culture of violence, violence has 
become pervasive and a legitimate way of resolving issues. This is 
not to say that, in a culture of violence, cultural norms and values do 
not surface, because the violence itself, as Steenkamp has noted, 
could affect and shape such norms and values. The inference here 
is not that the term culture of violence should be viewed as a broad 
category of violence, but that a culture of violence may develop 
from any or all of the broad categories outlined by Galtung, namely 
structural violence, direct violence and cultural violence. That 
culture of violence may also produce and foster other forms of 
fresh violence in the society. At this point, it is helpful to consider 
the different manifestations of violence in South Africa.
Faces of violence in South Africa
Even though violence is widely attested as a universal 
phenomenon, the prevalence of violence in South Africa has 
elicited the remark by some commentators that the country has 
adopted violence as its ‘12th official language’ (Molopyane 2013, 
cited in Van der Merwe 2013:73). Violence in South Africa has 
deep historical roots which are traceable to its inglorious 
apartheid past when the State legitimised violence to subjugate 
the opposition which, in turn, countered the actions of the State 
with violence of its own. Besides the legacy of the apartheid era, 
several other factors are attributed to the high level and diverse 
manifestations of violence and criminality in the country. Reports 
show that, among others, the failure of the government to curb 
growing unemployment and inequality, inadequate policing and 
prosecution of crimes, illicit ownership of and access to guns, 
substance use among youths as well as weak institutions have 




Moreover, certain cultural beliefs and social norms do not 
support, but actually undermine the use of appropriate and 
legal actions to deal with violence against women (Hunter 
2006). In situations where the perpetrator is related to the 
victim, a culture of silence often prevails for various reasons 
such as the importance of preserving family unity and honour 
or privacy issues. Overall, it appears that society also has 
become somewhat desensitised to this persistent violence and 
its consequences.
Presently, structural violence manifesting as poverty, 
unemployment, racism, displacement or hunger is associated 
with South Africa, because it has one of the highest rates of 
income disparity in the world (Van der Merwe 2013:72). 
However, the country also has become a breeding ground for 
physical violence in various forms and unprecedented degrees. 
Violence in South Africa spans all aspects of society and is 
feasible on not only interpersonal and family levels, but also 
communal and State levels. It appears that the political 
violence, which was legitimised under the apartheid 
government, eventually paved way for criminal violence in the 
post-apartheid State, largely due to the high inequality in 
socio-economic structures. As in the past, violence in South 
Africa has therefore remained a form of communication, a way 
of conveying a message, of dealing with conflict as Van der 
Merwe (2013:68) has shown.
On communal and State levels, public violence surfaces 
daily in the form of, among other things, protests over service 
delivery, students’ dissatisfaction with policies and programmes, 
and strike actions. Rivalries and feuding between gangs and 
between taxi drivers’ groups in South Africa are often marked 
by violence, while xenophobic attacks have become more 
widespread in the aftermath of the 2008 occurrence in which 
at least 60 foreigners were killed in several incidents in different 
parts of the country (Van der Merwe 2013:71). Violent mob 
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action against criminals in the form of ‘necklacing’,95 lynching, 
vigilante killings and other gruesome acts that could result in 
the death or maiming of the victims, are witnessed frequently 
and mostly in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements 
(Pandey 2012:138). Prison violence, homophobic attacks on 
lesbians and gay men, terrorism or freedom fighting (depending 
on the perception), sports violence, arson and vandalism are 
also included in the reported incidents of public violence in 
the country (SAPS 2016). In several instances of public violence, 
the State responds with force to group violence which generates 
further violent actions. For example, on 16 August 2012, striking 
mineworkers protested against low wages at Lonmin platinum 
mine in Marikana, but the Lonmin management declared the 
protest illegal and called in the police. In the ensuing standoff 
between the officers of the SAPS and the mineworkers, 34 of 
the protesters were killed, while 78 were injured by police 
bullets. There was public outrage against the State as the action 
reminded the public of the activities of the apartheid police.96
On interpersonal levels, attacks on white farmers have become 
rampant, but not nearly as armed robbery, aggravated assault, 
mugging, hijacking and burglary incidents as well as bullying in 
school settings. Instances of ritual killings and mutilations, which 
are culturally linked, also occur in some parts of the country. 
In  family settings, spousal and child abuse, familicides and 
(attempted) suicides are some of the commonest acts of violence. 
However, acts of rape, either by known or unknown assailants, 
have surpassed any other form of gender or family-based 
violence reported in South Africa which notably has one of the 
highest incidences and records of rape globally (Statistics South 
Africa 2000:1; Van der Merwe 2013:69).
95. Necklacing is a street term, used in South Africa, to describe a kind of mob justice in 
which a suspected criminal is executed by placing a used tyre on his or her neck (like a 
necklace) before lighting him or her up. 
96. See Pandey (2012:138–140) on the role of the State in escalating violence during the 
apartheid period. Pandey (2012:141) reiterates that, in the apartheid era, violence (militarism) 
‘became an accepted way of expressing discontent and frustration’ in the society.
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Rape and its ugly faces
Media headlines are awash with heartbreaking news of rape 
cases across the country on a daily basis. The endemic character 
of the act of rape is considered a national crisis and a priority 
crime, because, every 36 seconds, at least one woman is raped 
in the country.97 Any imaginable form of rape is witnessed in 
South Africa. Men are raped by men (especially in prison) and by 
women, while women are raped by men, and aged women and 
grandmothers are raped by young men. Children and infants98 
(as young as 1-month-old) are raped by older men who could be 
family members, neighbours, caregivers, teachers, friends, 
colleagues and strangers. Sometimes, lesbians are also (gang-)
raped in an act that is termed corrective rape which is meant to 
‘correct’ what the rapists regard as the victims’ perverted 
behaviour. In the rural practice of ukuthwala (Wood 2005:313–314) 
in which young girls are abducted for marriage (mostly in parts 
of the former Transkei), rape also becomes an inevitable 
outcome. Group rape, an occurrence common among young 
people and ritualised in some settings, often has cultural 
underpinnings (Wood 2005:304–315). A major fallout of the rape 
pandemic is the increase in the spread of AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases. The use of weapons and physical force by 
the perpetrators to threaten and to harm their targets also 
implies that the rape survivor would invariably suffer physical 
injury besides the psychological and emotional trauma she 
endures.
The horrendous nature of most of the statutory rape cases is 
brought home by the recent abduction and murder of a three-
year-old girl, Courtney Pieters, in the Cape Town area early in 
97. According to the SAPS (2016:43–44), 41 903 rapes were reported in 2015–2016 which 
implies that at least three times that figure were unreported cases, as analysts claim that only 
one in four cases of rape is reported. 
98. Data from a 2001 report by the SAPS shows that in 41% of rape cases in the country, 
children and infants are the victims (LoBaido 2001). For more on child sexual violence and a 
historical overview of the politics of sexual violence in South Africa, read Posel (2005:140–150).
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May 2017. The little girl was raped twice before she was murdered 
by her abductor, the 40-year-old Mortimer Saunders, who was a 
tenant and neighbour of her parents. In another incident, a 
16-year-old girl, Franziska Blöchliger, who was jogging in the 
forest of Tokai in Cape Town was raped, robbed of her mobile 
phone and jewellery, and strangled to death by an unknown 
assailant later identified as 28-year-old Howard Oliver, a married 
father of two children. Media and police reports show that 
schoolboys rape their fellow female schoolmates and document 
the act with their mobile phone cameras. Clergymen rape young 
girls (and boys). Young girls are kept as sex slaves by drug 
barons and powerful men of the underworld.99
The reports on the rape of women are equally endless. In 2015, 
two couples, relaxing in Rhodes Park in the Johannesburg area, 
were accosted by three men who raped the two women, 
murdered their husbands and dumped the bodies in a nearby 
dam. In another incident, a 26-year-old Nelspruit man was 
sentenced to 24 years in prison for raping his 86-year-old 
grandmother in 2012. In a most recent act, Hannah Cornelius, a 
21-year-old Stellenbosch University student, was hijacked in the 
company of a male friend, abducted, raped and stabbed to death 
by four men who have since been arrested by the police (News24 
2016a; 2016b; 2017c). Daily media reports of acts of sexual 
violence against women are too numerous to mention even 
though incidents of sexual violence in the country are on the 
whole underreported (Statistics South Africa 2000:6; Vorster 
2013:1, 5).
Pandey (2012:143) affirms that, overall, a culture of violence, 
which had developed during South Africa’s turbulent history, has 
persisted in the post-apartheid society, especially given that 
perpetrators are no longer severely punished. Thus, we assume 
that the high frequency as well as the brutal nature of the rape 
cases indicates that these criminal acts are a product of a culture 
99. Read online reports of incidents from News24 (2017a; 2017b).
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of violence that pervades the entire nation.100 Importantly, 
cultural and misogynistic forces also play active roles in many of 
these rape acts. Clearly, rape is an act of direct violence to the 
extent that certain cultural forces, which contribute to its 
perpetration, can be regarded as cultural violence. Aspects of 
culture are used to justify rape and sexual assault, and the cultural 
presumption in some circles is that these are normal male 
behaviours and should not be taken too seriously, because, after 
all, ‘boys will be boys’. However, this study does not presuppose 
that all acts of rape are culturally motivated, but it highlights 
forms of rape, specifically of females, that base their expression 
on cultural sanctions because of their prevalence in the country 
and as an illustration of cultural violence.
The increase in the rape of children and infants has been 
blamed on a cultural myth which claims that men can be cured of 
HIV infection if they have sex with a young virgin. Another 
element of culture that helps to legitimise sexual violence against 
women in some parts of the country is the belief that young boys 
who undergo initiation rites through circumcision are obliged to 
assert their masculinity by engaging in sex with a female in order 
to establish their new status in society. The practice of ukuthwala 
is also undoubtedly a cultural phenomenon and, because it 
entails the sexual violation of the abducted ‘bride’, it is classifiable 
as cultural violence. In these scenarios, sexual violence is 
ritualised.
The power dynamics at play in an act of rape are often clearly 
rooted in patriarchal and cultural norms that support male 
dominance of women who are expected to be passive and 
submissive in a gender hierarchical order that subordinates them 
to men and portrays them as sexual objects. Such norms 
encourage men to sexually assert the power bestowed on them 
by culture and, if necessary, in a physically violent way. However, 
100. Wood (2005:305) affirms that, ‘Rape was a widely used weapon in the wars waged in 
Southern Africa by the apartheid regime and its allies.’
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a problem arises when cultural elements are used to sanction 
ethically unsound practices – society descends into a state of moral 
atrophy and ethical bankruptcy. Of course, it is easy to assume 
that, because rape does not occur in a cultural vacuum, but cultural 
elements are employed to legitimise its manifestation, then most 
members of the society are complicit. On the contrary, perpetrators 
merely exploit weak and unquestioned misogynistic norms to 
legitimise their heinous deeds in the name of patriarchal power 
and authority. Their actions are not representative of what 
society stands for, but are products of a violent subculture. This 
statement agrees with the view noted earlier that, in a violent 
subculture, norms and values that emphasise the use of physical 
violence are developed by subcultural groups and do not 
constitute the dominant norms and values (Levinson 1989:16, 41).
In what follows I shall offer a brief sketch of a possible ethical 
response to the incessant wave of rape terror that daily sweeps 
through South Africa.
Ethical response to the culture of rape
Various interventions and strategies have been proffered and 
are being implemented to curb violence and to minimise its 
impact in the society. Existing literature on violence also 
contains recommendations from multidisciplinary perspectives 
in this regard. However, in practical terms, outcry against rape 
in the society has been limited mostly to women’s groups and 
female activists who express their horror through picketing, 
marches and rallies. Many women participate actively in the 
international campaign tagged ‘16 Days of Activism against 
Gender-Based Violence’. In several communities, women’s 
groups such as the African National Congress Women’s League 
hold placards and chant songs in front of courthouses to 
support victims of rape and other gender-based violence, and 
to decry the activities of perpetrators. But, on the whole, similar 
acts of outrage against sexual violence on the part of men in 
the society, are missing.
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Further, the government of South Africa has adequate policies 
that address violence and sexual violence in particular, but most 
cases of criminal violence are not prosecuted, and when they are, 
the conviction rates are rather low. The lack of deterrence 
therefore encourages perpetrators to continue their dastardly 
acts with impunity (cf. Steenkamp 2005:259). If the government 
also makes concerted efforts to ensure reduction in structural 
violence, represented by hunger, poverty, unemployment, 
endemic diseases and other ills, it will predictably lead to 
significant reduction in the level of direct and cultural violence.
However, the problem of cultural violence and, in particular, of 
sexual violence is not caused by the government. It is primarily a 
social problem that demands a home-grown solution. This study 
holds that a socio-ethical approach to tackling (sexual) violence 
in South Africa has the potential to offer preventative measures 
that would produce enduring impact on society. Can ethics then 
be brought into dialogue with the violent subcultures that deprive 
many members of society, especially women and children, of 
their dignity and peace? What kind of ethics will adequately 
address the moral ills of an African society such as South Africa? 
It is supposed here that cultural options must be sought to 
combat violence that thrives under the guise of cultural sanctions. 
In what follows, I shall briefly make a case for a cultural ethical 
solution to the problems of cultural violence such as rape.
What kind of ethics?
A number of scholars have noted that Western ethical models, 
which they claim is influenced substantially by Socratic and 
Aristotelian ethics, is inadequate to account for the African 
understanding of life and morality. The idea of a global or 
universal ethics, as proposed by Hans Küng, has also been faulted 
and considered inadequate for addressing African ethical issues 
(Bujo 2011; Ezekwonna 2005:208, 225). Those scholars therefore 
call for a coherent theory of African ethics that is able to address 
issues of morality at various levels of communal life on 
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the continent. That ethics has to be grounded in the community. 
The ‘community is regarded as the starting point in African 
ethics, because the people’s moral values are rooted in the 
community’ (Bujo 2011:1–2; Kunhiyop 2008:8; Okeja 2013:69–70). 
Elsewhere, we have affirmed that, because the community is a 
starting point in African ethics, a communitarian ethics is 
more  helpful in addressing ethical issues in an African society 
(Olojede 2015:1–6). Some commentators have further shown that 
the relational concept of ubuntu (which says, ‘I am because 
we are’) is ‘pivotal not only to Africa’s community life, but also 
to  its  ethics’ (Okeja 2013:75), and that other communitarian 
values  including respect, hospitality, friendliness, integrity and 
generosity are derived from ubuntu.
If the central issue in African ethics is relatedness or relationality 
(that is, as encapsulated by ubuntu), then the point that its focus 
is on a social rather than a personal ethics101 can therefore be 
regarded as valid. Because violence or sexual violence, in 
particular, disrupts family unity and tears the fabric of the society, 
it disregards the value of relationality. The perpetrator is 
completely fixated on what he considers a ‘legitimate’ cause 
based on his belief in some opaque subcultural elements and 
refuses to see that his action contradicts the fundamentals of 
social ethics – which is an ubuntu that is informed by hospitality 
and respect for others. His action possibly ruins a life, a family or 
a relationship, but he lacks understanding that ‘he is because his 
victims are’. The network of relationships is broken by one 
individual’s senseless and perverse act who fails to realise that, 
by wounding others, he is undoing himself. Sexual violence, 
specifically the rape that hinges its effectiveness on cultural 
norms, violates the ethics that is founded on ubuntu. Whatever 
subcultural elements are being used to legitimise sexual violence 
in any of its forms, should therefore be viewed as an anti-
community and anti-relational ethos and the violence itself as an 
anti-community action. They should be expunged.




It is incumbent on society to reformulate and reinforce communal 
ethos in order to counteract the existing negative norms that are 
being sustained by few at the expense of the many members of 
society who are daily traumatised by violent crimes. 
A communitarian ethics is an ethics of care which means it has 
utilitarian values that can be tapped to dismantle the subcultural 
forces behind rape and other forms of (sexual) violence in the 
society. Fostering that ethics of care and of communality, would 
be an appropriate step to take in these critical times.
An ethical response to the social challenge of violence and 
criminality that takes its point of departure from an African 
communitarian ethics would therefore begin not at the top, but at 
the bottom. Of necessity, it must carry out its task from the 
grassroots and family levels, and unpacking the nuances of that 
ethics is a corporate task that must involve all, including (potential) 
perpetrators and their targets. In essence, it would require active 
input on the part of men – many of whom only show apathy 
towards the danger that untethered violence poses to the well-
being and future of society. Unexamined assumptions about 
cultural values and norms, which are destructive, in essence, and 
violate the fundamentals of ubuntu, must also be probed and 
censored. The positive impact of an ethics founded on ubuntu, 
may not have been realised in the post-apartheid South Africa 
where many values, which were central to society, have been 
eroded by its historical experiences, because the possibilities, 
embedded in such an ethics, have not been adequately probed, 
taught or propounded. Such an ethics must raise pedagogical 
questions that need to be answered – in classrooms, at family 
dinner tables, in academic discourses, in church forums, at imbizos, 
inside lekgotlas, at young men’s initiation schools and at any youth 
forums in which the rudiments of what it means to be a relational 
being can be taught in a systematic and formal fashion. The impact 
of that ethics would produce the kind of social change that should 
lead to a culture of peace and security in the nation.
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This scholarly book focuses on important and burning ethical themes debated, 
informed and developed by South African social scientists. The ethics, represented 
in the book, reflects the multi-dimensionality of the unique South African context. 
The book challenges conventional borders and, from a South African perspective, 
shows that ethical study can be a rich and rewarding experience. It intends to add 
value – locally and globally – to scholars engaged in these matters. We have a 
shortage of academic books on these very specific and important issues grouped 
together in one volume – specifically written from a diverse but inclusive South 
African perspective. 
Professor Andries G. van Aarde, Commissioning Editor AOSIS Scholarly Books 
and Emeritus Professor University of Pretoria, South Africa 
What an interesting and exiting book this is! Good academic language and excellent 
critical and innovative thinking and reasoning. The title is succinctly and descriptive 
to the content of the book. This contribution participates in the process of trying 
to reflect scientifically and academically on sensitive acute issues that occur in 
the South African context. The authors have linked their discussion and reasoning 
with global perspectives as a mechanism not only to compare, but also to situate 
the issue of discussion in perspective and to contextualise it. The book is relevant 
in the racially charged social landscape of South Africa and deals with important 
recent developments that affect various kinds of relations and relationships. The 
authors are from different academic disciplines such as philosophy, theology, 
economics and the Institute for African Renaissance Studies. They managed to 
discuss the relevant hampering South African issues in perspective. It creates a 
platform for further and future discourse and understanding. The audience would 
be political theorists, sociologists, social activists, social scientists, economists, 
experts in journalism, medical scientists, theologians and psychologists.
Professor Dirk G. van der Merwe, Department of Christian Spirituality, 
Church History and Missiology, School of Humanities, 
University of South Africa, South Africa
